Thill replies to my post about common sense in a reasonable way: by challenging the definition. In that post I have identified common sense as consisting merely of the prejudices common to any given age. Thill is right to protest that unmodified common sense, thus defined, will likely have few defenders (with the possible exception of Robert Goodin); and I did relatively little to defend my definition in that post. So it’s worth examining Thill’s alternative definition.
According to Thill’s quote, common sense is better defined in terms of:
the stock of Truths pertaining to the world naturally accessible to normal human beings anywhere on this planet and the faculties of the ordinary human mind employed in gaining access to those truths, e.g., that there is a world independent of our thoughts and desires, that there are other human beings, animals, and trees, the observable regularities of nature, human nature, and animal nature, basic uniform facts of human biology, etc.
Thill’s definition runs the risk of conflating two very different kinds of knowledge: those available to most human beings in the everyday course of their experience, and those which build on an accumulated body of knowledge derived from long, rigorous and systematic testing of hypotheses. The former can reasonably be called common sense. The latter – which of course is close to what we might normally call “science” – cannot.
It is a gross exaggeration to call the truths of science “naturally accessible.” Given the weight of scientific evidence that has accumulated over the past 200 years (or more), and the cost of equipment for scientific research, it is no longer possible even in principle for anyone to learn all the truths of science. They must instead be accepted on faith, on trust in scientific authorities. (I have previously claimed that this faith is not different in kind from faith in the Buddha or the Bible, but such a claim is not essential to the point at hand here; let us assume for the sake of the present argument that there is some sort of significant difference in kind between the two.) Long and sustained observation has told most human beings that the sun goes up and comes down in the sky, in a manner similar to a baseball being launched and landing. The claim that the sun does this is of course completely wrong; but it is naturally accessible to every human being with eyesight, it is what empirical observation tells the vast majority of us, to the point that we still speak of the sun “rising” and “setting” even when we know very well that the earth revolves around the sun and not vice versa. If one says “it is true that the earth is round and the sun revolves around it,” one is entirely correct and justified. If one says “it is common sense that the earth is round and the sun revolves around it,” one is either using “common sense” in the relativist sense that I advanced in the previous post – according to which “common sense” just means “the presuppositions of our society” – or one is being willfully blind.
But if we set aside the accumulated wisdom of modern natural science thus, Thill has still made a good point that there is a large body of knowledge available to human beings everywhere in their daily experience. One can cite many examples: that rocks fall when dropped, that human beings die when stabbed with a knife, that wet wood produces more smoke than dry wood, and so on. (I am particularly fond of the last example; thanks to it, reading Sanskrit philosophy made me better at barbecuing.)
This body of knowledge is real, and important. How shall we think about it? To my mind the most helpful way to classify it comes from the underrated anthropologist Robin Horton, in the concluding essay of his Patterns of Thought in Africa and the West. Horton began with a division between “commonsense” and “theoretical” thought, which he refined (respectively) into “primary” and “secondary theory.” Even with his anthropologically informed understanding, Horton notes that “primary theory really does not differ very much from community to community or from culture to culture.” (321) The entities it describes are the basic inhabitants of everyday experience: “people, animals, sticks, stones, rocks, rivers and so on.” (11) It does not speak of what these things are at a more level invisible to the naked eye (atoms, cells, illusions, ideas in the mind of God); rather, it describes relatively simple spatial, temporal and causal relationships among them. When we speak of things hidden to the naked eye, such as particles and waves or gods and spirits, then we have moved to the level of secondary theory, which is vastly alien from culture to culture. (Horton notes that his Nigerian undergraduates are as incredulous that anyone could disbelieve in spirits as New York undergraduates might be that anyone could believe in them.)
Horton moved from “common sense” to “primary theory” because he wanted to stress the commonalities between primary and secondary theory; but even to him, “common sense” had long seemed adequate as a way of speaking of primary theory. I don’t have a significant problem with using “common sense” to mean “primary theory,” in Horton’s sense; this is quite a different usage of “common sense” from the previous one, but quite defensible. The next question is: what then is the significance of this common sense for philosophical reflection? I will take up that topic next time.
Amod:
Interesting set of posts.
