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Benjamin C. Kinney, Jabali108 (commenter), Jayarāśi, Neocarvaka (commenter), Ramachandra1008 (commenter), religion, T.R. (Thill) Raghunath
This week, another foray into the debate over “common sense.” Apologies in advance to those readers who are not interested in this particular topic, or who will find this post’s precision rough going. Common-sense advocate Thill has been by far this blog’s most prolific commenter, and I think advancing the debates in the comments requires taking his views on directly and systematically. Moreover, I think the topic is an important one in its own right. The claims made by Thill, Jabali108, Neocarvaka and Ramachandra1008 in their comments, if they were true, would rule out the vast majority of South Asian philosophical thought (and a great more besides): probably all the philosophy originating in the subcontinent except for the shadowy Cārvāka-Lokāyata school of thought. Only the Cārvākas can be thought to completely exclude “religious” ideas from their worldview; but there is little if anything left to be learned from this school now, since all we have from them is the scantest of fragments. (The only surviving complete text attributed to a Cārvāka is Jayarāśi’s Tattvopaplavasiṃha, which these commenters have already dismissed as not really a Cārvāka text.) If South Asian thought is worth bothering with at all, then we’ll need to defend those conceptions of the world that are in some respects at odds with various elements of “common sense” – which, according to Thill, excludes all “religion.”
As I did last week, I will assume that my readers have read the two posts that preceded this one on the subject; I will not assume that you have read the comments to those posts. In his first comment, Thill very helpfully gives us his definitions of three key terms whose meanings have so far been elusive in this debate:
The word “plausible” also has the meaning “worthy of being accepted as true or reasonable” and this is exactly sense in which I am using that word. Interpreting “plausible” in terms of “apparent truth”, as Amod does, is at odds with this sense.
The word “reliable” means “credible; trustworthy; dependable.” That which is plausible (= worthy of being accepted as true or reasonable) is, therefore, also reliable in this sense.
The word “infallible” means “indubitable; exempt from and incapable of error”. That which is true is also infallible. Truth excludes error and doubt. Hence, knowledge of truth also excludes error and doubt. Therefore, truth and knowledge of truth are infallible.
The distinction made here was surprising to me. As it is described here, the distinction between infallibility (on one hand) and plausibility or reliability (on the other) appears to be a distinction between truth and justification. If something is infallible, that means that it is actually true. If it is merely plausible or reliable, that in turn means that it is worthy of being accepted as true, worthy of our trust, credible, believable – that is, we are justified in believing it. Plausibility and reliability are about justification, not truth as such. And there must be a distinction between the two, for Thill’s entire argument depends on there being a significant difference between infallibility and reliability (or plausibility), and with these terms defined thus, that requires a distinction between justification and truth. If we are only justified in believing those things that are actually true, then only the infallible (that which must be true) is reliable (that which we are justified in believing); but that is exactly what Thill’s argument requires him to deny. For Thill there must exist some claims which are reliable but not infallible; and according to the definitions above, these are claims which are at least potentially false but which we are nevertheless justified in believing. (Unless, of course, the ground of these definitions shifts beneath our feet.) If we are never justified in believing false things, then the distinction between reliability and infallibility – as expressed here – collapses.
So assuming the distinction between truth and justification in this way (thus allowing for the distinction between infallibility and reliability), let us continue to “common sense” – in Thill’s definition of the term, as beliefs which can be learned by human beings without special training (which has also not yet been defined). Thill, as I understand it, wishes to claim that common sense is “worthy of being accepted as true or reasonable” and “credible; trustworthy; dependable” – qua common sense. That is, insofar as something can be learned without specialized training, it is worthy of being accepted as true or reasonable.
Now, let me return to my favourite counterexample. Since we learn without specialized training, from the evidence of our senses, that the sun goes up and down as a thrown baseball does, this fact clearly belongs to common sense as Thill defines it. (And I will reiterate that if common sense merely tells us that the sun appears to go up and down, then it must be superseded by specialized training when it comes to the actual truth, for it tells us only about appearances and not truth. If common sense is to have any of the philosophical weight claimed for it, certainly if it is to be considered reliable, then it must tell us about reality and not merely appearance.) It is for that reason – it has been in response to this claim – that Thill has already accepted or at least implied, repeatedly, that common sense is not infallible. As must be the case, for in this case the conclusions of common sense are simply false.
Now what of reliability and plausibility? If common sense qua common sense is “worthy of being accepted as true or reasonable” and “credible; trustworthy; dependable,” this too must include the false claim that the sun literally rises and falls. Thill introduces the distinction between infallibility on one hand, and reliability or plausibility on the other, in order to claim that every single common-sense claim is, if not infallible, still reliable and plausible. But this set of claims includes the claim that the sun rises and falls. The claim of the sun’s rising and falling, because it is a member of the set of commonsense claims, must therefore be considered “worthy of being accepted as true or reasonable” and “credible; trustworthy; dependable” – even though we have already agreed it to be false. We cannot avoid such absurdities so long as we consider a commonsense claim “worthy of being accepted as true or reasonable” merely on the grounds that it is common sense. (And if you don’t like this example, I reiterate that if common sense is indeed not infallible, there must be cases where it is wrong, and those cases may be substituted here mutatis mutandis.)
Now several of the critiques that the commenters have made to my posts have suggested that they assume common sense is all or nothing: if I say (as I have) that common sense as a category is not reliable, that must imply that every member of the category is unreliable. But, as Ben has rightly and repeatedly noted, this assumption is a pretty basic logical mistake. I have never said that everything which falls in Thill’s category of “common sense” is false, or even that most of it is. I am merely saying this: the bare fact that a claim falls within the category of common sense is insufficient reason to consider the claim worthy of being accepted as true or reasonable. Each claim must be accepted on its own merits, based on the variety of sources of knowledge we have available to us (logic, perception, trustworthy authority). The fact that something is learned without specialized training does not make it worthy of belief, any more than the fact that it is learned with specialized training.
This point (in addition to brevity) is why I entitled the earlier post “lack of training is not reliable” rather than “beliefs achieved without training are not reliable.” Some beliefs obtained without specialized training are indeed reliable, in the sense discussed here; but their reliability does not stem from the absence of specialized training. I reiterate: the fact of a belief’s being learned without specialized training does not make that belief worthy of being accepted as true or reasonable – let alone actually make the belief true.
One further note: So far I have been pushing ahead with objections to the common-sense advocates’ views and their logical flaws. I have not yet addressed a central objection that they have made to my view: that ways of knowing other than common sense (such as science) themselves depend for their reliability on common sense itself. This point should be addressed, especially given some of the claims I have just made in this post, and I intend to do so. (Ben has already made some important points on the topic.) I intend to take it up in a post soon, but this one is already long enough. Let us discuss the matters here in the meantime.
I’ll address other points later (I look forward to responses from other commentators as well.) but I want to make a brief response to two points:
1. Common Sense Realism and South Asian Philosophy: I don’t think it is accurate to claim that common sense realism, which hinges on the view that sense perception and the operations of the “Buddhi” or intellect yield knowledge of the world, would “would rule out the vast majority of South Asian philosophical thought”.
The reason is that the major schools of philosophical thought in India, e.g., Sankhya, Nyaya-Vaisesika, Mimamsa, Visistadvaita, Dvaita, even an early school of Buddhist philosophy (Sarvāstivāda, which affirmed ‘the existence of all dharmas in the past, present and future, the ‘three times’) are all committed to the reliability of sense perception and reasoning, and, by implication and even explicit avowal, common sense realism.
Now many of the representative texts of some of these schools hold that theistic or other metaphysical claims do not contradict common sense knowledge based on sense perception and reasoning.
In fact, Madhvācārya, a thirteenth century Indian philosopher in the Dviata or “dualist” school, maintains that the reliability of perception and reasoning is a necessary condition of understanding the metaphysical import of the Vedas! The common sense knowledge of the plurality of selves and objects is a foundation of his metaphysics!
So, the espousal of theistic or metaphysical claims in these traditions does not imply that they rejected common sense knowledge.
Their arguments for common sense realism and their refutations of views they considered at odds with common sense realism and the means of arriving at common sense knowledge are still worthy of study and especially so if we are advocates of that view.
Indeed, if we are advocates of common sense philosophy, we would also benefit from a study of arguments in the Indian tradition which attack the reliability of sense perception and reasoning.
So, I remain puzzled by Amod’s view that the appeal to common sense knowledge “would rule out the vast majority of South Asian philosophical thought”.
South Asian philosophical thought is ill-served by making it look as though a great deal of it is opposed to the appeal to common sense, to the appeal to ordinary ways of knowing. Contrary to the impression one may get from attending conferences and reading journals on south Asian philosophy, Advaita and Madhyamika are hardly the best representatives of South Asian philosophical thought.
2. Sunrise and Sunset Again and Again:
Illusions are not delusions and as Austin pointed out in his trenchant critique of Ayer’s theory of “sense-data”, the “argument from illusion” tends to mistakenly assimilate optical illusions in the category of delusions.
Sunrise and sunset are exactly what to expect if there is rotation of the earth! So, there is nothing delusive or “unreliable” about seeing sunrise and sunset! Every astronomer knows that.
So, what exactly is the problem raised by seeing sunrise and sunset? Nothing! In just the way there is no problem with seeing a bent stick in water. In fact, if we didn’t see a bent stick when it is immersed in water, there would be something wrong with our perception!
That there is sunrise and sunset is an incorrigible item of common sense knowledge.
This knowledge that there is sunrise and sunset must not be conflated with knowing how there is sunrise and sunset. The latter pertains to a correct explanation of sunrise and sunset. We can also ask why or how the stick immersed in water looks bent.
Now, in the case of the bent stick, human beings are able to know that they are seeing, as they must to do so given the laws of refraction, etc., a bent stick but that the stick is not really bent by taking it out of the water and making some elementary inferences.
But how could human beings figure out in this fashion that sunrise and sunset are due to the rotation of the earth and that the sun actually does not revolve around the earth? Obviously, they could not transport themselves to a observation post outside the earth to ascertain this!
So, the fact that human beings were tempted to think that sunrise and sunset was due to the revolution of the sun around the earth is entirely understandable and this unusual instance provides no adequate basis on which to make sweeping judgments about the “unreliability” of common sense knowledge.
In any case, human beings have figured out that sunrise and sunset are due to the rotation of the earth and so it is a mistake to talk as though they are still committed to the explanation that sunrise and sunset are due to the motion of the sun every time they see sunrise or sunset.
