Tags
Bret W. Davis, conferences, Emmanuel Lévinas, Japan, Kyoto School, Martin Buber, Nishida Kitarō, nondualism, SACP, Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī, skholiast (blogger)
I’m currently at the 2010 SACP conference in Asilomar. I had the good fortune to be on a panel about emptiness with Bret Davis, who was presenting on the Kyoto School philosophy, especially Nishida Kitarō. Davis’s discussion of Nishida and Ueda pushed me to think further about the idea of irreducible encounter, which I’d recently examined in posting about Skholiast and Ken Wilber.
I’ll admit often feeling a certain impatience with philosophers of encounter like Lévinas (which probably makes me what Skholiast called an “ātmanist”). It has never been clear to me why, exactly, we’re supposed to be so limitlessly bound by “the Other” (usually with the capital letters). Lévinas’s philosophy strikes me as ruthlessly Abrahamic: at its core is a bowing and scraping before God, drastically opposed to any embrace of the divine with ourselves, parallel to Sirhindī‘s insistence on God’s distance from his creation. As I noted in the comments to that post, Sirhindī advocated not merely intolerance to, but subjugation of, indigenous Indian traditions. Likewise Davis, in our conversation after his talk, noted that Lévinas uses the term “pagan” in an extraordinarily negative sense; his Abrahamism reminds me of Tertullian asking rhetorically “What has Athens do to with Jerusalem?” And while I am somewhat uncomfortable with the lack of humility expressed in a humanist view, I’m even more uncomfortable with trusting an Abrahamic god.
Davis’s talk, however, helped me put many of these ideas in perspective. Nishida’s thought, it turns out, is close to Lévinas’s in a number of ways, though far removed from Abrahamic traditions. (Intriguingly, Nishida even wrote a book entitled I and Thou, while apparently entirely unaware of Buber‘s work of the same title.) Nishida tells us that “there is no universal that would subsume I and thou,” for that would deny the individuality and otherness of the two terms. The other must remain other. Nishida has a Zen take on the matter rather than an Abrahamic one: there must be something shared between the self and the other or no encounter can take place; but one must speak of this shared universal as emptying itself out, a “None” rather than a “One.”
But why should we think this way? A particularly evocative quote in Davis’s talk helped give me a clue in explanation: “I am truly myself by way of not being myself; I live by dying.” Now it seems like we are dealing with the paradoxes of hedonism: when all we seek is our own happiness, we don’t get it. We are most fulfilled when we live for something bigger than ourselves; a life centred entirely on the self will fail even on its own terms. Perhaps I’m getting more sympathetic to this sort of view as I approach marriage – realizing the fulfillment in a life choice that requires a certain self-overcoming, requires you to live for someone else as they live for you.
JimWilton said:
I think the normal Zen take on the matter is “not two” rather than “none”.
But this is only if you need to talk about it. The better approach is sometimes a slap upside the head.
Amod Lele said:
Yes, fair enough – but that it is “Not One” is just as important as that it is “Not Two,” and I think that’s what Nishida is getting at.
skholiast said:
When I was about to get married, a friend of mine, who studies seriously under a Sufi master, cited a hadith to me. I haven’t tracked it down but I assume it’s legit; to wit (more or less): the Prophet (p.b.u.h.) said, If you want to get close to Allah, get yourself married.
I’ve looked into Hiroshi Kojima’s Monad and Thou and the Kyoto school is very interesting to me. One of my favorite works– though not one I claim to have plumbed deeply– is Tanabe’s Philosophy as Metanoetics. Nishida’s essay “I and Thou” is new to me, and I am not sure the book it is in has been translated, but he does treat the dialectic of self (or non-self) and other in a number of works, more and more towards the end of his life.
While I see encounter as an irreducible, I am also coming (again) to see the very strong appeal of monism, which I suppose can’t really help but be atmanism when one turns to consciousness. I am not convinced, but I think monism can be too quickly dismissed, and I’ve been guilty of this myself in the past (perhaps as a reaction to being strongly attracted to it initially).
There is no question that Levinas speaks hyperbolically (I think Ricouer points this out somewhere), which is not to say this excuses excess, nor that Levians would ask to be excused. I think he means his hyperbole; I suspect he might say that there are some realities one cannot express except without recourse to such tropes. E.g. his frequent quotation from The Brothers Karamazov, “Each of us is guilty before everyone for everyone, and I more than the others.” He pushes for a decision, an act by the intellect and will together; he’s not spinning theories. In this he’s faithful to Kierkegaard and in his way to Heidegger, even the “later” Heidegger who he didn’t like so well (see e.g. secs. 43-49 in H’s Contributions, which I will now need to re-read with Nishida in mind). But Levinas was after all a philosopher, and no Tertulllian; even as he calls for choice, he does so in an idiom that is all about meditation. He well knew that the debate between Athens and Jerusalem would not be settled. It is ongoing. While we live in time, the question will be suspended–but cannot be tabled.
Amod Lele said:
I would love to learn more about the Kyoto School; I’ve had relatively little chance to explore them so far. My most in-depth exploration of them so far was a paper that I wrote on Nishitani in the first year of my PhD, and I knew I was only scratching the surface.
I’m coming to see more appeal in encounter traditions, though I remain a little suspicious; but if I were to really try and think them through, it would probably involve some relation to monism. I have a feeling that the attempt to resolve the tension between monism and encounter may be at the heart of the Christian Trinity. Perhaps one can still technically be nondual by virtue of being triune?
skholiast said:
Yes, I think you are right. While I am sure that the Trinitarian definitions are about experience first and doctrine second, it might be a pretty close second. By this I mean that while the church fathers were clearly trying to resolve intellectual tensions between unity and relation, and to stave off possible misconstruals or mis-applications of previous formulae, they always do this in reference to the experience of the saints.
In a rather different register, I think Hegel also tries to marry encounter with monism in this way; also Peirce.
Amod Lele said:
Funny, I’d never thought of Hegel in those terms, as influenced by him as I am. But you’re surely right – the dialectic is all about encounter.
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