As I see it there is common sense, special sense and common science. Common sense as I think you have been pointing out in your latest post covers a spectrum of assumptions which range from the universal to those particular to a society. The idea of special sense may be me on my grinning charger but I think it has merit. From a discussion of Dr. Farrer’s Finite and Infinite in Mascall’s Existence and Analogy I read that the proofs of the existence of God have lost their cogency because modern man (1943) no longer has the capacity of ‘metaphysical intuition’ . Modern man may well follow the classic arguments but he no longer feels the force of them. Most readers in the history of ideas are struck by the power that the Ontological Argument had over very great intellects of the past. I myself am somewhat aloof from the modern notion of possible worlds as a speculative platform but then others leave the mother ship of Realism with supreme confidence. They boldly go, so to speak. They carry the talisman of a special sense.
Common science is the ability to disregard the direct evidence of the senses and declare that the stick is not bent in water and that the course of the earth is round the sun, that the earth is spherical. Apparency is not everything and the notion of unity behind multiplicity becomes a guiding principle. Even a divagation into alchemy leads ultimately to the Periodic Table. On that subject I once asked on a list with mostly Indian members whether they would prefer as an account of nature the Periodic Table or the Panchikaranam of Shankara (doctrine of emanations) and they were inclined to think that they were rival accounts which is an indication of how common sense and common science can clash or Mythos and Logos.
Michael, I did not think anyone knew Mascall anymore except perhaps reactionary Anglicans. I’ve often thought that the distinction between noetic and epistemic has been lost– I am not sure I can do a good job defending it (or even defining it) myself– and that this is doubtless “part of the problem”. Whether it is the place for a solution to start is doubtful. I once thought so, but a friend of mine (an orthodox christian) gently pointed out to me that I was unlikely to get very far by saying, “you see, there is a special sort of knowledge, noetic knowledge…”
Skholiast:
Yes, but what do you put the strange attractor of the Ontological Proof down to? What do you make of Edward Feser who promotes the proofs for the existence of God assiduously? He seems to be open to persuasion by arguments. There are many others. Obviously it is not analogous to the theorem of Pythagoras for the obtuse student. Pascal and Kierkegaard were irrationalists though acute enough to get any proof that the intellect could proffer.
“Thill’s definition runs the risk of conflating two very different kinds of knowledge: those available to most human beings in the everyday course of their experience, and those which build on an accumulated body of knowledge derived from long, rigorous and systematic testing of hypotheses.”
I was giving an account of commonsense and did not mention science. There was no “gross exaggeration” on my part since I did not include the truths of science in the “the stock of Truths pertaining to the world naturally accessible to normal human beings anywhere on this planet”.
All the same, I should have clarified that “the stock of Truths pertaining to the world naturally accessible to normal human beings anywhere on this planet” is not exhaustive of all truths accessible to the human mind. Of course, there are truths, e.g., many truths of science and art, accessible only by dint of special training and application of methods of research.
The relation of commonsense and science is complex, but it seems to me that science is largely an extension or development of commonsense.
Science does not contradict the claims of commonsense on sunrise and sunset. It only provides a correct explanation of the facts of sunrise and sunset evident to commonsense.
Even when science corrects certain parts of commonsense, it is still parasitic on other parts of the latter. The scientist relies on the faculties of the ordinary mind and develops their capacities.
The distinction between appearance and reality is also part of commonsense, e.g., people living in the desert have recognized for ages the difference between a mirage and a real oasis without benefit of scientific explanations of mirages. When science provides such explanations, it only augments commonsense.
“Science does not contradict the claims of commonsense on sunrise and sunset. It only provides a correct explanation of the facts of sunrise and sunset evident to commonsense.”
This claim needs unpacking. “Common sense” about sunrise and sunset could, I suppose, tell us one of two things.
1. Common sense tells us that the sun merely appears to go up and go down in the sky, as a thrown baseball goes up and down. Effectively, common sense is only a matter of initial appearances, not real explanations. In this case your claim is correct: science does not contradict common sense, for common sense is telling us only about the appearance of the sun and not its reality. But the same is true of Advaita Vedānta: it tells us that everything is not what it appears to be. Then common sense has none of the power that is claimed for it; we acknowledge that it merely tells us about the appearances.
2. Or, common sense tells us that the sun actually does go up and down in the sky, in which case common sense is simply wrong and science is right. We still need a theory of error to explain why common sense is wrong. But Madhyamaka provides this just as science does.