We can also talk of the apparent sizes of things in contrast to their real sizes. It is common sense knowledge that big ships and planes can appear small if they are a great distance from the observer. This common sense knowledge was developed in science to understand that the Sun, moon, planets, and stars are much larger than they appear to be. Of course, there is nothing delusive in seeing their small size. That’s inevitable given their distances. And these cases hardly provide a basis to conclude that perception is not reliable. In fact, perception would not be reliable if they did not appear small!!!
The central distinction is between what is perceived and the explanation of why what is perceived is the way it is. A correct understanding of the latter is largely the domain of science.
“This knowledge that there is sunrise and sunset must not be conflated with knowing how there is sunrise and sunset. The latter pertains to a correct explanation of sunrise and sunset. We can also ask why or how the stick immersed in water looks bent.”
There’s something I’m not understanding about the definition and borders of common sense. <a href"http://loveofallwisdom.com/2011/07/is-common-sense-merely-plausible/#comment-9421"Your past comments have certainly included the operations of reasoning and intelligence as part of common sense. Why does this instance not fall into that same category?
Ack, sorry about that link. I had meant to point here.
Thill, do you or do you not agree that common sense is fallible? If you do, then by definition there are cases in which it is wrong. Sunrise and sunset is only one vivid example of these; other examples may be substituted. You already tried to dispute the example in the previous post, and I already replied: if you don’t like the example you may substitute your own example of cases in which common sense is wrong – for if you have agreed that common sense is fallible then you have agreed that there are such cases. I reiterated this point above as well, in the hopes that attention could remain focused on the salient issue. The point in the post is, given any case in which common sense is wrong, to call common sense “plausible but not infallible” or “reliable but not infallible” in the sense in which you have described those terms is to say that in such cases, where common sense is wrong, we should still believe it anyway.
It therefore contributes little to this discussion to argue over that particular example unless you wish to claim one of the following three things:
1. This example of common sense’s wrongness is different from others, in a way significant to the larger point which you have not yet explained.
2. The defence of common sense that you use with this example applies mutatis mutandis to every other example of common sense’s wrongness, in a way you have also not yet explained.
3. Contrary to pretty much everything you have already said on the topic, you are now going to go back and claim that common sense is in fact always infallible after all.
So unless you are making one of these three claims, your attacks on the example only avoid the problem. If you are, please explain which, and why.
(So having said all that, I’m putting the following point in parentheses to highlight the fact that the defence of that example is a tangential point, and should not be focused on at expense of the larger argument, again unless you’re going to make one of the three claims above about its relevance to that argument. Your defence of common sense on sunrise/sunset remains flawed in the same way it has always been. Training in astronomy tells us that given the earth’s rotation we should perceive sunrise and sunset; it does not tell us that the sun really does go up and down, quite the opposite. Without that training, what we learn from common sense – ie inference merely from sense perception – is not merely that the sun appears to go up and down, but that it really does. The movement in the sun in the sky appears to follow exactly the same kind of curved arc that a thrown baseball does; without the training of astronomy, it is a commonsense inference to explain that movement by the same explanation one gives for the baseball’s movement, to say that the sun goes up and down as the baseball does. Or are you going to now try to say that common sense has only to do with appearances and not explanations? You seem to be going in that direction at the end of your comment. But if so, common sense no longer functions as a criticism of the likes of Madhyamaka; for Madhyamaka too provides us with the two-truths doctrine as an explanation of our perceptions. You can criticize that explanation, but insofar as common sense has to do only with appearances and explanations, such criticism is no longer a defence of common sense against specialized training but merely a defence of one type of training against another.)
Sorry, I missed the point where you said you were going to reply to other points later. So if there’s a tone of irritation in the above comment that suggests you’re willfully ignoring the larger point, it is not called for and I apologize – at least assuming that you are going to get back to that larger point.
Re South Asia, you have claimed here: “However, since the essence of religion is supernaturalism (there is no known system of religious belief and practice which does not countenance some supernatural entities, processes, and events) and since common sense undermines supernaturalism, common sense undermines the essence of religion. I don’t think one could reasonably espouse any of the extant systems of religious belief and at the same time consistently appeal to common sense.”
Since these systems all have as a central tenet karma-rebirth (Sarvāstivāda), God (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita), the infallibility of the Veda (Mīmāṃsā) and/or an eternal nonphysical soul (Sāṃkhyā), they are all positing something supernatural, “religious.” By your lights they are therefore at odds with common sense.
Perhaps more fundamentally, if common sense refutes so much philosophical speculation, why bother reading philosophy in the first place? You already know the answers.
“Since these systems all have as a central tenet karma-rebirth (Sarvāstivāda), God (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita), the infallibility of the Veda (Mīmāṃsā) and/or an eternal nonphysical soul (Sāṃkhyā), they are all positing something supernatural, “religious.” By your lights they are therefore at odds with common sense.”
By any “lights”, assuming that they are not dim, these claims are at odds with common sense knowledge. However, as I have acknowledged earlier, common sense knowledge is not exhaustive of reality since we are not omniscient.
What does not contradict common sense knowledge should be considered if there is a good argument for it. If a claim contradicts common sense knowledge, then it’s either false or probably false. This depends on whether the claim contradicts an infallible item of common sense knowledge or a highly probable item of common sense knowledge.
If a claim violates the conceptual structure of common sense, e.g., identity (identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle are parts of what I call common sense conceptual structure), then it is really unintelligible.
“Perhaps more fundamentally, if common sense refutes so much philosophical speculation, why bother reading philosophy in the first place? You already know the answers.”
In this context, you may want to read what Kant has said about the history of philosophy. It appears that your conception of philosophy has been shaped by your reading of metaphysics to the extent that you seem to identify philosophy with metaphysics. I have repeatedly, and unsuccessfully it seems, pointed out to you that there is more to philosophy than metaphysics even in the works of a Plato or Aristotle.
The twentieth century has witnessed a revolution in philosophy and its methods initiated by the work of Wittgenstein, Moore, Austin, Ryle, and Strawson. I don’t know how familiar you are with their central writings, but any acquaintance with them should put to rest any doubts on the value of doing philosophy which is not metaphysically oriented.
As a too-brief response: most of my doubts on the value of doing metaphysical philosophy come from reading the likes of Wittgenstein, Ayer, Moore, and their progeny in the analytical school. Every glance I take at their work convinces me more of the value of metaphysics.
Metaphysics has become a substitute-religion for those who don’t subscribe to a religion. This explains the rise of idealism in the West in the nineteenth century with the waning of Christian belief.
The common factor in religion, and its outgrowth, metaphysics, is the deep need for the making the universe congenial. In idealism, it took the bizarre way of identifying the universe with the human mind and/or its contents. Since it is all “mind-stuff”, we can be completely at home in it.
Since the impulse driving both religion and metaphysics is a deep emotional need, neither can be unseated or dislodged from a human breast merely by force of argument or reason.
Er, that should say most of my doubts on the value of doing non-metaphysical philosophy, as the second sentence implies. The philosophies in question are so poorly thought out and so devoid of valuable content that they make the value of metaphysics stand out clearly in comparison.
I am waiting with bated breath for an example of a metaphysical claim, a demonstration of its awesome “reliability”, and a vindication of its value. Perhaps, any of the members of the “Metaphysics Party” on this blog can provide one.
“Since these systems all have as a central tenet karma-rebirth (Sarvāstivāda), God (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita), the infallibility of the Veda (Mīmāṃsā) and/or an eternal nonphysical soul (Sāṃkhyā), they are all positing something supernatural, “religious.” By your lights they are therefore at odds with common sense.”
All these are claims you have said (or implied)you don’t subscribe to! I am not clear on what grounds though and why you still think they have value since you also think they are false.
Yes, seeing sunrise and sunset doesn’t show the “unreliability” of perception. On the contrary, this is a case of reliable perception since the rotation of earth generates sunrise and sunset.
What has turned out to be wrong is the traditional explanation of sunrise and sunset. That was an error of reasoning, of thinking.
What about Moonrise and Moonset?
All this talk of common sense has me thinking of another reason why Jayarāśi really is a Cārvāka. He does actually accept common sense in the everyday context. His attack on philosophy is a roundabout defense of common sense, but it is not a *philosophical* defense of common sense of the kind that seems to be sought on this blog. His attempt to expose the self-refuting nature of philosophical argument is done without putting forward any philosophical justification for common sense at all. Like a Pyrrhonist, he seems to think you could live according to common sense without attempting to “vindicate” it or even think it’s true, reliable or plausible in any robust philosophical sense. This is how I interpret my favorite Jayarāśi quote: “When, in this way, the principles are entirely destroyed, all everyday practices are made delightful, because they are not deliberated.”
Paradoxically enough, Jayarāśi might be more of a defender of common sense than traditional Cārvākas! How could you possibly give a philosophical vindication of common sense? Doing so seems to bring you right out of common sense, unless you take the philosophically problematic route that common sense vindicates itself. So just to provoke our esteemed “common sensers”, I’ll claim that Jayarāśi is more of a Cārvāka than anyone else!
I. “His attempt to expose the self-refuting nature of philosophical argument is done without putting forward any philosophical justification for common sense at all.”
What about his philosophical arguments against other philosophical arguments? They would also be “self-refuting” if philosophical argument has a “self-refuting nature”.
II. “When, in this way, the principles are entirely destroyed, all everyday practices are made delightful, because they are not deliberated.”
What is the relation between deliberation and taking delight in “everyday practices”? Why should deliberation detract from taking delight in everyday practices?
“he seems to think you could live according to common sense without attempting to “vindicate” it or even think it’s true, reliable or plausible in any robust philosophical sense.”
Obviously, everyone, including the skeptic, lives according to common sense, on pain of death or loss of limb. Common sense and our irrevocable adherence to it is neither augmented nor undermined by philosophical argument. The skeptic doesn’t fail to know that he or she is hungry because of skepticism and the “defender” of common sense doesn’t enhance that knowledge in any way because of his or her “defense” of common sense.
Neocarvaka, I think you actually completely agree with Jayarāśi once you grant that philosophy has no effect either way on one’s ability to live by common sense. As for deliberation, I think Jayarāśi, like Sextus, is not necessarily making any normative statement. If you find deliberation delightful, good luck to you. But if you find it detracting from your ability to enjoy life, you might see what he has to offer. There’s even less evidence for this attitude in Jayarāśi than there is for Sextus, but I find that it’s more fun and makes better sense of his text than confusing his skepticism with modern skepticism and dismissing it as nonsense.
