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Advaita Vedānta, Arthur Schopenhauer, Dermot Killingley, Engaged Buddhism, Hajime Nakamura, Joel Brereton, nondualism, Paul Deussen, Paul Hacker, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Swami Vivekānanda, Upaniṣads
In studying Indian philosophy today one is often confronted with a question that can be surprisingly tricky: what counts as Indian philosophy, anyway? Sometimes what we think of as ancient Indian thought might be something quite different.
Perhaps the boldest statement of this point was the 1962 article “Schopenhauer and Hindu ethics,” by the late German Indologist Paul Hacker (now translated in a collection of Hacker’s writings by Hacker’s student Wilhelm Halbfass). Hacker is reacting against what was until that point a commonplace in the presentation of Indian philosophy – an interpretation presented as uncomplicated fact, for example, in Hajime Nakamura’s A Comparative History of Ideas – which turns out to have a far more modern provenance.
The commonplace in question is what Hacker calls the tat tvam asi ethic, an idea found above all in the works of Swami Vivekānanda. This ethic is Vivekānanda’s influential attempt to use Advaita Vedānta to support an altruistically engaged politics, closely parallel to what would come to be called Engaged Buddhism; it would later be picked up enthusiastically by other modern Hindu thinkers like Radhakrishnan. Tat tvam asi is the Chāndogya Upaniṣad’s famous teaching that “you are that,” that each of us individual people is ultimately identical to the supreme principle of the universe, brahman. This idea of personal identity with brahman is standard in the Advaita Vedānta tradition of Śaṅkara and others. (Joel Brereton argued, in an article helpfully reproduced here, that tat tvam asi‘s original meaning in the Chāndogya is actually quite different, but that’s another story.) But Vivekānanda adds something else: an ethics of altruism. Because each of us is identical with brahman, we are therefore also all each identical with everyone else. And therefore if we really understood how things were, we would help out everyone else:
There are moments when every man feels that he is one with the universe, and he rushes forth to express it, whether he knows it or not. This expression of oneness is what we call love and sympathy, and it is the basis of all our ethics and morality. This is summed up in the Vedånta philosophy by the celebrated aphorism, Tat Tvam Asi, “Thou art That.” To every man, this is taught: Thou art one with this Universal Being, and, as such, every soul that exists, is your soul; and every body that exists, is your body; and in hurting any one, you hurt yourself, in loving any one, you love yourself. (Collected Works of Swami Vivekānanda, Mayavati Memorial Edition, I.388-9)
Against this “tat tvam asi ethic,” Hacker thinks he has found a smoking gun of sorts. A scholar with a background in Engaged Buddhism and similar movements might expect that such political engagement is a modern Indian invention; but Hacker goes a step further. For him this ethic is not even Indian at all, but an invention of German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. In his 1841 work On the Basis of Morality, which identified compassion as the fundamental basis for morality, Schopenhauer claimed:
In Sanskrit tat tvam asi (this art thou) is the formula, the standing expression, for this knowledge. It is this that bursts forth as compassion on which all genuine, i.e. disinterested, virtue therefore depends, and whose real expression is every good deed. In the last resort, it is this knowledge to which every appeal to gentleness, leniency, loving-kindness, and mercy instead of justice, is directed. For such an appeal is a reminder of that respect in which we are all one and the same entity. (Schopenhauer, E.F.J. Payne translation, p. 210)
And according to Hacker, Vivekānanda only believed in the tat tvam asi ethic because he got it from Schopenhauer! It happened indirectly, through the well connected Indologist Paul Deussen – a mutual friend of Schopenhauer and Vivekānanda (and Nietzsche), who believed that tat tvam asi could be a strong support for compassion and activism (though it had not actually been such in Indian history). Looking through Vivekānanda’s writings, Hacker finds that before Vivekānanda met Deussen in September 1896, he lamented that Vedānta (specifically meaning Advaita) was an impediment to altruism and social service. Based on the journals of others present at the 1896 meeting, Deussen and Vivekānanda almost certainly discussed the tat tvam asi ethic there; and after that meeting, Vivekānanda began giving a great number of enthusiastic speeches proclaiming that Advaita Vedānta offered the highest support for compassion and social activism. (Both Hacker and Vivekānanda tend to use the concepts of morality, compassion, activism and social service almost interchangeably; I think my dissertation demonstrates that this is a great conflation, but that too is another story.) Hacker concludes that the link between Vedānta and compassion was effectively conjured up by Schopenhauer, and adopted by modern Indians only because Schopenhauer’s idea passed to Vivekānanda through Deussen.
