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Alasdair MacIntyre, Brāḥmaṇas, Friedrich Nietzsche, Hebrew Bible, Jesus, Leo XIII, modernity, Pali suttas, Qur'an, Siddhattha Gotama (Buddha)
Alasdair MacIntyre, especially in his Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry, has frequently tried to make the case that adequate moral inquiry needs to be embedded within a tradition. In the book he makes the case by arguing that Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris shows a fuller and more adequate understanding of the attempts to get beyond tradition (Nietzsche’s genealogy and the Ninth Edition of Encyclopedia Britannica) than they show of themselves or each other. I’m not going to address the details of his case here. But I want to note one point that MacIntyre frequently seems to shy away from: for Leo XIII and the Catholic tradition that precedes him, it is not the case that adequate moral inquiry must take place within a tradition. Rather, it must take place within this tradition, the universal and apostolic Catholic Church. The inquiries of the Confucians or Muslims are not significantly better, in this respect, than those of deracinated cosmopolitans like the Encyclopedists or Nietzsche.
In this, MacIntyre skirts around on an idea that endures through the history of the Abrahamic traditions: that the ultimate truth is tied to one single historical event, time, place and/or people. It begins with the idea recorded in the Book of Exodus that the Hebrews/Israelites/Jews are God’s chosen people, and continues with the idea that the single human person Jesus of Nazareth was the only begotten human son of God. The Qur’an, too, is a single set of revelations made in a small geographic area to one human person, not adequately translatable (so the claim goes) into a language other than the original, which is better than any other revelation that has been or will be made.
It is in this context that I am intrigued by the Buddhist claim that there are multiple buddhas. While this claim is much more pronounced in the Mahāyāna, it is clearly there from the early Pali Buddhist texts. The Pali texts speak all the time of buddhas at different times and places in the universe. These buddhas include many pratyekabuddhas – people who attained liberation on their own, but didn’t teach it to anyone else.
What is striking to me about this view is its universality – comparable to the universalist self-conception of modern science and liberalism. Like early Buddhists, liberal scientists believe that the most important truths happened to be found in one particular historical context – the enlightenment of the historical Buddha or the experiments of Westerners from the 16th century or so onward – but there is nothing necessary, or essential, about these events happening in this particular place. Anybody who had done the right experiments with the right equipment could have found out the truths of science – and anyone who had done the right earlier experiments could have made the right equipment. So too, it happens to be that in our era Siddhattha Gotama was the only one who found out the truth on his own, and the only one who can let us find out the truth in our lifetime. But it’s not only possible that people could have done the same in other eras, it’s already happened. Even we could do it – but it would be much, much harder than listening to his teachings. (The idea that we not only could but should do it is what led to the birth of the Mahāyāna, a far more universalist tradition.)
In this way the Buddhists are distinct not merely from the Abrahamic traditions, but from the Vedic traditions they reacted against. In the Brāḥmaṇa texts, the Sanskrit sounds and words of the Vedas are absolutely central to the truth of the universe; and the brahmin varṇa (caste) has privileged access to it. Buddhism was not only more egalitarian about caste; it was also more egalitarian about linguistic and geographic origin, which is surely among the reasons it spread far wider than the Vedic traditions did.
So as it turns out, we see a tension between universal and particular views of truth (and our relation to it) in South Asia as well as the West. I don’t know as much about the East Asian case, but I suspect the same issues were faced there, since early Confucians had a tendency to treat non-Chinese as barbarians.
In nearly all of these cases, the universalist side looks far more sympathetic than the particularist – at least to those of us who are outside each particularist tradition that claims the truth as its own. But the particularists still may be on to something, as MacIntyre notices; I don’t think his way of generalizing from “this tradition” to “a tradition” succeeds, but we may need to think along similar lines. One should unhesitatingly grant the important point of modern scientists, that there is no inherent link between their historical circumstances and the truths they have found. Aliens could have discovered the same ideas, as other buddhas discovered the truth of the dharma. But just as in our age (according to the Pali tradition) only one person actually did find out the Buddha’s truth, so on this earth only the West actually did create modern science, and the various liberal modern ideas that came along with it. There were preconditions in Indian culture that made it possible for Siddhattha Gautama to be liberated there; he only meditated on enlightenment after he’d been a monk for a long time, in one of the relatively few cultural contexts that made monasticism possible at the time. So too, the particular situation of Renaissance Europe made the Western Enlightenment and the growth of modern science and liberalism possible. As I noted last time, our access to universal truth can only come through our particular, historically conditioned, human minds.