The philosophical analysis of common sense leaves it as it is (in Wittgenstein’s parlance), but this has implications for other philosophical views including skepticism.
“Jayarāśi might be more of a defender of common sense than traditional Cārvākas!”
Does he accept perception as a “valid means of knowledge”? If he doesn’t, he cannot be a Cārvāka philosopher.
According to the first chapter of Kautilya’s Arthasastra, Sankhya, Yoga, and Lokayata (Carvaka)are the three traditions of philosophy based on “Anviksiki” or critical thinking including logic. It is intriguing and noteworthy that the Yoga tradition of philosophy is included here, contrary to the popular misunderstanding that the Yoga tradition is all mystical and non-logical.
If Jayarāśi rejects reasoning or inference (if that means anything at all), he cannot be a Carvaka.
How could you possibly give a philosophical vindication of common sense? Doing so seems to bring you right out of common sense, unless you take the philosophically problematic route that common sense vindicates itself.
“How could you possibly give a philosophical vindication of common sense? Doing so seems to bring you right out of common sense, unless you take the philosophically problematic route that common sense vindicates itself.”
Sorry, I meant to make a comment on this as well in the previous response.
What do you mean by getting “right out of common sense”? If common sense includes a basic or fundamental conceptual structure, as I have pointed in a previous response, how can we step out of this conceptual structure? Even a skeptic has to use this conceptual structure on and off the philosophical track.
On the other hand, there are many notable vindications of the appeal to common sense in philosophy, e.g., Moore’s work. This certainly implies that it is “possible” to give a philosophical vindication of common sense.
On my (admittedly strange) view of what Jayarāśi is up to, he operates in two contexts: one is a philosophical context and the second is an everyday context (vyavahāra), which might be “common sense.” In an everyday context in which philosophical questions simply aren’t raised, maybe Jayarāśi would even say we “know” things by “valid means of knowledge,” but once you really start examining these alleged sources of knowledge philosophically, the project tends to undermine itself.
I’m probably wrong, but it seems to me that common sense philosophers like Moore and Reid are simply blocking questions like “how can we trust perception?” or “is the extra-mental world real?” Obviously questions have to stop in real life, but stopping them in philosophy isn’t very interesting. What I like about philosophy – as opposed to other kinds of inquiry – is that you’re *always* allowed to ask, “why?” Common sense philosophy stops questioning before I personally would be satisfied, but maybe this is a question of intellectual taste. If a philosopher accepts common sense because it’s common sense, and for some reason doesn’t think that’s begging the question, I suppose that could be an intellectual taste, too.
I don’t understand the notion that it fine to think in everyday life that if I see a cat in broad daylight and my mental and visual condition are not impaired, then there is really a cat wherever I happen to see it, but that in philosophy this claim mysteriously becomes problematic or “unjustified”.
Either judgments based on normal perception in normal conditions are true or they are false. On grounds of simple logic, it seems incoherent to maintain that they are true in everyday life but doubtful or false in philosophy. This also alludes to the incoherence in the claim that a judgment is true “conventionally” (whatever that means) but not so at the “ultimate” level (whatever that means).
One approach to philosophy is to question the foundation on which you construct your view.
For example, your ground is that: “Either judgments based on normal perception in normal conditions are true or they are false”. The issue is whether you are interested in examining this basic assumption — in looking into whether there is a possibility beyond true and false.
Contextualism in contemporary epistemology comes in a few varieties, but the most popular is “attributer contextualism,” in which the truth value of sentences such as “Sally knows she has hands” are context-sensitive (they are true in normal contexts and false when the standards of knowledge attribution are raised, as in an epistemology classroom). Whether Sally actually has hands is not context-sensitve. That’s true whether anyone knows it or not, but since knowledge involves something more than truth (justification, reliable causes or whatever your favored analysis of knowledge says) knowledge attributions can be context sensitive. That’s the model I’m using for contextualism, anyway. See the work of Stuart Cohen and Keith DeRose for more. Also, the most amusing article on contextualism is David Lewis’s “Elusive Knowledge.”
You mean that although in an epistemology classroom Sally still mercifully has a mind left intact but just cannot say that she has one?
If so, I would like to know what it is about an epistemology class which does such things to us, e.g., render us incapable of claiming that we know that we are speaking with the help of a tongue when we indubitably do so even in an epistemology classroom.
The notion that one can’t assert true claims, i.e., that I have a head, merely because one is in an epistemology class is truly astonishing.
“I have a head.” is an important claim. Any assertion of it implies that it is true and also that one knows that it is true. The context, including the epistemology class, makes not a whit of difference to these implications.
You could call my point contextualism, if you like; I prefer interdependence.
However, your illustration, saying that “Whether Sally has hands or not is not context sensitive” assumes the existence of an objective observer. And an objective observer changes the context.
For example, if we assume that Sally lives in a universe where all of the planets are entirely underwater, all beings have fins, and there is no such thing as hands — then it would be impossible to say that Sally has hands or not. This is because the concept of “no hands” depends on the concept of “hands”.
If we introduce god or an objective observer from another world (which is saying much the same thing) — only then it is possible to make the distinction that you make — that contextualism relates to Sally’s knowledge but not to the question whether Sally has hands or not.
I am interested in the writers you cite. I’ll try to look them up.
“the most popular is “attributer contextualism,” in which the truth value of sentences such as “Sally knows she has hands” are context-sensitive (they are true in normal contexts and false when the standards of knowledge attribution are raised, as in an epistemology classroom).”
If Sally has hands and does not incur brain damage or a paralysis of her cognitive faculties in an epistemology class, she certainly knows that she has hands even in that strange context.
What make her claim “true in normal contexts”? And how does it then become false “when the standards of knowledge attribution are raised”? Indeed, what does this phrase mean?
“knowledge attributions can be context sensitive.”
What does this mean?
“I’m probably wrong, but it seems to me that common sense philosophers like Moore and Reid are simply blocking questions like “how can we trust perception?” or “is the extra-mental world real?””
They are certainly not “blocking” those questions since they have given answers to them based on a painstaking and rigorous analysis of those questions!
But, as you know, in philosophy it is imperative to understand the meaning of a question and the grounds for asking it in the first place. By all means ask “Why?”, but this implies also asking why we are asking “Why?”!!!
I am sure you make various judgments and perform different actions based on your sense perceptions. When do you really ask whether you have observed something carefully or whether you have formed a correct judgment based on your observation? This should tell you a great deal about the distinction between sensible doubt and senseless or pointless doubt. The mere fact that I can ask “How do I know that my wife isn’t from another galaxy?” doesn’t mean that it is sensible to ask that question.
No philosopher of common sense I know of accepts common sense merely on the grounds that it is common sense. They do so because of good pragmatic, explanatory, and evidential reasons.
“how can we trust perception?” or “is the extra-mental world real?””
What do these questions mean? Isn’t this the first question we need to ask when presented with these questions? The meaning of the words “trust”, “perception”, “extra-mental”, and “real” in these questions sorely need clarification.
We’ve moved to modern external-world skepticism, which is radically different than ancient skepticism, but let’s move there. I agree that common sense philosophers are not blatantly begging the question, but at the end of the day I have a hard time understanding Moore as not more subtly begging the question against the skeptic. He asserts that we have good evidence for believing we have hands, but the evidential status of claims about the external world is what’s at issue and skeptical scenarios are precisely designed to make *any* appeal to such evidence questionable. You can’t just say, “Here is one hand and here’s another.” The whole point of external world skepticism is to question such statements. The conclusion of external world skepticism is NOT that we actually are dreaming or even that it’s probable that we’re dreaming. But if you can’t rule out such a crazy possibility given your current evidence, how can you really claim to know stuff?
As for ordinary language philosophy, I enjoy reading Austin, but I’ve never understood why something as riddled with contradictions and vagaries as “ordinary language” should be the gold standard of philosophy. Surely we can do better. In Sense and Sensibility, Austin says skeptics misuse words. Sure, they use them differently than most people, but you’re allowed to do that in specialized contexts. Language is a malleable thing (which Wittgenstein saw – his appeal to ordinary language is far less dogmatic than Austin’s).
I just don’t buy any of this talk about how skepticism “doesn’t make sense.” It makes perfect sense in epistemology, where you are doing non-pragmatic, theoretical inquiry into knowledge. Besides, movies like The Matrix made sense to millions of people, so I’m not even sure that skeptical scenarios are actually all that strange to people with no philosophical training. If skepticism were as wildly meaningless and dependent on philosophical training as ordinary language types think, I doubt The Matrix would have done so well!
I don’t think, however, that you need to answer skepticism in order to know anything (a la Cartesian foundationalism). If you don’t like thinking about skepticism, there are plenty of other issues in philosophy for you to think about it. But denying that it’s sensible is a lot harder than common sense philosophers think. I find that understanding external world skepticism is a lot easier than any of the convoluted “diagnoses” of skepticism!
Well put, Ethan. Thank you.
Skepticism is self-refuting. To argue for skepticism, you must assume the very things you are denying, most importantly:
1. knowledge that you are advocating skepticism
2. (implied by 1) knowledge of the language in which you formulate skepticism
3. (also implied by 1) knowledge of your own existence
4. knowledge of the support offered by your premises for your skeptical conclusion
As Strawson, Quine, and Davidson agreed in a panel discussion at Oxford several years ago, it is also futile to argue with a skeptic in just the way it is futile to argue with someone who claims that we cannot know whether a premise supports a conclusion or undermines it!
Of course, a skeptic must hold this view and at the same time claim that her premises support her conclusion or undermine some other conclusion! What a genius!
‘Argument for Skepticism” is an oxymoron. If skepticism is true, then we cannot know logical relations, including relations of logical support between the premises offered by the skeptic and his conclusion.
“Besides, movies like The Matrix made sense to millions of people, so I’m not even sure that skeptical scenarios are actually all that strange to people with no philosophical training. If skepticism were as wildly meaningless and dependent on philosophical training as ordinary language types think, I doubt The Matrix would have done so well!”
The Matrix makes and rests on so many knowledge claims, claims about simulation, simulated reality, the true reality, overcoming the spell of simulation, and so forth. It has nothing to do with classical skepticism.