Is Hacker’s account right? Dermot Killingley’s “Vivekānanda’s Western message from the East” (in William Radice’s unfortunately OOP Swami Vivekānanda and the Modernization of Hinduism) has demonstrated that it is likely overstated. Killingley shows that Vivekānanda had started making some claims similar to the tat tvam asi ethic before he had met Deussen. The encounter with Deussen probably crystallized the idea of the tat tvam asi ethic in Vivekānanda’s mind, but he had had most of the basic idea already. Like the Engaged Buddhists, Vivekānanda had already been searching for ways to bring together his ancient tradition with the modern Western idea of political engagement; his encounter with a Westerner helped him develop the idea, but the Westerner doesn’t deserve all the credit. And as with Yavanayāna Buddhism, the idea’s modern provenance should not necessarily discredit it.
The story Hacker tells is an interesting one. But from the point of view of my current philosophical interests, still more interesting are the reasons why he tells it. I will turn to that point next time.
skholiast said:
I doubt that Schopenhauer’s interpretation just got smuggled into Indian philosophy without the ground being prepared for it. But I have often been struck that altruism is hardly the only ethic that has historically been drawn from the assertion of the oneness of all things. The most obvious locus is the Gita, of course, where the lesson seems to be: since there is no real difference between you and the fellow you are aiming your arrow at–fire away! Of course it’s more complex– there’s an extensive account of karma and right conduct and so on– but it does go to show that there’s nothing immediately self-evident about Vivekananda’s application.
Amod Lele said:
I agree with this. Interestingly, though, the Gītā itself was one of the favourite texts for Schopenhauer, Deussen and Vivekānanda in supporting the tat tvam asi ethic, and is a major part of Hacker’s polemic. (I didn’t address this point in the post itself because it was already pretty long.) Verses XIII.27-8 say that “he who sees the supreme lord existing alike in all beings… does not harm the self by the self” (na hinasty ātmanā ‘tmānaṃ). But yes, given the context of the rest of the Gītā, it seems awfully forced to take that passage as meaning “one should not harm others because in so doing one harms oneself.” Examining the passage in the light of other passages in the Gītā and related literature that say very similar things and explain them in more detail, Hacker takes it as meaning that one who sees the supreme self does not harm his own self through greed and craving, which seems pretty plausible to me – much more so than Vivekānanda’s interpretation, given that the Gītā’s exoteric message is indeed one of war. Rāmānuja seems to say something like this: that the verse means the true seer doesn’t injure himself with his mind. Śaṅkara, for his part, takes these verses to mean that the ignorant person harms the changing entity which he takes to be his true self, because he doesn’t see the real unchanging self underlying it.
Thill said:
I am sorry, Amod! I regret to inform you that “Tat Tvam Asi Ethics” is the mother of all truncated nonsense!
If you are identical to That, and “That” is Brahman, then only you exist, according to Advaita, because Brahman is the sole existent. There are no others. So, ethics, understood in terms of prescriptions for one’s relations with others, is impossible.
If you are That, you are perfect! How then is ethics possible even construed in terms of “Care of the Self”?
Thill said:
“But I have often been struck that altruism is hardly the only ethic that has historically been drawn from the assertion of the oneness of all things. The most obvious locus is the Gita, of course, where the lesson seems to be: since there is no real difference between you and the fellow you are aiming your arrow at–fire away!”
I fail to see how any prescription concerning “others” can be based on the doctrine of oneness sinc eaccording to that doctrine there are no others!
Be that as it may, the injunction to fire away at the opponent, in the Gita, is based, in addition to the appeal to the duty of a warrior and the earthly and heavenly rewards of performing those duties, on the immortality of the soul and not on the alleged oneness between Arjuna and his opponents. Since Arjuna does not want to destroy his kinsmen and former teachers, Krishna argues against Arjuna’s belief that he is actually destroying his kinsmen and former teachers by killing their bodies.
But this fails to address Arjuna’s concern for the adverse consequences of destroying the bodies of his kinsmen and former teachers. Arjuna’s appeal to those adverse consequences of killing the bodies of his kinsmen and former teachers is not refuted by Krishna’s appeal to the (doctrine of) the immortality of the soul. Krishna’s response is a fallacy of irrelevance.
michael reidy said:
It does seems unnecessary to use a mahavakya with ontological import to enjoin compassion when the Dharma Sastras are full of rules about charity for all the castes and orders of life. Perhaps an overarching slogan was needed which would transcend the structural divisions of Hindu* life. He gave the country pride when he was lionised in America. As the saying goes if you but melted snowballs in Chicago you are a physicist at home.