Either way, most arguments from “common sense” used to deny Advaita or Madhyamaka can also be used to deny science. Science, like Madhyamaka, has a theory of error. It explains why we see things that are in fact illusory. In terms of their relationship to common sense, there is no difference whatever between science and those illusionist philosophies like Madhyamaka and Advaita that you so revile. The playing of common sense as a philosophical trump card should cease without delay.
You seem to mistakenly assume that commonsense cannot distinguish between appearance and reality or that commonsense does not have a “theory of error”. I have already pointed out that the distinction between appearance and reality is a commonsense distinction. The words “error”, “illusion”, etc., have established meanings and criteria in ordinary language. And science borrows those senses and criteria. Optical illusions, e.g., a stick which appears to be bent when immersed in water, are also familiar to commonsense.
Commonsense tells us that if you were seated in a stationary train and another was moving on a track next to it, this creates the illusion that your train is moving.
Thus, a scientific explanation to the effect that the illusion or appearance of the Sun’s motion is created by the real motion of the earth is entirely within the scope of commonsense understanding.
The relationship between metaphysical theories and commonsense is not even remotely analogous to the relationship between scientific truth and commonsense. Scientific truth is testable and has massive evidence. It is an extension of commonsense in many contexts. Further, in many contexts, scientific truth and its demonstration depend on commonsense. But, as I have shown in other posts, many of the metaphysical claims or speculations of Madhyamika, Advaita, etc., are just incoherent. A metaphysical theory which is crazy enough to deny all of commonsense is self-refuting because its very terms presuppose commonsense truths and the meanings of ordinary language, the medium and repository of commonsense.
I am not denying that common sense (in the sense at issue here) can distinguish between appearance and reality (which is a good point). The idea of a mirage would likely be common across very different desert-going cultures, accessible to primary theory. However, as soon as we try and explain what that mirage is or why it happens, we have moved to secondary theory; we are well beyond common sense in terms of any common human understanding. Common sense can tell us that we are in error; but once we start to explain why that error happens, we have begun to delve into the complexities of psychology of whatever sort, a step removed from the day-to-day understanding of humans involved in everyday practical activity. Perhaps simple if-then examples like the train could be held to be parts of common sense – but this still only allows us to identify when we misperceive, not how or why.
More importantly, you have not done anything to clear up the current confusion in your definition of common sense: according to you, does common sense tell us only that the sun only appears to go up and down, or that it actually does? If the former, common sense only reminds us that we need a theory of error of some sort, something that can explain why things appear the way they do; if the latter, common sense is wrong and there’s an end on’t. Either way, the philosophical significance of common sense is very limited (as I expand on somewhat in yesterday’s post).
And on the contrary, the relationship between illusonist theories and common sense is exactly analogous to the relationship between scientific theories and common sense. Your own train analogy serves to make the point. Just as science can explain why commonsense appearances are wrong with analogies to common sense, When Śaṅkara tells us that what we perceive to be multiplicity is in fact unity, he explains it by saying that what we perceive to be a snake is in fact a rope. He starts with common sense because that’s where his listeners begin, just as a scientist does; that doesn’t mean he agrees common sense is right. In neither case is the secondary understanding “parasitic” on the primary; the secondary supersedes the primary. It is a dialectical argument. I can attempt to refute a fundamentalist Christian by referring to Bible passages that praise human reason and intelligence as the glory of God’s creation, and therefore arguing to the conclusion that we should reason for ourselves and not take scripture as given. That doesn’t mean that I actually believe in God or the truth of the Bible, only that I recognize that argument must start with people where they are. My understanding is not “parasitic” on theirs in any way.
Now don’t get me wrong here. It may well be that a scientific understanding is largely correct and the views of Madhyamaka and Advaita are entirely wrong. I am somewhat sympathetic to such a perspective, and have not wholly made up my mind on it. But if it is indeed the case that Madhyamaka and Advaita are entirely wrong, the reasons for this have absolutely nothing whatever to do with this so-called “common sense.”
The discussion to date brings the focus back on the key concept of commonsense. I will address some points you made later on, but for now I wonder whether you have succumbed to an “all or nothing” fallacy on commonsense: either all of commonsense is incorrigible or none of it is, either all of commonsense is infallible or none of it is.