Amod makes, as usual, a number of interesting and thought-provoking points.
“There were preconditions in Indian culture that made it possible for Siddhattha Gautama to be liberated there;”
What do we mean by “preconditions” here? Are these necessary conditions, or sufficient conditions, or both, for Gotama’s “liberation”? They can’t be sufficient conditions since there were any number of monastics at that time who were not liberated. So, they must be necessary conditions for Gotama’s liberation.
But we know that we can grasp the necessary conditions for something and yet fail to grasp why it is the way it is. Hence, the necessary condition of monasticism still fails to illuminate the “liberation” of Gautama.
One could also object that monasticism is not even a necessary condition for the “liberation” achieved by Goatama. I will not pursue that here beyond noting that it only leaves one thing on table in its wake: the connection between monasticism and Gotama’s liberation is merely an accidental connection and not a causally significant correlation.
“So too, the particular situation of Renaissance Europe made the Western Enlightenment and the growth of modern science and liberalism possible.”
The reference to “the particular situation of Renaissance Europe” is vague. There are so many aspects of that situation.
There is good evidence of the use of the scientific method in the classical epoch in India and China. The evidence of some striking technological achievements in metallurgy, etc., in India and China implies the use of the scientific method. So, “the particular situation of Renaissance Europe” is not even a necessary condition for the scientific method.
The “particular situation of Renaissance Europe” is not a sufficient condition for the scientific method since statements describing that situation do not imply the existence of the scientific method.
So, again, we are left in the end with this view: the connection between the “particular situation of Renaissance Europe” and the scientific method is purely accidental or coincidental.
If the “Enlightenment” of any individual has causal conditions, internal and external, then the presence of those conditions would result in “enlightenment”. But there are numerous individuals who have met those conditions without achieving “enlightenment”. Hence, “enlightenment” is “acausal” or has no causal conditions. So, the appeal to any external conditions of historical context to account for “enlightenment” is futile.
The Katha Upanishad says that “This Atman cannot be attained by the study of the Vedas, or by intelligence, or by much hearing of sacred books. It is attained by him alone whom It chooses. To such a one Atman reveals Its own form.”
Leaving aside the issue of consistency of this Upanishad on this point, if it is true, then it implies that there are no external and internal causal conditions in human existence for Atman realization. Of course, then the whole edifice of Sadhana, spiritual discipline, practice of the eightfold path, etc., resting on the central notion of the means to enlightenment or Atman realization collapses.
An objection to my previous post could point out that although external conditions of historical context have nothing to do with “enlightenment”, Atman realization, etc., there are indeed necessary internal, but not sufficient, conditions for attaining “enlightenment”, Atman realization, etc.
The most important of these necessary conditions is a single-minded aspiration for “enlightenment”, Atman realization, etc. All the known cases of “enlightenment” are cases in which the individuals in question pursued or aspired single-mindedly for “enlightenment”.
I concede to this objection and now see that there are indeed necessary internal conditions for “enlightenment”, but this still a far cry from Amod’s ideas on the external historical conditions which allegedly made possible Gotama’s “enlightenment”.
My previous argument only succeeds in showing that there are no sufficient conditions, internal or external, for “enlightenment”.
Many imponderables here and yet some apriori empirical rules of thumb apply. A culture that values extreme deference to elders and authority probably will not be one in which science will flourish whatever the external conditions. What potential is trapped by the caste system?
Most intelligent followers of any of the major religious traditions who have made their home there know well that there are faults, patches, leaky roofs and yet they stick with it. There is a disjunction between the eternal reality as they see it and the mundane organisation. It isn’t like a political party where you go looking for the best programme.
I wrote earlier that “All the known cases of “enlightenment” are cases in which the individuals in question pursued or aspired in a single-minded way for “enlightenment”.”
I would add that there are also no known cases of individuals attaining “enlightenment” without a single-minded aspiration for it.
Hence, single-minded aspiration for “enlightenment”, if we accept the reality of the latter, is a necessary internal condition of “enlightenment”.
There is a qualitative difference between the perfection we long for and the not-even-approximations we get, and yet we love the all-too-human as much for its fallibility and finitude as despite it. It is only by loving the particular limited and mortal being that we know love itself.