“The conclusion of external world skepticism is NOT that we actually are dreaming or even that it’s probable that we’re dreaming. But if you can’t rule out such a crazy possibility given your current evidence, how can you really claim to know stuff?”
“The conclusion of external world skepticism is NOT that we actually are dreaming or even that it’s probable that we’re dreaming.”
So, what is the “conclusion” then?
“how can you really claim to know stuff?”
This sound like classical skepticism, the view that we cannot justifiably claim to know anything. I suspect that this “external world skepticism” eventually mutates or collapses into classical skepticism. If you disagree, pl. specify the items of knowledge or types of items of knowledge countenanced by this “external world skepticism” and we can go from there.
“He asserts that we have good evidence for believing we have hands, but the evidential status of claims about the external world is what’s at issue and skeptical scenarios are precisely designed to make *any* appeal to such evidence questionable.”
Ok, so the fact that I see and feel my hands, that other can see and feel them, our general knowledge that the normal human body has arms, that I can lift things and put them down, etc., doesn’t really count as evidence for the claim that I have arms? Great!
Now, perhaps, the skeptic can tell us what does or would count evidence for the claim that I have arms?
If nothing does or would or could count as evidence, then it is meaningless for the skeptic to ask for evidence to show that I have arms, isn’t it?
What would be the point of asking for evidence at all then?
To say “This is not evidence for X.” presupposes some concept of evidence, some concept of what would count as evidence or “proof”. What is the skeptic’s concept of evidence or “proof”?
If the skeptic says “I could be dreaming or hallucinating.”, this doesn’t imply that you and/or I could also be dreaming or hallucinating.
So, the skeptic must start with “WE could all be dreaming or hallucinating.”
But this is fatal to skepticism, even “external world skepticism”. “We” already implies the existence of others, i.e., an external world!
Thus, to argue from “WE could all be dreaming or hallucinating.” to the conclusion that “WE cannot know that there is an external world.” is incoherent.
Some clarifications:
The conclusion of external world skepticism is “Nobody knows anything about the external world.” We might have knowledge of deduction, knowledge of our appearances, knowledge of mathematics and logic, etc. External world skeptics simply pick out one class of propositions and claim that we don’t know whether any of those are true or false. Now, you can claim that all that knowledge rests on knowledge of the external world. It probably does, but not necessarily (Matrix denizens or disembodied spirits could learn logic). There we presumably disagree and I have serious doubts about whether any further inquiry will settle that disagreement.
Hellenistic Academic skeptics seem to make the claim that “nobody knows anything at all.” Peter Unger (in his 1975 book, Ignorance) actually does straightforwardly make that claim, and his book is fascinating if you give it a chance. But at least some Academics, such as Carneades, probably meant that they had a “pervasive intellectual apprehension” or what Cicero called “probable knowledge” that knowledge is impossible. This is not out-and-out self-refuting, since it’s not really a straightforward knowledge claim in the first place.
Pyrrhonians (and I think skeptical Cārvākas and skeptical Mādhyamikas) don’t even make probable claims. If you ask a Pyrrhonian whether knowledge is possible or not, they’d suspend judgment even on that. There’s a big scholarly debate about whether they accept some beliefs or actually suspend judgment on all beliefs whatsoever. Presumably common sensors, pragmatists, phenomenologists, etc. will say that action in the world rests on belief and knowledge, but Pyrrhonians report that they act on appearances alone. I think this issue is worth consideration and to do that we need to get clear on what we mean by “belief” and “knowledge.” But the Pyrrhonian way of life doesn’t, it seems to me, rely on figuring any of this out. That’s an issue for us dogmatists!
The basic differences are these: Pyrrhonians are pursuing a way of life whereas modern skeptics are engaged in a theoretical inquiry into the possibility of knowledge. Academics are probably somewhere between.
But again, if skepticism of the modern or ancient varieties isn’t interesting to you, just think about something else. I’m going to think about something else now, so good luck to you!
I think Thill is right that there is common sense in non-Cārvāka philosophy. Nyāya, for instance, has its common sense realism, but to make that work it’s worth pointing out that their metaphysical system becomes very cumbersome and not very common sensical at all (absences and the inherence relation have to actually exist, which is pretty weird stuff). I say this gives reason for my claim that a full philosophical vindication of common sense is not really possible without resorting to non-common sense.
I am rethinking my approach to common sense. Here are two trains of thought. I hope to address Amod’s points after I get more clear on these trains of though.
1. Let’s be very clear on what we mean when we say that common sense is fallible. It could mean:
A. There are cases in which what most people believed or took for granted turned out to be wrong, e.g., they once believed or took for granted that the sun goes around the earth, but this has tuned out to be false.
OR
B. Common sense ways of knowing, i.e., sense perception and reasoning, are fallible or prone to error.
(A) assumes that “common sense” refers merely to what most people believe or take for granted. Since this is not the sense in which I am using “common sense”, the truth of A is irrelevant to my view.
I am now inclined to think that (B) is meaningless. It makes no sense to say that perception or the faculty of reasoning itself is fallible or infallible. There is a category mistake involved in saying that perception or the faculty of reasoning is fallible or infallible.
To say that perception is fallible is to say that perception can be wrong or incorrect. But it is meaningless to say that the sense faculties of seeing, smelling, touching, and hearing can be wrong or incorrect. They are just what they are and no question of their being right or wrong arises.
If it makes sense to say that perception can be “wrong”, then either a given act or process of perception and/or its given object of perception must be “wrong”.
But it makes no sense to say that an act or process of perception is wrong or incorrect or erroneous. And it also makes no sense to say that the object of perception is wrong or incorrect or erroneous.
If we see a stick bent when it is immersed in water, neither process of perception here is “wrong” in nor the object, the bent stick, is “wrong”.
Therefore, it makes no sense to say that perception is fallible (or infallible).
The faculty of reasoning also cannot be meaningfully deemed fallible or infallible. The beliefs, explanations, claims, judgments, etc., one forms by exercising the faculty of reasoning with or without sense perception can turn out to be wrong, but the faculty itself cannot be meaningfully deemed fallible or infallible.
Therefore, I don’t think it makes sense to claim that common sense is “fallible” on the grounds that perception and reasoning are fallible because the latter is not a meaningful claim.
2. What is it that I am appealing to when I appeal to common sense?
Let me reiterate that by appealing to common sense, I am definitely not appealing merely to what most people believe or take for granted.
I am appealing to a conceptual structure which is basic and fundamental to and presupposed by any knowledge-claim, an ordinary or scientific knowledge-claim, a conceptual structure constituted by concepts or categories such as object, attribute, event, change, process, similarity, difference, identity, spatio-temporal location, self or person, thinking, sensation, feeling, animate, inanimate, etc.
I am also appealing to the basic and fundamental ways of knowing by means of the faculties of sense perception and reasoning.
And I am appealing to truths, i.e., justified knowledge-claims, arrived at by deploying the conceptual structure and ways of knowing I have just mentioned.
In this light, retrospectively, my dismissal of some metaphysical claims on the grounds that they contradict common sense implies that:
a. Those metaphysical claims violate the conceptual structure of common sense.
b. They exclude or reject sense perception and/or reasoning.
c. They are inconsistent with the truths arrived at by deploying the conceptual structure and ways of knowing constitutive of common sense.
Thill, as a first reply to this I would simply like to say: thank you. I feel like we’re finally starting to make some real progress here.
More later, not sure whether it will be in a comment or a post.
There is a lot of interesting stuff here, I appreciate this analysis. But I do disagree on a few points:
“Let me reiterate that by appealing to common sense, I am definitely not appealing merely to what most people believe or take for granted.”
This is granted, but sometimes it can be very hard to tell the difference. Something being ‘common knowledge’ (to label the latter category) largely happens because people observed it, because there was no common-sense counterevidence. An earth-centered universe is is no longer common knowledge, but only because specialized training (telescopes, orbital mathematics) has been applied to the basic sensory observations (sun goes up, sun goes down), and we all got thoroughly educated in the outcome.
The point being: Can’t I rephrase your point A as “There are cases in which the apparent-truths provided by perception turned out to be wrong?”
(Though I worry I’m getting off track with this. It’s not as important/interesting as your further stuff.)
“The beliefs, explanations, claims, judgments, etc., one forms by exercising the faculty of reasoning with or without sense perception can turn out to be wrong, but the faculty itself cannot be meaningfully deemed fallible or infallible.”
This, I believe, is misguided. But to start, I like your usage of the term ‘reasoning’ here, it’s much easier to define and specify than the term ‘thinking’ you use in your other comment below: I’m thinking about what I’ll have for lunch, but I’m not reasoning about it.
But once we’ve limited this to reasoning, I can then say: Doesn’t human reasoning make errors in fundamental, characteristic and systematic ways? It takes specialized training to make and follow a coherent logical argument without falling into all kinds of fallacies, that’s why we needed a higher education to get to the point where we can have this discussion. Quantitative reasoning takes enormous training, and remains susceptible to ridiculously arbitrary biases.
Indeed, we end up with both correct judgments and incorrect judgments- and I certainly wouldn’t try to measure which is more frequent. But I see plenty of “meaning” and “point” both in the claim that human reasoning is flawed: after all, it teaches us that common sense reasoning is no more trustworthy than other kinds.
“I am appealing to a conceptual structure which is basic and fundamental to and presupposed by any knowledge-claim… I am also appealing to the basic and fundamental ways of knowing by means of the faculties of sense perception and reasoning.”
What, if any, implications does it have for your proposal if “fundamental” matters of perception and identity can be erroneous? The idea “I have a continuous-in-time sensory experience while awake” seems like one such fundamental pre-knowledge point, but as I have alluded in the past, it is demonstrably false. These hidden discontinuities are not just a product of rare or experimental situations, they occur every few seconds. (Again, evidence omitted to save space/time, but happy to provide if it becomes important.)
Small but important revision/caveat:
“…it teaches us that common sense reasoning is no more trustworthy than other kinds.”
Let me back away slightly from that claim and instead say “it teaches us that common sense reasoning is not necessarily more trustworthy than other kinds.”
I don’t intend to deny the possibility that common sense might hold a better truth/falsehood ratio than other kinds of knowledge. This claim is (as you’ve noted) impossible to assess, but all the more reason I don’t want to make it! My claim is “~better”, rather than “equal”.
Ben, more later, but for now if you talking about reasoning, then it still makes no sense to say that reasoning, i.e., induction and/or deduction, is itself “flawed”.