I also wonder whether you have succumbed to a non-sequitur on commonsense: Commonsense is mistaken on sunrise and sunset. Therefore, all of commonsense is mistaken.
Well, before you write your detailed comment, let me clarify: I am not saying all of common sense is mistaken, by any means. I am saying only that some of it definitely is mistaken, possibly even most of it, and certainly enough of it that to say something is “common sense” offers us no additional reason to believe that it is true.
How are you able to conduct your life? How are you able to carry on this discussion now? I am sure it is not by dint of Madhayamika metaphysical “twitterings”! LOL
And, if I may ask, which part of commonsense is not mistaken according to you? Which truths of commonsense do you, albeit grudgingly, countenance?
In other words, in my view there is an intelligence native and innate in the ordinary mind, or if we eschew “mentalese”, in the human organism. This is part of commonsense. The scientific method, in its rudimentary and advanced forms, is based on a development of this native intelligence of the ordinary mind or the human organism.
It is truly astonishing that intelligence is exhibited by all organisms. The survival of various organisms for millions of years testifies to the awesome power of this innate intelligence in all life.
Abhidharma as developed in the Mahayana in one model breaks down the mind into eight consciousnesses. Intelligence — or cognizance — runs through all of them. The first six consciousnesses are sense consciousnesses — with the mental consciousness in this context being thought of as a sense similar to sight, smell, etc. Each of the six sense consciousnesses are further analyzed as either ayatanas (a dyad comprised of subject and object) or dhatus (a triad comprised of sense consciousness, sense organ and object).
Ihe sixth consciousness or mental consciousness is a basic level of mind that acts as an integrator of the other five sense consciousnesses — similar to the way in which a crystal ball would reflect colors from a piece of colored cloth. It is the sense consciousness that makes sense of our world in a basic dualistic way. Tsoknyi R. refers to the sixth consciousness as “mere I” — basic dualistic mind without strong emotion.
The seventh consciousness is known as the “afflicted consciousness”. It is the aspect of mind that contains detailed memory, creates a strong sense of self and other in a territorial way and is subject to kleshas or strong ego based emotions. Tsoknyi R. refers to this consciousnes as “reified I”.
The eighth consciousness or alaya vijnana is known as the storehouse consciousness. It is conceived of as the consciousness where karmic “seeds” or habits are imprinted. In part because there is a tendency to mistake this aspect of mind as a basis for a “self” — some traditions speak of this aspect of mind as “mind stream” with the image of a constantly moving and changing flow rather than a “storehouse”.
Intelligence operates through all of the consciousnesses — but it does so in a dualistic way based on a fundamental mistake or ignorance. Chogyam Trungpa R. describes avidya or this basic ignorance that creates dualistic mind as panic that results in bewilderment. He analogizes to a natural state of mind that is free and has no boundaries as being like riding in a car that is traveling very fast. As long as the mind is one with the car and moving at the speed of the car, there is no problem. But stepping out of the experience results in panic.
The point is that dualistic mind is created in each moment — largely as a result of past habit or karma. The Buddhist teachings on this point are, in a sense, beliefs — of course. But they are also grounded in meditation experience. So, in a sense, they arise from an exploration of the world that can be analogized to science. But it is hard to know where science with its positing of an objective observer and a separate world that can be studied can come together with an understanding like this that is based on subjective experience (although it is a subjective experience that can be passed along, albeit with some real effort and commitment on the part of student and teacher).
I like it when you get enthusiastic, Thill. Occasionally I am in danger of type-casting you as a naysayer. This is the sort of comment I can savor as well as agree with.
Common sense should be seen as something apart from common knowledge, like simple sense from simple knowledge. To attribute past beliefs on the flatness of earth to common sense is a misappropriation of words.
Rather, common sense should be understood as a basic system of logic, intuitive logic. Not the background knowledge that we knowingly or not employ in our thinking, but the method by which we employ it. The understanding of common sense should even be Herakleitan.
Thank you, Medísari, and welcome to the blog.
I wonder about thinking of logic as common sense. It seems strange to me, since so many people think in a way that is not logical; fallacies are a way of life for most. According to nearly every definition of common sense that I have heard, it is either not common (as in this case) or not very sensible. Is there something more specific you had in mind?
“I wonder about thinking of logic as common sense. It seems strange to me, since so many people think in a way that is not logical; fallacies are a way of life for most.”