Amod Lele said:
Good point: Vivekānanda was likely grasping for a more “universal Hindu” ideal, one that would transcend caste distinctions.
Thill said:
“Thou art one with this Universal Being, and, as such, every soul that exists, is your soul; and every body that exists, is your body; and in hurting any one, you hurt yourself, in loving any one, you love yourself.” (Collected Works of Swami Vivekānanda, Mayavati Memorial Edition, I.388-9)
This sounds stirring, Herr Vivekananda! But, then, how do you reconcile these stirring statements with your whirring advocacy of non-vegetarianism? Aren’t you hurting yourself by killing animals and eating their flesh? LOL
But wait a minute! These “stirring statements” contain contradictions:
“every soul that exists is your soul”. This affirms and denies in the same breath that there are other souls! Why not just say plainly that only your soul exists?
“every body that exists, is your body”. This affirms and denies in the same breath that there are other bodies! Why not just say plainly that only your body exists?
“Social service” then becomes nonsense. There isn’t even one other individual, body, or soul to do service to!!!
Thill said:
Are TTA (Tat Tvam Asi) and ABA (Aham Brahmasmi) examples of a pathology of the intellect?
It looks plausible that they are. If I claim that I am identical to a cat or that you are, I am ready for the loony bin! If I claim that I am identical to the Sun or that you are, I am ready for the loony bin! If I claim that I am identical to Barack Obama or that you are, I am ready for the loony bin. If I claim that I am identical to Indra or Zeus or that you are, I am ready for the loony bin. How is it that when I claim that I am identical to Brahman, the absolute or ultimate reality, or the being greater than which nothing can exist, or that you are identical to Brahman, I am lauded as a great philosopher or mystic and appointed head of an ashram and not carted off to the loony bin? Is it because I have flattered you in a manner which cannot be surpassed?
And what are the psychological roots of a denial of the reality of others or of anything other than one’s “Self”? Is it some mega form of narcissism unanticipated in textbooks on pathology? What could beat that form of narcissism or self-absorption, self-love, and self-affirmation which has culminated in a denial of the existence of others, or rather, of anything other than one’s “Self”?
Could Advaita be the culmination of mega-pathological narcissism! LOL
Thill said:
Or rather, I should ask: Could Advaita be the product of a mega narcissistic disorder?
Thill said:
I heartily recommend Narasingha P. Sil’s book “Swami Vivekananda: A Reassessment”. It deflates various bombastic myths on Vivekananda. See Chap. 6 on “Vivekananda’s Humanitarian and Social Thought”.
Ethics, and particularly an ethic of benevolence or compassion, presupposes the reality of other selves and the reality of their suffering. If it is true, as Shankara claimed, that “jivo brahmaiva na parah”, i.e., “the living individual (jiva) and Brahman are identical”, then there are no other selves to relate to in actuality. This undermines any foundation, not to mention a metaphysical foundation, for ethics.
Schopenhauer’s curious metaphysics of “oneness” entails that compassion is a form of self-love and self-pity since the other is identical to oneself. Far from supporting compassion, his metaphysics of oneness reduces it to self-love and self-pity in just the way a Hobbesian analysis reduces benevolence to self-love.
Thill said:
I must clarify that I do not mean that Schopenhauer intends to reduce compassion to self-pity or self-love, but that this is what his metaphysics of oneness logically ends up doing to compassion which, Schopenhauer also paradoxically acknowledges, is the very paradigm of an other-oriented emotion or state of mind.
Amod Lele said:
This is basically true as far as it goes, but I suspect that’s not very far. I take up the point further in today’s post: that an ethics is ultimately self-interested is not necessarily a slam against it; nor is a benevolence rooted in self-love necessarily not benevolence.
Thill said:
The point is not that “ethical egoism” is impossible, but rather that even this “ethical egoism” assumes the reality of the other(s)because one of its cardinal principles is that one ought to promote the interests of others if it is in one’s own interests to do so!