Specific instances or examples of inductive or deductive reasoning may be flawed and therefore their conclusions may false or implausible, but since there also specific instances or examples of inductive or deductive reasoning which are not flawed and whose conclusions are true or plausible, enumeration of the former sort of examples does not show that reasoning itself is flawed. And, again, it is not possible to show that the former sorts of examples vastly exceed the latter.
Further, since you would have to use reasoning to argue for this claim, it is self-refuting.
I think that to claim that “Reasoning is inherently flawed.” is meaningless and/or pointless in just the way it is to claim that “Thinking is inherently flawed.”
Brief thoughts:
1) Individual instances of successful reasoning are exactly as unconvincing as individual instances of failed reasoning. As you point out on other threads, it becomes a question of the odds: how probable is it? My intuition is that the untrained (common sense) reasoner makes frequent errors. As we both agree, this is impossible to quantify- but if that weren’t true, we wouldn’t need college courses on the stuff.
Question: if trained reasoning were reliable, but untrained reasoning were unreliable, how would that impact the value of common sense?
2) “Further, since you would have to use reasoning to argue for this claim, it is self-refuting.”
No, but it is self-doubting! If reasoning has low-to-moderate chance of error, we can (and do) reason our way to conclusions that suffice until something better arises. And to follow up on the above question, I could claim that untrained reasoning is the flawed (substantial error) stuff, while trained reasoning (as we use on this blog) is reliable.
3) We’re bumping into an ugly seam between the empirical and the philosophical. Philosophically one can argue that the claim “reasoning is flawed” is incoherent, but empirically there’s a lot of evidence that untrained people are bad at logical reasoning. I recognize and accept my own biases, when I say that I personally won’t be satisfied with any philosophical argument that fails to account for seemingly-contradictory empirical evidence.
Thill, if, as you claim, using reasoning to say “reasoning is inherently flawed” is self-contradictory, this surely depends on an implicit premise that anything inherently flawed should not be believed. But I see no reason that this premise is the case. You keep accusing me of saying only the infallible is reliable. But here it appears to be you who is doing exactly that. What is not infallible is not perfect; it is flawed. But we don’t have any perfect or infallible tools at our disposal. Why shouldn’t we make do with the flawed ones?
A friend once described a professor saying in class “25% of everything I tell you is wrong. I just don’t know which 25%.” I think that’s about the right way to approach these matters. This isn’t a recipe for paralyzing self-doubt; 75% is pretty good odds. We’re perfectly justified in pressing on ahead with the beliefs we have, which will probably turn out to be mostly right; we just need to be vigilant about the places where they are wrong.
If we’re stuck with common sense as a basic cognitive framework (perhaps you have some transcendental argument for this claim), how can you say so many people (skeptics, religious people, etc.) don’t use it? How on Earth would they ever have strayed from it? Are these Kant-style transcendental illusions? But wouldn’t these illusions require going beyond common sense? If so, then people clearly CAN do without common sense at least some of the time and if they can, doesn’t the question arise of whether we ought to stick with common sense about at least some beliefs? How could you rule out the stuff outside of common sense as a possible means of answering these questions?
As I pointed out in a previous response, work in the cognitive psychology of religion, e.g., the work of Pascal Boyer, shows the Janus-faced nature of religious beliefs, i.e., they conform to some common sense truths and violate others. And this, in part, explains their appeal. It’s like a storyteller who skillfully combines realism and fantasy to enhance the appeal of his stories.
We all know that fire is not controlled by any being other than the human who starts it and/or puts it out. This is a common sense truth. And this truth is at odds with the religious belief that fire is under the control of a supernatural being, Agni of the Vedas.
Why then do some people believe in the existence of Agni, the God of Fire, despite the fact that they know how to start and put out a fire without first getting Agni’s permission or intervention?
“Praise Allah but tie your camel to the post.” expresses the quintessence of the double-mindedness (use common sense here and suspend it there)inherent in religious belief.
The skeptic too suffers form this double-mindedness, insincerity, and hypocrisy when she speaks a language and proclaims in that language that we can never know anything, not to mention the other things she knows and does which are at odds with her proclamation!
Some further clarifications are called for.
1. You say that it is meaningless to speak of perception and reasoning as being fallible or infallible, because “They are just what they are and no question of their being right or wrong arises.” If no question of their being right or wrong arises, that seems to me to imply that they can also not be plausible, implausible, reliable or unreliable, for they are just what they are and no question of their being right or wrong arises. Would you agree with that claim?
Would you also agree that what you have said about perception and reasoning applies transitively to common sense, so that it too cannot be said to be fallible or infallible?
If the answer is yes to both questions, it would seem that you are implying that common sense as a category can also not be said to be plausible, implausible, reliable or unreliable. If that is so, I think we may actually be in agreement. Let us see.
2. b) seems an uncomfortable fit with everything else in this section. Common sense as you have described it isn’t a matter of perception and/or reasoning as such, though it may depend on them and be closely tied to them. Rather, it has to do with a conceptual structure which appears to be a Cartesian kind of a priori foundationalism: like Descartes’s self, it is a category (or rather set of categories) which is required for any (other?) knowledge-claim to make sense. a) and c) fit well with this conception of common sense; b) does not.
Moreover, if all this is so, it needs considerably more unpacking. The categories you have identified are complex ones whose meanings can be and have been endlessly debated. And they are very different from one another in kind. I don’t think you are claiming that “matter is made of atoms” would depend on the categories of “animate” or “inanimate,” for example; so it is not the case that every knowledge-claim depends on each of the concepts in this supposed conceptual structure. But somehow it is being said that every knowledge-claim depends on this structure as a whole. Why? Why are we to believe that this structure is in fact a coherent structure – let alone one that is a precondition of knowing? This question has been at the heart of my concerns about “common sense” from the beginning – I’m not at all sure that the concept as you have put it is a helpful one to describe anything. And, how do we decide that a particular concept does or does not fit into this structure? The latter question seems an enormous one to be waved away with an “etc”!
Also, I note that in the new approach to common sense spelled out here, no reference is made to special training or the lack thereof. Is that intentional? Did you find the definition in terms of special training to be inadequate?
“If we occasionally get sums wrong, is it because we are not really doing arithmetic?Is Thill saying something like this?”
Yes, people may mistakes in counting, but this does not show that arithmetic is untrustworthy or unreliable.
In just the same way, if due to environmental conditions, visual or other cognitive impairment, optical illusions, etc., people arrive at incorrect or erroneous beliefs or judgments, this does not show that perception and reasoning are in themselves “unreliable”.
“Also, I note that in the new approach to common sense spelled out here, no reference is made to special training or the lack thereof. Is that intentional? Did you find the definition in terms of special training to be inadequate?”
Consider the following pairs of claims:
1A. I know that water can make your clothes wet.
1B. I know that water is made of H2O.
2A. I know that heat can melt ice.
2B. I know that heat is molecular motion.
3A. I know how the opening “tune” of Beethoven’s fifth symphony sounds.
3B. I know that Beethoven’s fifth symphony begins with a four-note motif: three G’s and an E-flat and three F’s and a D.
What is the difference between 1A and 1B? What is the difference between 2A and 2B?
Both depend on perception and reasoning, but to truly know the object of knowledge affirmed in 1B and 2B, one needs scientific training and knowledge.
In just the same way, to know the object of knowledge affirmed in 3B, one needs musical training and knowledge.
Obviously, there are different types or kinds of knowledge, scientific, technological, musical, etc. All of them presuppose the basic knowledge furnished by the common sense conceptual structure and ways of knowing.
The common sense conceptual structure has primacy. Violations of it result in nonsense. The concepts of object and process are among its fundamental concepts. If a philosopher comes along and proclaims that we can do away with the concept of object and just have the concept of process, this results in nonsense because to identify a process we need to first identify a locus, an object. There is no such thing as change independently of objects which undergo or provide a locus for particular changes.
This is far from a satisfactory account of the connection between the supposed conceptual structure you posit and the lack of specialized training. The description of the conceptual structure you put forth is based on its being a precondition for knowledge (whether trained or untrained). There is no necessary connection explained here between that structure and the absence of training.
The fact that a person is capable of using a concept without specialized training (e.g. God, a concept regularly used by five-year-olds who are not particularly precocious) indicates that the absence of specialized training is not what makes a concept part of this presumed structure, to the point that it appears to me that that absence is no longer part of your definition of “common sense” at all.
The concepts of heat and wetness are not among the list of concepts in the conceptual structure you describe. Are they supposed to be contained in the “etc”? If so, why? If not, what do the untrained claims “I know that water can make your clothes wet” or ” I know that heat can melt ice” have to do with your conceptual structure? Perhaps they presuppose it, but so, presumably, do “I know that water is made of H2O” or “I know that heat is made of molecular motion.”
I think you have two definitions of common sense here, an old (and probably indefensible) one and a new (and more interesting) one, which refer to more or less entirely different phenomena. On the latter, it’s not clear why the term “common sense” should be used to refer to it at all.
The common sense conceptual structure is embedded in natural languages and is acquired with the acquisition of a first natural language in childhood. That process of acquisition of a first natural language is not a process of special training akin to scientific or technical training as I pointed out in an earlier response to a question raised by the shadowy “Charlie” who appears and disappears on this blog.
What special training is required to see a tree or a dog? What special training is required to reason that an explosion indicates fire or or that thick smoke indicates fire or that hearing a growl in a forest indicates an animal? What special training is required to know that I am in pain or that you have thoughts and feelings?
If you acknowledge that no special training is required in these cases, but that special training is required to know that water is H2O and heat is molecular motion, you have granted my point that common sense does not involve special training. And if you grant that scientific and technological training presupposes common sense, you have also granted that special training involves common sense.
Amod, some of the confusion here can be dispelled if you understand that “common sense” is a complex concept. Again, I have identified three strands in the concept: conceptual structure, ways of knowing, and stock of knowledge.
I agree that the “sub-concept” of common sense conceptual structure needs further clarification.
But your question on the connection between special training and common sense is applicable only to common sense ways of knowing and stock of knowledge.
Perception and reasoning can be subject to special training, e.g., sitting in front of a plum tree and observing all the details carefully, taking a course in critical thinking, learning to observe through a microscope or telescope, ear training in music, etc.
Sorry, I forgot to delete these sentences from my earlier response. Pl. ignore them.