The error again here is to equate commonsense with the way many people think. It is commonsense that people sometimes act or think contrary to “commonsense”! Further, the basic laws, e.g., the law of contradiction, the law of identity, the law of excluded middle, etc., of logic derive from commonsense and are consistent with it.
Buddhist thought posits that common sense or conventional logic determines that something “truly exists” or is “real” based on one or more of three approaches: functionality, continuity or consensus.
Functionality looks at the relative qualities of something that appears. For example, if a diamond sparkles and has a hardness that scratches glass, it is deemed “real”. If a person breathes and eats and speaks, he is “real”. A wax sculpture of a person would lack some of these qualities and is deemed “fake”.
Continuity is based on the perception that something is unchanging over time. So, because a river or a mountain outside of our window appears to be unchanging, it is said to be “real”. By contrast, a mirage that disappears is thought to be “fake”.
Consensus is based on a shared perception that something exists in a certain way. So, if we share a consensus that paper colored green with the words “United States Treasury” printed on it has value, that paper is considered “real” and not counterfeit.
Each of these bases for common sense has potential problems. Functionality depends on causes and conditions coming together and upon an arbitrary choice of conventional qualities that separate objects as “real” or “fake”.
Continuity is illusory since even relatively stable objects like a mountain change moment to moment and “objects” like a river are stable only because patterns of change are relatively stable — like a fire brand that seems to form a solid “O” when it is swung in a circle.
Consensus is also conditional and depends on the make up and qualities of the observers that generate the consensus.
What common sense mostly depends on is ignorance — an unwillingness to look at the world in more than a superficial way. In fairness, common sense is very useful in living in the relative world and in a society where consensus creates meaning. It is just helpful to reflect in a deeper way — so that we aren’t mislead by “common sense” into thinking that there is any “self” or “other” that exists in any absolute sense. And that is why in the context of philosophy — where we are trying to consider our existence in a more than superficial way — “common sense” has limited utility.
“In fairness, common sense is very useful in living in the relative world…”
As if we have any evidence that there is anything else than this so-called “relative world”! All the same, it is curious that you grossly abuse language and deem commonsense “ignorance”. That’s a contradiction in terms. Those familiar with the English language wouldn’t attribute commonsense to a person who is ignorant of the dangers of lighting a cigar in a room into which combustible gas is leaking!!!
“It is just helpful to reflect in a deeper way — so that we aren’t mislead by “common sense” into thinking that there is any “self” or “other” that exists in any absolute sense.”
Please open your eyes and mind and see without Buddhist blinkers! LOL It is commonsense that all selves are embodied selves! Hence, it is commonsense that selves depend on living bodies! It is also commonsense that living bodies are subject to death. Hence, it is also commonsense that selves are not eternal!
So, far from providing a superior alternative to commonsense, your much-vaunted “Buddhist wisdom” on the dependent and non-eternal nature of selves is sheer commonsense in exotic dressing!
And that is why in the context of philosophy — where we are trying to consider our existence in a more than superficial way — “common sense” has limited utility.
“And that is why in the context of philosophy — where we are trying to consider our existence in a more than superficial way — “common sense” has limited utility.”
What court of appeal do you have in philosophy other than plain commonsense, logic (derived from commonsense), and science (an extension of commonsense or a superstructure built on commonsense)?
This debate on commonsense shows the need for clarity on the nature of commonsense. If we are not clear on what we mean by “commonsense”, we can’t determine its proper status and role in philosophy.
To attain that clarity, let us consider some of the ways in which the concept of “commonsense” is used.
Let us first reject the idea that commonsense means “what people think” or “the way people think”. That’s an excessively broad definition of commonsense and one at odds with standard meanings of “commonsense”. Commonsense is a significant part of “what people think” and “the way people think”, but it is not equivalent or identical to those concepts.
Let us also reject the caricature that “commonsense” refers to the stock of beliefs of peasants and such! Peasants are endowed with commonsense, perhaps to a greater extent than philosophers, but commonsense is not identical or equivalent to a peasant’s stock of beliefs.
How do we use the term “commonsense”? Sometimes it is used in the sense of “knowledge of obvious or evident facts of everyday life”. These facts may pertain to the natural world, human artifacts, the nature of human beings, consequences of decisions and actions, and social interaction. Thus we say of someone who plays with explosives, or entrusts to a stranger a significant sum of money, or proposes marriage to someone she just met, or spends all her income in the first few days of a month, that she lacks commonsense or the knowledge of the obvious relevant facts.