As Schopenhauer argued in “On the Basis of Morality”: “…compassion as the sole non-egoistic motive, is also the only genuinely moral one”. This is because it is an essential feature of compassion that you want to alleviate the weal or woe of the other for the sake of the other. In terms of Schopnehauer’s analysis of the three-fold sources of human action, viz., egoism, malice, and compassion, compassion is incompatible with egoism and malice. So, it would make no sense for him if you say that “compassion rooted in self-love (egoism, narcissism?) does not cease to be compassion”. For Schopenhauer, the very nature of compassion excludes egoism or self-love.
In philosophy we can produce such interesting and baffling statements:
“Compassion rooted in self-love does not cease to be compassion.”
“Pride rooted in shame does not cease to be pride.”
“Courage rooted in cowardice does not cease to be courage.”
“Love rooted in hate does not cease to be love.”
“Admiration rooted in contempt does not cease to be admiration.”
“Temperance rooted in excess does not cease to be temperance.”
“Virtue rooted in vice does not cease to be virtue.”
I suspect that an aura of profundity emanating from such statements prevents the audience from seeing through the nonsense in their core.
Amod Lele said:
You may be right about Schopenhauer. I barely know even the outlines of his thought; it may be that there is a contradiction at its core, if he believes that compassion or benevolence are essentially for the other’s sake. Then his thought turns out to be a conflation of the two concepts of altruism which I intend to discuss in this coming Sunday’s post.
As for the seemingly contradictory statements you list, however, none of them strikes me as essentially nonsensical. Much depends on definition and circumstance.
Some examples:
One might hold a deep contempt for something in oneself (say, one’s cowardice) and for that very reason, admire the same behaviour in others. This is an admiration rooted in contempt which does not cease to be admiration.
More broadly, one might have spent one’s formative years immersed in vice, in a way that made one see the flaws of this vice so clearly that one spent one’s adulthood seeking virtue. Had one (in this case) had a more moderate adolescence, one would have been less concerned to pursue virtue as an adult, and therefore been less virtuous. This is a virtue rooted in vice which does not cease to be virtue; this case could probably apply, mutatis mutandis, to many of the rest of the statements you list.
Thill said:
I see that depending on how you construe “rooted in” in these statements, you can make them coherent.
Thill said:
Bingo! The “devas of illumination” just did me a favor! LOL
If you take “rooted in” in the sense of “motivated by”, then you could definitely claim in all coherence that “Courage motivated by (recognition of one’s) cowardice does not cease to be courage”, “Virtue motivated by (recognition of one’s) vice does not cease to be virtue” and so on. I will grant this.
However, what I had in mind when I adopted your term “rooted in” was “reduced to”. So, my claim is that “Compassion reduced to self-love does not cease to be compassion.”, “Courage reduced to cowardice does not cease to be courage”, etc., are nonsensical. If you have reduced compassion to self-love, or to the “machinations” of the “selfish gene”, then you have eliminated compassion. It then makes no sense to claim that you still have compassion. What you have is self-love, or the “machinations” of the “selfish gene”.
Thus, any statement of the form “X even when reduced to Y does not cease to be X” is nonsenical. Hence all of the following instances of it are nonsensical:
“Compassion reduced to self-love does not cease to be compassion.”
“Pride reduced to shame does not cease to be pride.”
“Courage reduced to cowardice does not cease to be courage.”
“Love reduced to hate does not cease to be love.”
“Admiration reduced to contempt does not cease to be admiration.”
“Temperance reduced to excess does not cease to be temperance.”
“Virtue reduced to vice does not cease to be virtue.”
michael reidy said:
Thill:
It’s probably not safe to go global on the basis of slogans. If you view the self (lower case) as the ultimate source and centre of reality then it may well the case that enlightened egotism, utilitarianism or some other nice calculation might be the spring of action. Shankara and Vivekananda are reminding us that this is a partial view and that ‘Brahmanasmi’ (I am Brahman) is the counterweight. It’s Self vs self, knockout or submission to decide the winner.
Thill said:
What slogans? “I am Brahman” has no weight at all because it has no mass or substance! So, it can’t possibly provide a “counter-weight” to anything.
To use your slogans, if the “I” in “I am Brahman” is the individual self (small “s”), then this is patent nonsense for reasons I don’t even have to take the trouble to point out.
On the other hand, if this “I” is the Self or Atman(big “S”), then the falsely glorified, alleged mahavakya “I am Brahman” is just stating that “Brahman is Brahman”, a mere tautology!
So much for “going global on slogans”!
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