“Amod, some of the confusion here can be dispelled if you understand that “common sense” is a complex concept. Again, I have identified three strands in the concept: conceptual structure, ways of knowing, and stock of knowledge.
I agree that the “sub-concept” of common sense conceptual structure needs further clarification.
But your question on the connection between special training and common sense is applicable only to common sense ways of knowing and stock of knowledge.
Perception and reasoning can be subject to special training, e.g., sitting in front of a plum tree and observing all the details carefully, taking a course in critical thinking, learning to observe through a microscope or telescope, ear training in music, etc.”
“special training is required to know that water is H2O and heat is molecular motion”
I am talking about the process of discovery of these scientific truths. Obviously, I can say that I know that water is H2O or that heat is molecular motion without benefit of the training and the research underlying the original discovery of those truths.
To return to the concept of common sense, I would like to augment the concept of common sense ways of knowing with an addition: immediate inner cognition or inner awareness. This is how we know our sensations, feelings, thoughts, mental imagery, or imagination, by an immediate awareness or cognition of them. So, the ordinary, common ways of knowing include: perception, reasoning, and immediate inner cognition or awareness of the contents of our own minds.
Is recollection or remembering a way of knowing? A memory-claim seems to be a knowledge-claim. “I have a vivid memory of my grandmother singing on my fifth birthday.” looks like the knowledge-claim “I know that my grandmother sand on my fifth birthday.” Since I could be mistaken, such knowledge-claims are fallible, but plausible or highly probable.
Further, a particular memory claim may be true or false, but it makes no sense to say that the faculty of memory or remembering is itself “unreliable”. If it is, we would all be constantly checking every memory-claim and that is patently false. Memory-claims are privileged in this sense: they are taken to be veridical unless there is evidence to the contrary.
So, the repertoire of common sense ways of knowing includes: perception, reasoning, immediate inner cognition or awareness, and recollection or remembering.
Humans are organisms on this planet. Perhaps, a study of the instinctive or innate knowledge shown by other organisms can shed light on what is instinctive or innate in common sense?
Tinbergen showed that even young chicks were terrified and ran for cover when a silhouette model was pulled in a direction which made it look like a hawk. They did not do so when it was pulled in another way which made it look like a goose. They did so with no mother around to warn them and no prior experience of being threatened by a hawk. This implies that the chicks instinctively knew that the hawk posed a threat to them.
It is a fact that there is such instinctive knowledge in all organisms including the human. The explanation of it is a different issue.
Common sense knowledge includes not just acquired knowledge, but also such forms of instinctive or innate knowledge.
Calling common sense a “complex concept” only serves to make matters worse. The “conceptual structure” was already so large as to be in danger of incoherence, and now far more potentially unrelated material has been thrown into the mix with it.
I will define the concept of phlebonga as referring to sense perception, rats, fire, phrenology, Medford rum, Anselm’s ontological argument, Grape-Nuts, the medulla oblongata, Michele Bachmann, toilet bowl cleaner and a pony. Is “phlebonga” then coherent or useful? Why, of course – it’s a complex concept.
Amod, these caricatures are not helpful and make me consider the wisdom of further participation in this discussion.
You haven’t provided any reason for your proclamation that common sense is not a complex concept. I would think it’s elementary that a concept is “complex” if it has has several strands and you have done nothing at all to undermine the analysis of common sense in terms of conceptual structure, ways of knowing, and stock of knowledge.
I don’t think you quite understand the notion of a conceptual structure. In its very nature, it will include a great deal of fundamental concepts in terms of which we make sense of our experience of the world. Think of the categories of understanding and their sub-categories. “hot”, “cold”, “hard”, “soft”, “long”, “short”, “heavy”, “light”, “broad”, “narrow”, etc., are not among the fundamental properties we ascribe to things? If asked to explain the category or concept of quality, are you not going to include these and many more?
The laws of logic are not part of our conceptual structure? We can make sense of the world in terms of ascription of contradictory properties to things at the same time? An object can be large and small at the same time to the same observer? A process can be lengthy and short in duration at the same time to the same observer? Logic is fundamental to the way we make sense of the world and claims about the world.
So, mere cavil about the inclusion of necessary elements is not philosophical argument.
Instinctive or innate knowledge has to be part of common sense. Obviously, it cannot be a product of training since that would imply that it is acquired. So, it must be a part of common sense knowledge.
None of this obliterates the distinction between common sense knowledge and knowledge acquired by means of training in science, technology, and the arts.
Obviously, if I can admit that “Heat is molecular motion.” is not an example of common sense knowledge but of scientific knowledge, or that the knowledge that the opening “tune” of a symphony consist of notes x, y, w, and z is not an example of common sense knowledge, I have shown that there are items of knowledge different from common sense knowledge.
I have already addressed the question concerning the basis of the distinction (not a sharp dichotomy) between common sense knowledge and scientific knowledge in earlier responses.
If you think that my recent elaborations of the concept of common sense threaten the distinction between common sense knowledge and other forms of knowledge, I would like to see an explanation of why this is the case. Caricatures are not helpful.
I could be wrong, but I have a feeling that Amod hasn’t quite rid himself of the simplistic notion that common sense is merely what people believe and/or the tendency to take appearances for reality. All this may stem from his immersion in metaphysical theories and their self-styled superiority over common sense.
This creates problems in understanding what Thill has to say which paints a complex picture of common sense in terms of conceptual structure, ways of knowing, and stock of knowledge, each of which has its own complexities as the recent exchange on whether perception itself can be judged fallible or infallible shows.
Before we can judge common sense, we need to understand what it is.
Thill’s thesis now seems to be: “Common sense” refers to our ordinary and common extensive conceptual structure (the set of categories or concepts in terms of which we make sense of the world), ways of knowing (perception, reasoning, immediate inner cognition, and recollection or remembering), and stock of knowledge (infallible and plausible or highly probable judgments.
If this is not common sense, then what is it?
Is this conception of CS now in danger of destroying the distinction between CS and other forms of knowledge?
If Thill maintains that the existence of atoms, molecules, microbes, and genes is not an item of common sense knowledge since special training and observations made in controlled settings such as scientific experiments, special forms of analysis and testing, etc., were required to arrive at these truths, then this is sufficient to show that the distinction between common sense knowledge and forms of knowledge gained by special training, e.g., ear training in music, has not collapsed.
How does the augmentation of the concept of common sense to include what are clearly common sense ways of knowing, e.g., immediate cognition of one’s sensations or feelings, and recollection or remembering, undermine the distinction between knowledge gained by special training and common sense knowledge?
“Amod, these caricatures are not helpful and make me consider the wisdom of further participation in this discussion.”
Thill, I could make a TON of comments about the pot calling the kettle black here. Suffice it to say that I am not the only one to have engaged in caricatures and mockery of an opponent’s position here.
I would certainly prefer that that end on both sides, however. I would love to have a chance to raise the tone of discussion. May we make a mutual agreement to attempt to treat each other’s positions more seriously and refrain in the future from snide comments, potshots, mockery and caricatures? I will if you will.
Other member/s of the Common Sense Party, that applies to you too.
You admit then that you are engaging in a caricature of my attempts to enlarge our understanding of common sense by including elements hitherto ignored by comparing it to the arbitrary inclusion of disparate elements in a concept?
I hope you are not taking a reductio ad absurdum for a caricature, unless of course the reductio starts with a caricature of the position it seeks to refute.
I am open to the opportunity to revise any caricatures I may have presented of your position. Go ahead.
We have at least three phenomena at issue here.
1) A conceptual structure containing a wide variety of concepts whose connection to each other has not yet been specified.
2) Knowledge (and/or ways of knowing) obtained without specialized training (which, incidentally, remains undefined).
3) Knowledge (and/or ways of knowing) obtained with specialized training.
So far, “common sense” has been specified to include 1 and 2 but not 3; yet it has been agreed that both 2 and 3 depend on 1. The inclusion of 1 and 2 but not 3 in a single concept seems entirely arbitrary to me. I really do not see why we have any more reason to accept this concept than we have to accept the concept of “phlebonga” as specified above. To say that it is a complex concept does not help matters here; it is not that I reject the notion of complex concepts, but rather that it has not been specified what makes it all a single complex concept (and one that is worth using) rather than a set of disparate concepts that are best kept separate. I can arbitrarily create a concept “phlebonga” out of a bunch of random phenomena if I so choose, and defend this arbitrary selection by saying it is a complex concept. But its being a complex concept does not make it a coherent one, nor does it make it worthy of our use; you have not, as far as I can see, established any reasons why “common sense” as you have defined it is worthy of our use in a way that “phlebonga” is not. That’s the point that I was trying to make, though I agree that my way of putting it was disrespectful and I will attempt to refrain from such in the future if you will agree to attempt the same.
I will respond to this later, but for now I want to say that I don’t consider charges of nonsense or incoherence or absurdity “disrespectful” if they are backed with arguments.
I am still curious what you consider disrespectful in my recent responses to your objections.
Let me also add that I earnestly traversed religious and metaphysical-philosophical routes for many years and got nowhere in terms of understanding the world I actually live in. My own experience is not proof positive that they lead us nowhere, but at least I have the benefit of that experience in talking about religion and metaphysics.
The “phelbonga” stuff is about arbitrarily including obviously disparate things in a single concept, but your objection to my concept of common sense is that it arbitrarily excludes a type of knowledge, knowledge gained by special training, from its range or scope.
The analogy with “phlebinga” will work only if you show that I have arbitrarily included disparate things in the concept of common sense.
Since I have used the criterion of absence of special training (I don’t understand why this concept of special training needs further clarification in light of paradigm cases of special training I have already provided, e.g., experimental lab training, ear training in music, and, I would now add, training in medical diagnosis and treatment of diseases.) to include a conceptual structure which is acquired with the acquisition of a first natural language, specific items of knowledge, e.g., knowledge of one’s sensations and feelings, knowledge of the existence of dogs, cats, etc., innate knowledge of some threats such as fire, snakes, etc., and ways of knowing not dependent on special training, e.g., perception, reasoning, inner cognition, and remembering, in the concept of common sense, I have certainly not included disparate things since these are all epistemic elements and certainly not arbitrarily since their inclusion is based on a criterion. So, the analogy with “phlebonga” fails.
I understand your objection to be this: if the common sense conceptual structure is presupposed by CS knowledge-claims such as “Rocks cannot fly around by their own initiative.” and by scientific knowledge-claims such as “Heat is molecular motion.”, then common sense must include both types of knowledge-claims.