Charles Williams says someplace, that the altar must be built and the sacrifical ground cleared according to the most exacting specifications, and then “the fire will come down” — somewhere else. I take this to mean that the traditions are not sufficient and are even misleading, but that nonetheless, unless one is faithful to what must prove false in the end, what is true in the end cannot come. I would perhaps not go quite so far as to state this “unless” unequivocally, since I maintain that the spirit blows where it listeth, but I do think that tradition is, as Michael said a bit ago, how most of us set our feet on the path.
Some of this reminds me of a discussion we had in the comments following a post of yours back in April; and I blogged a bit about it later.
Skholiast, if I get what you’re saying here it is actually parallel to my line of reasoning in the previous post: as limited and particular beings we can never have direct or immediate access to the universal; any such access must always be mediated through other particulars, and most likely through other particular beings like ourselves.
It’s tempting to say that this is a Descender’s view, that it rules out the kind of direct Ascent aimed at by a mystic, but your point about dialectic is apropos here: every serious Ascender has some sort of Descent elements in their thought, and vice versa.
But let’s take a deep breath! Amod and I have both assumed that Siddhattha Gotama was “liberated” or “enlightened”!
The search for necessary and/or sufficient conditions makes sense only if that to which they pertain is real in the first place.
What does it mean to claim that Gotama was “liberated or “enlightened”? Liberated from what? Enlightened about what? And how do we know that he was “liberated” or “enlightened”?
Perhaps, Amod can address this issue in another post. I would be very interested in his reflections.
Funny you should mention this, Thill. I was wondering the very same thing about you. Can you tell me what you mean when you use the word ‘enlightened’?
Skholiast, I can only fall back on the ordinary meaning of that word “enlightened”. It refers to a condition or state in which one has a clear perception of, or insight into something. Hence, one also has knowledge of that something.
It is an interesting question whether this “knowledge” is a form of “knowing that” or “knowing how” or both. I suspect that in the Buddhist and Gita-based Hindu traditions (BG: “Yoga is skill in action”) both forms of knowing are included in the idea of “enlightenment”.
However, the construal of “knowing that” varies across traditions.
In Upanishadic/Gita tradition, it is all about knowing that one is the Self or Atman. This, of course, assumes the existence of the “Self” or “Atman”.
In the Buddhist traditions, “knowing that” pertains to the nature, cause, and means of elimination of suffering.
So, I suppose that to claim that Siddhattha Gotama was “enlightened” is to ascribe “knowing that” and “knowing how” to him concerning the nature, cause, and means of ending suffering, and of course, success in carrying through the “knowing how” aspect.
The big question is: How do we know that these claims are true or plausible?
We could argue, based on Buddhist scriptural accounts of Gotama’s life, that he did not overcome the physical pain and suffering associated with any significant ailment. He had a painful death due to dysentery. I am sure he had his share of (physical) headaches.
As to emotional suffering, e.g., grief at the loss of loved ones, etc., how can we know that he overcame or liberated himself from that form of suffering?
It could also be argued that if he was a compassionate person, then he must have undergone vicarious emotional suffering at the sight of the suffering of others. This is a constitutive aspect of compassion.
So, I am inclined to think that the available evidence shows that Gotama was not “enlightened” in the specific Buddhist sense of that word. And this is because the Buddhist concept of “enlightenment” is such that no instantiations of it can actually be found, tall claims to the contrary notwithstanding.
As to the Hindu concept of “enlightenment” in terms of Atman knowledge, etc., again no instantiations of this concept can be found since there are no good reasons to believe that the Atman is real.
None of the claimants to Atman knowledge (= knowing which you know all that is to be known, i.e., omniscience) have shown that they know anything other than what is commonly known.
Moreover, they have also amply demonstrated that they don’t know some things which others have known or come to know, e.g., Ramakrishna’s and Ramana Maharishi’s ignorance of cancer and its cure, RM is also reported to have said that there were cities within the sacred hill of Arunachala and that Hitler was also a Jnani!!!
If these claimants to Atman knowledge were speaking the truth, how come they have not shared any of their alleged omniscience to benefit humanity by showing the causes and cures of horrible diseases, etc? They have displayed the same ignorance about so many things in the world in just the way other ordinary humans have.
Hence, it is highly improbable that claims of “Atman knowledge” are true.
MR: “A culture that values extreme deference to elders and authority probably will not be one in which science will flourish whatever the external conditions.”