I believe I addressed this in response to a comment by Ben in which he said that if common sense is presupposed by scientific knowledge this would make scientific knowledge a subset of common sense. I had replied that it would actually make common sense a subset of scientific knowledge in the sense that it would be among the assumptions of scientific knowledge, e.g., Copernicus’ theory assumes our common sense knowledge that the Sun exists and that we observe it from the earth.
Two types of knowledge-claims could presuppose the same conceptual structure and yet be different in relevant ways to exclude the inclusion of both in a category of knowledge, i.e., common sense knowledge.
The relevant difference is the the fact that one is based on special training and the other does not require this sort of training.
So, musical knowledge is gained by special training of the sort which is quite clear to grasp, e.g., ear training. This musical knowledge depends on auditory perception in just the way the untrained listener’s recognition of a tune or melody depends on auditory perception.
Both the musician’s knowledge and the layman’s knowledge depend on the same elements in our conceptual structure, e.g., the concepts of sound, sequence of sounds, etc. but the musician’s knowledge born of special training consists of further concepts not given in our ordinary conceptual structure, e.g., notes and their relations.
Therefore, although they share the same conceptual structure the musician’s knowledge of the melody in terms of its constituent notes and their relations is different from the layman’s knowledge in terms of mere recognition of a tune or melody. So, the latter is included in common sense knowledge, but not the former.
All this applies mutatis mutandis to scientific and technological knowledge.
“The concepts of heat and wetness are not among the list of concepts in the conceptual structure you describe. Are they supposed to be contained in the “etc”? If so, why?”
Heat and cold, wetness, and dryness, are among the basic qualities or properties we ascribe to objects, events, or causal interactions. They are part of our common sense conceptual structure. The judgment that water makes things wet, heat dries up things, etc., are part of common sense knowledge.
If not, what do the untrained claims “I know that water can make your clothes wet” or ” I know that heat can melt ice” have to do with your conceptual structure? Perhaps they presuppose it, but so, presumably, do “I know that water is made of H2O” or “I know that heat is made of molecular motion.””
Yes, I have been insisting all along that common sense is presupposed by science. So, it should come as no surprise to you that the common sense conceptual structure is presupposed by science. As I said, all knowledge-claims presuppose the common sense conceptual structure, but this is consistent with the fact that scientific knowledge requires special training whereas common sense knowledge does not.
How does it affect the concept of an object to acknowledge, as you have done, that objects are impermanent and changing moment to moment so that they should be viewed as much or more as a process than as a fixed thing?
This is not, in my view, a common or a common sense understanding of what an object is.
If we look at the process of change in an even more detailed way, is it possible even to capture an experience of an object as a concept? It seems to me that if one is receptive enough and open enough that by the time that you form the concept of a flower that it has changed. It is not that the concepts aren’t useful — on some level they are just heavy handed and overlay our experience of the world rather than capture it.
I don’t know that this is much of an insight — it seems uncontroversial to me. But when we speak of common sense in a colloquial way, we are not really addressing impermanence with any subtlety or real understanding. In other words, the impermanence that we are understanding is something of a fixed concept of impermanence and does not penetrate to an experience of the ephemeral nature of our experience.
And it is possible to look into interdependence in a similar way — so that objects are less discrete and hard edged and it is understood that nothing exists outside of a context.
I think this type of understanding is helpful — it tends to lead toward a view of life and the world that is less self-centered.
But I may be getting ahead of myself. Does this make any sense to you?
This last comment was addressed to thill, by the way.
“objects are impermanent and changing moment to moment so that they should be viewed as much or more as a process than as a fixed thing?”
I don’t understand what this means. It would imply that since you and I aging every day, that you and I should be viewed as a process of aging rather than as entities which undergo aging???? LOL
Yes. We should be viewed as a process of aging, not as entities that are aging. This is the only logical conclusion if you consider impermanence in a deep way.
You have defined existence to include impermanence (existence in space time as an element of the definition). However, the impermanence that you are willing to accept as intrinsic to existence is a fixed, conceptual impermanence. You say that a flower exists and you are including within that a fixed concept of deterioration over time. This concept of existence is partial logic — it is a generalization (just as your concept of flower is a generalization).
The other aspect of your definition is that things that exist have attributes. This is the same as saying that existence implies interdependence. None of these attributes, of course, are permanent. All depend on relationships and comparisons. And if you were to view the “thing” in isolation, it would have no attributes.
This is why interdependence implies emptiness — to use the Buddhist term. And because you have acknowledged that interdependence is included in the definition of existence, you have established the connection between existence and emptiness (or as a Buddhist would say, appearance and emptiness).
“You say that it is meaningless to speak of perception and reasoning as being fallible or infallible, because “They are just what they are and no question of their being right or wrong arises.” If no question of their being right or wrong arises, that seems to me to imply that they can also not be plausible, implausible, reliable or unreliable, for they are just what they are and no question of their being right or wrong arises. Would you agree with that claim?”
The crucial idea here is “necessary condition”. Perception and reasoning are the necessary conditions of knowing whether a claim is true or false, reliable or unreliable, whether something exists or does not exist. Hence, truth and falsity, reliability and unreliability do not apply to perception and reasoning themselves. Obviously, if we make distinctions between truth and falsity, reliability, and unreliability, existence and non-existence, this presupposes the existence and operations of their necessary conditions. So, the denial of perception and reasoning, the denial that we perceive and reason is utter nonsense.
“Would you also agree that what you have said about perception and reasoning applies transitively to common sense, so that it too cannot be said to be fallible or infallible?”
You need to consider the distinction I have made among the three strands of the fabric of common sense. The common sense conceptual structure is presupposed in making the distinction between truth and falsity, and, hence, in making the distinction between infallibility and fallibility. It is a necessary condition of that making those distinctions. Hence, it makes no sense say that the common sense conceptual structure is itself infallible or fallible.
I have already shown that it makes no sense to attribute “error” or “unreliability” to the common sense ways of knowing, perception and reasoning.
That leaves us with stock of judgments which constitute common sense knowledge. Only of these judgments, can we meaningfully assert that they are infallible or fallible, reliable or unreliable. I have already shown that fallible common sense judgments are nevertheless reliable in just the way fallible scientific and technological judgments are nevertheless reliable.
“If the answer is yes to both questions, it would seem that you are implying that common sense as a category can also not be said to be plausible, implausible, reliable or unreliable. If that is so, I think we may actually be in agreement. Let us see.”
See the last paragraph in my response above.
“Thinking is inherently flawed.” is meaningless. It would imply that when I think about what to have for lunch, or about seeing my grandmother, my thinking is “flawed” and this makes no sense.
Amod’s gallant attempt to rescue this claim by giving it the meaning “we regularly and frequently get things wrong” doesn’t quite succeed for the reason I have already mentioned. This is vague.
What things? How am I getting anything wrong by thinking that I will go to restaurant X for dinner tonight or take a drive along route Z this weekend or read Santideva’s Bodhicaryavatara later this week? This makes no sense.
Perhaps, we are left with a platitude: there are many examples of false judgments, or claims, or beliefs, held or made by someone or the other.
Well, then, there are also many examples of true judgments, or claims, or beliefs, held or made by someone or the other.
But the number of false judgments or claims or beliefs is vastly greater than the number of true judgments or claims or beliefs? How is this possibly established? One would have to know all the beliefs, claims, or judgments, held or made by all human beings to determine this and that is impossible for obvious reasons.
“Thinking is inherently flawed.”
It’s either meaningless or pointless to make that claim.
A. “We regularly and frequently get things wrong.”
B. “We regularly and frequently get things right.”
Why A rather than B? How do we adjudicate between them?
“we regularly and frequently get things wrong”
If true, this would obliterate the distinction between the intelligent and unintelligent, but also, more importantly, between the expert and the non-expert.
I would like to address a key passage in Amod’s recent post:
“The distinction made here was surprising to me. As it is described here, the distinction between infallibility (on one hand) and plausibility or reliability (on the other) appears to be a distinction between truth and justification.”
The category of reliable judgments included both true judgments and plausible (reasonable to believe because highly likely to be true, to work, or happen)judgments. Hence, the central distinction is not between infallibility and reliability, but between two types of reliable judgments, the infallible or the true and the plausible or highly probable.
“If something is infallible, that means that it is actually true. If it is merely plausible or reliable, that in turn means that it is worthy of being accepted as true, worthy of our trust, credible, believable – that is, we are justified in believing it.”
We are justified in believing both the infallible and the reliable. Hence, justification does not serve as as a criterion of distinction between the infallible and the reliable.
Again, it is not an issue of the distinction between the infallible and the reliable since the infallible is obviously reliable. Rather, it is an issue of understanding that the reliable includes not just the infallible but also the plausible or highly probable.
So, X is reliable if and only if we are justified in believing in X.
And, we are justified in believing X if and only if X is either infallible, or plausible or highly probable.
Therefore, X is reliable if and only if X is either infallible, or plausible, or highly probable.
I am inclined to view probability in objective terms as a function of probability weighting rather than in purely subjective terms of strength of belief or confidence or conviction, e.g., it is the available evidence which determines the plausibility or the probability that there will be a hurricane in a certain area.
“Plausibility and reliability are about justification, not truth as such. And there must be a distinction between the two, for Thill’s entire argument depends on there being a significant difference between infallibility and reliability (or plausibility), and with these terms defined thus, that requires a distinction between justification and truth.”
A true belief is a justified belief. A plausible belief or a belief concerning what is objectively highly probable is also a justified belief. We are justified in subscribing to both. Hence, the concept of justification does not drive a wedge between the infallible and the plausible or highly probable.
What distinguishes the infallible and the plausible or the highly probable is obviously the negligible likelihood of error, the negligible element of uncertainty, in the latter. But this negligible likelihood of error, the element of uncertainty, does not detract from reliability. Science, technology, and our everyday transactions are all based on this truth.
“If we are only justified in believing those things that are actually true, then only the infallible (that which must be true) is reliable (that which we are justified in believing); but that is exactly what Thill’s argument requires him to deny. For Thill there must exist some claims which are reliable but not infallible; and according to the definitions above, these are claims which are at least potentially false but which we are nevertheless justified in believing.”
What do you mean by “potentially false” here? Mere logical possibility of falsehood? If so, that’s irrelevant here. What is important is the likelihood of falsity. This a matter of probability theory. If you show that X is improbable, then you have shown that it is not plausible to believe that X is the case or will be the case. This would show that the judgment that X is the case or will be the case is unreliable.