How then do you explain the scientific and technological achievements in the classical epoch in India and China?
A society could compartmentalize its scientific enterprise, politics, and religion and encourage “extreme deference to elders and authority” in politics and religion, while allowing for questioning of “elders and authority” in science.
Such a society would still have scientific development although, of course, there is the risk of “spill over” of critical attitudes from the arena of scientific enterprise to its politics and religion.
“None of the claimants to Atman knowledge (= knowing which you know all that is to be known, i.e., omniscience) have shown that they know anything other than what is commonly known.”
Consider the case of Shankara.
Is there even one true empirical claim this man made which could not have been known to others in his time and which we can now justly regard with astonishment or wonder?
None, Nothing, Nada, Zilch, Sunya, Zero!
What gives just cause for astonishment is the fact that a person alleged to have realized his identity with Brahman has contributed Zilch or Zero to the stock of empirical knowledge.
Thill:
You’re treating the enlightenment of sages as though it were on the same footing as a report of an Elvis sighting. It is I suppose, to put it mildly, a category error, the confusion of the empirical and the metaphysical. Or indeed the Nasruddin error of looking for something where your particular illumination is good rather than where it is.
In one way the sages would agree with you. Enlightenment is not a thing that can be confirmed or disconfirmed empirically. Shankara who is a strong irrationalist would say that only the scriptures are the source of knowledge about matters which are beyond the scope of logic.
So sorry no cure for the common cold or cancer but yes to miraculous healing which is by definition anomalous.
On the deference question this may bring you up to date:
http://pipeline.corante.com/archives/2010/05/26/indias_research_culture.php
Michael,
You missed the point and evade the implications of what the “sages” have claimed. There is no distinction between the empirical and the metaphysical from the standpoint of Atman or Brahman realization. Remember, they say that Atman or Brahman is an all-inclusive reality! If it is an all-inclusive reality, then it includes or embraces what you deem “empirical” and “metaphysical”!
And your own “sages” claim that the knower of Atman or Brahman becomes identical with it. It is “non-dual knowledge”.
If so, it follows that the knower of Atman or brahman must also know all that Atman or Brahman encompasses! If so, it follows that the knower of Atman or Brahman must also possess empirical knowledge. That’s why The Upanishads clearly declare that one knows all there is to know by knowing the Atman or Brahman.
But it is true that none of claimants to Atman or Brahman knowledge have given us any piece of empirical knowledge either about the human body or the universe, which Atman or Brahman encompasses and has an infallible and complete knowledge of.
Hence, all the claims to Atman or Brahman knowledge are false.
We would be justified, on this ground, to reject the very idea of Atman or Brahman knowledge.
MR: “So also it has been said by an author of a Purana “Do not bring those things within the range of argumentation which are beyond thought.”
Yes, this is the usual cop out and inquiry-stopper! Divert the attack on the inquiry itself instead of the issues!
“Shankara who is a strong irrationalist would say that only the scriptures are the source of knowledge about matters which are beyond the scope of logic.”
Was his “irrationalism” the inspiration for his endless debates with other philosophical schools im his time?
How can you understand scripture without logic? Shankara himself uses logic in his interpretations of scriptural claims.
Thill, the point is: What are the issues? And how far you are willing to take the inquiry? Are you willing to consider what the limits of logic and abstract reasoning may be?
You are like a student of Renaissance Art who analyzes the molecular structure of paint pigmentation. And when someone suggests that there is something more to Art than that, you say “This is the usual cop out and inquiry stopper! Divert the attack on the inquiry itself instaed of the issues!”
False analogy, Jim, false analogy!
In the case of a painting everyone knows objectively that there is more to understanding it than an analysis of the constituents of the materials used in creating the painting.
In the case of claims of “enlightenment”, no one knows objectively that there is really something more to them than what they mean, if anything at all, in the language in which they are asserted and what they logically imply!
I have already clarified the concept of “enlightenment” in the Buddhist and Upanishadic traditions. The main issues are:
1. What is the evidence to show that the Buddha was “enlightened” even according tot eh Buddhist concept of “enlightenment”?
2. How can we hold that he overcame all suffering when he evidently did not overcome physical suffering?
2. Since he was a compassionate man, and compassion involves vicarious emotional suffering at the sight of the suffering of others (that’s the price of compassion!), he must have also suffered emotionally. How can we still hold that he overcame or transcended all suffering?