“If we are never justified in believing false things, then the distinction between reliability and infallibility – as expressed here – collapses.”
But it is a misuse of the word “reliable” to equate it with falsity. When we say that something is reliable, we may not necessarily mean that it is infallible, but we certainly don’t mean “falsity”. That would be inconsistent!
Certainly, you do not subscribe to the false alternatives “infallible or false”? Everyday life, science, and technology all depend on there being a third alternative, the plausible or highly probable.
“We are never justified in believing a false judgment.” If this is true, it certainly does not entail “We are never justified in believing a plausible or highly probable claim”.
So, I don’t think Amod has undermined my distinction between two types of reliable claims, the infallible and the plausible or highly probable. These are the types of claims one appeals to in appealing to common sense knowledge.
If we occasionally get sums wrong, is it because we are not really doing arithmetic? Is Thill saying something like this? Does he take C.S. to be an overarching, self correcting M.O. which if we fall from it is not thereby fallible anymore than Arithmetic is fallible when we fail to ‘carry’. Is there a whiff of Platonic ideality about this view, but with the tribute of inversion of doxa and episteme?
Does C.S. split on some issues, freedom of the will for instance and if it does what higher court decides?
Does Amod agree that what is plausible or highly probable, e.g., many judgments in science and technology, is also reliable?
At this point, I think it depends on the meanings of the concepts of “plausible” and “reliable,” which still seem to involve a great deal of equivocation.
The definitions above (“worthy of being accepted as true or reasonable” and “credible; trustworthy; dependable”) are ambiguous. If a set of claims X is described as “plausible” or “reliable” on these definitions, this description could mean one of two different things about X:
1. The set X is right most of the time, and therefore we should believe it as long as we have no particular reason to believe otherwise.
2. Any statement which denies any member of X should be presumed wrong.
I’m fine with accepting #1 where X is most of the cases at issue: knowledge claims derived from perception, reasoning, scientific evidence and maybe even “common sense” itself, at least if I can figure out what Thill means by the latter now that he’s wobbling back and forth so much between a foundational conceptual structure and the lack of specialized training.
I’m not fine with accepting #2. That a claim Y denies X (in whichever of these cases) is one strike against Y, one reason not to believe it. It is not a definitive or final reason not to believe it.
Incidentally, Jabali, Thill said a while ago that the concept of probability does not apply to metaphysical claims. Do you believe the same?
“Incidentally, Jabali, Thill said a while ago that the concept of probability does not apply to metaphysical claims. Do you believe the same?”
How do you assign probability values to the claim that there is a soul or that God exists or that everything we see is “illusory”?
If someone claims that we can know by means other than perception and/or reasoning, I would be mighty interested in the basis for this claim. Hopefully, this other mysterious means is not the stale “verbal testimony” of Indian philosophy. It’s just a form of reasoning, an appeal to the authority of an “expert” or scripture.
Those who claim that God cannot be known by means of perception and/or reasoning have the burden of explaining the alternative means by which her existence is known. What is it? Intuition? What is it? “Samadhi” or “superconsciousness”? What is it?
Thill (above): Well, if by “caricature” you mean that the point I made was irrelevant to your position, then no, it was not; as my followup comment makes clear, I think it quite appropriate in terms of content. What I was hoping was that you were disappointed by the snide, sarcastic tone which has increasingly come to characterize posts in both directions, and might be willing to work together to raise the tone so that our disagreements may be more constructive and helpful. If I misread your use of “caricature” in that sense, then no, I concede nothing.
I hope the critical discussion continues between Amod & Co and Thill & Co. The more acute the reasoned criticisms, counterarguments, alternative proposals, etc., the better it is for the understanding.
Incidentally, respect is something which is properly accorded to persons, not to claims, arguments, positions, beliefs, theories, explanations, etc. If it is fine to advocate the latter for good reasons, it is also permissible to decry, condemn, eviscerate, and ridicule them for good reasons.
Unfortunately, humans tend to treat beliefs, theories, etc., as akin to their personal property and treat any attack on them as akin to an attack on their personal property. Or, worse, they delusively identify with the beliefs, etc., and treat any attack on them as an attack on their person or identity.
I hope we can transcend or overcome these flaws and continue with the search for clarity and truth on the issues raised.
This overlooks the fact that beliefs, theories, etc., have a function in a person’s psyche and life. There are deep connections between sincerely held beliefs or views and the emotional life of a person. This is the reason religious and metaphysical beliefs and views, once adopted on the basis of emotional needs, including the need for an identity, are generally impervious to the possibility of change on grounds of reasons, evidence, etc.
There are also connections to vested interests. Doctrines and theories which legitimize vested interests are defended with recourse to force and persecution because those vested interests are at stake.
All this raises the odds considerably against the probability of the prevalence of rationality or the force of good reasons alone and justifies a good measure of skepticism concerning the wisdom of engaging in debates on objects of religious or philosophical or political conviction.
Those who care about clarity and truth should pursue inquiry and discussion with like-minded individuals regardless of any emotional manipulation, e.g., “Your criticisms of Christianity hurt my feelings.”, “Your criticism that Madhyamika metaphysics is nonsensical offended me.”, and so on. Let us go where good reasons lead us and leave behind those who wallow in their “emotional needs”.
BTW, some religious beliefs may serve a person’s “emotional need” to hurt, persecute, or exercise tyranny over others. Some metaphysical views may also serve a person’s “emotional need” to downplay the achievements of others in various fields of discovery and invention. So, the appeal to “emotional need” does not automatically justify religious belief or a metaphysical view. We want to know what sort of emotional need is involved, but even this does not justify the belief or view. It can only explain the person’s espousal of the belief or view.
I am sure that Amod and other contributors to this blog want to move on to other topics. I thank them for their contributions to the discussion. I intend to continue with my inquiry into common sense on my own blogs “The Baloney Detective” and “The Way of Ordinary Wisdom”. Here is my current perspective on common sense:
1. There is a basic, fundamental, common, bedrock, and indispensable framework of knowledge. The term “common sense” is notoriously vague, but I propose that “common sense” or “common sense knowledge” should refer to this framework of knowledge. The appeal to common sense is the appeal to this framework of knowledge.
2. It is a framework of knowledge and not of mere belief. Hence, it is characterized by certainty and/or reliability.
3. It includes objective, subjective, and inter-subjective knowledge.
4. It has a conceptual structure or set of basic concepts in terms of which the world is understood.
5. Perception, reasoning, inner cognition or introspection, and memory are the means which produce and sustain this framework of knowledge.
6. Common sense knowledge is expressed in ordinary natural languages in contrast to the artificial, technical languages in which scientific and technological knowledge is typically expressed.
7. The process of acquiring common sense knowledge allows for corrections based on repeated recourse to the means of such knowledge, e.g., perception, reasoning, etc.
8. However, common sense knowledge does not require or depend on special methods of investigation, experiment, and testing characteristic of science and technology. The latter presuppose common sense knowledge.
As you can imagine, I disagree with a significant chunk of this, but I also agree it is time to move on. I look forward to reading your writings on the topic on your own blog; I think it’s the ideal venue for you to expand on your conception of common sense more than you have. Today’s post will be on a topic that is related to the present discussion and in some respects comes out of it, but is set in terms of concepts I find helpful myself rather than those I distrust.
It might be interesting to discuss the connection between common sense and practical action, as a supplement to the discussion about common sense and epistemology/metaphysics/discourse. As an entry point, it seems to me that there are ethical positions that more effectively challenge common sense in practice than, say, practicing solipsists, whatever form that practice might take.
Thank you, TStockmann. I think the point will probably come up in the future. Knowledge about ethics is quite central to my philosophical concerns. I think the debate over “common sense” per se has been going on a little long, at least for the moment, but related points will certainly emerge.
Thank you for these comments, all.
I agree with Jabali that there is an important difference between people and their beliefs, especially for the purposes of a discussion. Thill is right that the distinction is not always as clear as we might wish it to be, but it is nevertheless very important. I don’t think that attacks on people (as opposed to beliefs) have been made on this blog in a while; that is why I haven’t decreed as blog owner that they cease. Some examples of personal attacks may be found in the comments to this post, and I did begin to step in. Fortunately that debate soon expired on its own; if it had continued in that manner, I might have had to threaten to ban participants, and follow up on the threat if it continued.
Generally speaking, we have managed to keep our attacks on positions and beliefs rather than people, which is as it should be. However, that doesn’t mean all approaches to beliefs with which one disagrees are equally good.
I do think it is important to have respect for the beliefs of one’s debate interlocutors or intellectual opponents. I use the words “respect” and “respectful” because one can express disagreement, even strong disagreement, with opponents’ beliefs without deriding those beliefs.
Consider the difference between:
“The world is full of suffering, which an omnipotent God, by definition, can prevent; therefore the idea of a God who is both omnipotent and omnibenevolent is absurd.”
and:
“An omnipotent and omnibenevolent God who creates suffering! What an asinine idiocy!”
Both quotations have more or less the same content, express the same ideas, make the same argument. The second one does no more to bring out truth than does the first. At best, it is equal. At worst, it interferes with the process of finding truth, because it baits, it taunts, it raises defences, it encourages irrational reactions. I find it quite unhelpful to choose the second form over the first.
Sometimes the content of a truth itself (or a position sincerely proffered as truth) may hurt a participant’s feelings; then the hurt feelings are unavoidable and must be part of any sincere seeking the truth. But this isn’t always the case. Indeed I think most of the time it is not. More often, the hurt comes from other participants phrasing their positions in a way more insulting than necessary – something I freely admit having done in earlier comments to this post. It is possible to seek truth and simultaneously respect the other participants’ beliefs in a debate. It’s harder to do that than it is to insult those beliefs, which is why I’ve strayed from that ideal recently. It’s still worth trying.
Just a last little yelp as the caravan passes on. Whereas as an ontological realist I agree that occasional/adventitious error does not hollow out our innate beliefs about the world what has been called common sense here, I at the same time do not agree that common sense in its turn hollows out what has been called with a pejorative emphasis, metaphysics. At its most basic that subject would include be such questions as – how is perception possible, what is the link between conscious states and brain events, does such a question make any sense etc. The onus is on the proposers of ‘solo sensus communis’ to show that metaphysics must be abandoned.
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