3. If the claimants to Atman or Brahman knowledge were making true claims, then they should have also given us significant bits of information about the world which their unenlightened contemporaries could not have access to. But the claimants to Atman or Brahman knowledge have not done so. So, how can we still hold that their claims of Atman or Brahman knowledge are true?
The attack on the use of logic, etc., is essentially an attack on the only instrument of inquiry we have on these matters. Have you ever noticed how in religion no complaints are raised against logic, etc., as long as you are defending the articles “faith” however inane?
I think it is a reasonably good analogy. There may be a consensus about Art (or maybe not depending on the work of Art involved) — but appreciation of Art is certainly not achieved through logic. At best, logic comes in after the fact in an effort to explain the experience of Art. And I would argue that the role of logic (i.e. the role of the Art critic) is as likely to obscure the experience of Art as to illuminate it.
In terms of your arguments about what Buddhists mean by enlightenment, you equate “suffering” with an inability to order the world to make it align with our desires and aversions. You argue that because we have an aversion to the pain of a headache, the Buddha cannot be enlightened because he is unsuccessful in ordering his world to conform with his attachments (i.e. the attachment to a life that is free from headaches, or cancer, or death for that matter). What this shows is that you have no real understanding of Buddhism. Enlightenment is not simply being superefficient at achieving goals of self gratification.
What are the relevant similarities between analyzing bizarre and bombastic claims on enlightenment and art appreciation? Unless you show the relevant similarities, you are stuck in a false analogy between art appreciation and the analysis of claims on enlightenment.
Your response shows that you do not understand what the terms “suffering” and “overcoming suffering” mean in plain English.
If a person has dysentery, we would not say that he has “overcome” physical suffering.
If a person feels grief or pain at the sufferings of another, we would not say that he has “overcome” emotional suffering.
Plain commonsense and the weight of experience shows us that, with the exception of those in pathological conditions, human beings will always be vulnerable to physical and emotional suffering.
You missed the entire point of the analogy — which is to illustrate the limits of logic and abstract reasoning. One doesn’t understand Art through logic. Would you agree? Using logic to understand the world is like using a menu in a restaurant — it can be a useful guide, but it is not the only way or even the best way to understand if the restaurant serves good food.
Similarly, one doesn’t understand any ultimate truth through logic (whether the tradition is Buddhist, Christian, or otherwise), because logic depends on analysis of distinguishing characteristics and any experience of non-duality is beyond concept and beyond thought.
An analogy succeeds in making a valid point only if it correct. The attempt to understand claims on “enlightenment”, which was my task at the start of this thread, is not analogous to the attempt to understand a work of art.
Further, one knows that the work of art is real and that we can always appeal to that work and the aesthetic experience of it to adjudicate between competing claims or judgments on it. How in Manjusri’s name can you do anything even remotely like that in the context of claims on “enlightenment”?
Again and again you misunderstand the function of logic. In an earlier context, I had shown that logic is used simply to understand the implications of claims and whether a set of claims is consistent or consistent with other claims known to be true. Again, that’s all I am doing with claims on “enlightenment”.
Jim: “One doesn’t understand Art through logic. Would you agree?”
Sorry, I don’t agree. All great art involves logic, that inexorable logic which ties some elements to others to make a coherent whole. So, a developed logical sense does help in the appreciation of a great work of art. Have you ever discerned this logic in a masterpiece of art or music and stood in awe of it? Try a Beethoven symphony or a painting by Caravaggio for a lesson in logic in great art.
Thill, that is not my experience of Art. Most Art (maybe some forms of conceptual art are exceptions) do not depend on logic — Art is a wordless, emotional or intuitive experience. Logic comes later. Sometimes a good critic has insights that help to understand the experience intellectually. And sometimes the application of logic tends to spoil the experience — in the same way that explaining a good joke can spoil the joke.
And I suggest that most artists would feel constrained or stifled by an effort to create through application of logic. It would tend to turn the creative process into a paint-by-number exercise.
Perhaps we just have to disagree on this point if your experience is different.
As for enlightenment. I am not aware of any Buddhist teachings that say that freedom from headaches is a mark of the Buddha. I have heard it said that for a Buddha “pain and pleasure are ornaments which are pleasant to wear”. As for experiencing the suffering of others through compassion — I expect that is very close to the experince of mahasukha (great joy).