Sometimes we say to someone “Go figure! Use your commonsense!” Here we use “commonsense” in the sense of “faculties of sound judgment” which include observation of the facts, elementary logic, and the use of background knowledge of everyday truths.
On other occasions, we use “commonsense” to mean “obvious and common (inductive) inference”. Thus, on a trek in Alaska, we may say to someone “Look there’s a grizzly cub! The mother must also be close! It’s commonsense!”
So, to sum up my brief inquiry into the meaning of “commonsense”:
“Commonsense” refers to a)knowledge of obvious or evident facts of everyday life, facts pertaining to the natural world, human artifacts, the nature of human beings, consequences of decisions and actions, and social interaction. b)”faculties of sound judgment” which include observation of the facts, elementary logic, and the use of background knowledge of everyday truths, and c)obvious and common (inductive) inferences.
Later on, I will apply this account of “commonsense” in assessing Amod’s claims on commonsense.
Amod’s interesting but mistaken claims on commonsense ignore one all-important fact: our commonsense helped us to survive (and develop culture which enabled and/or augmented the transmission of commonsense) for hundreds of thousands of years! If much of commonsense was “mistaken”, we would not have survived or developed culture! Commonsense has adaptive value and this is a function of the fact that commonsense was and is for the most part veridical.
It may well be that there is no other world than the relative world. And it may also be that the relative world is “like an illusion”.
Use of “common sense” in a philosophical discussion is, in a very real sense, ignorance — at least to the extent it is invoked to cut off discussion.
I think it would be useful to define how “common sense” reaches its conclusions — or to identify the assumptions that ground common sense. I offered a Buddhist view — not because it is necessarily right — but because it might be a starting point for discussion.
If you admire some of the Zen poets in just the way I do, we can reflect on, learn from, and enjoy these two poems!
It is too clear and so it is hard to see.
A dunce once searched for a fire with a
lighted lantern.
Had he known what fire was,
He could have cooked his rice much sooner.
– Joshu Washes the Bowl, The Gateless Gate #7
Zen Flesh, Zen Bones, p. 176
Translated by Paul Reps and Nyogen Senzaki
Before I had studied Zen for thirty years, I saw mountains as mountains, and waters as waters.
When I arrived at a more intimate knowledge, I came to the point where I saw that mountains are not mountains, and waters are not waters.
But now that I have got its very substance I am at rest. For it’s just that I see mountains once again as mountains, and waters once again as waters.
Ching-yuan
Thanks Thill.
And, in return, here is one of my favorite poems about common sense:
The Mirror
An appalling-looking man enters and looks at himself in a mirror.
“Why do you look at yourself in the glass, since the sight of your reflection can only be painful to you?”
The appalling-looking man replies: “Sir, according to the immortal principals of ’89, all men are equal before the law; therefore I have the right to look at myself in the glass; with pleasure or pain, that is an entirely personal matter.”
In respect of common sense, I was certainly right; but from the point of view of the law, he was not wrong.
C. Baudelaire, Paris Spleen, tr. L. Varese
Amod, I especially applaud the attempt to integrate anthropology and philosophy like this. (Robin Horton is an anthropologist I find challenging). I think of “common sense” partly in the way Moore talked about it (but not so narrowly), and partly a la Oakshott’s account of “practical experience” (cf Experience & its Modes). This tends to see “common sense” in terms of projects and motives, not so much in terms of content. Whether the sun goes up and comes down or whether the earth turns about an axis is, in terms of content, not a matter of common sense at all (as I am thinking of it here), though doubtless human beings will “commonly” say the one or the other. But that they will undertake a job by day rather than by night if they need to see, is a matter of common sense. This is a pragmatic account, and also , dare I say it, edging towards the existential, if it starts to elaborate an account of “projects”– but here we are already leaving behind “common sense.” In other words, common sense is in a way unconscious of itself as such. The moment the idea of “common sense” has arisen, we are on the way to something more reflective– science, philosophy, the metapsychology of Buddhism, etc.
This is an interesting take on the matter, Skholiast. If I read you right, it seems you’re saying the idea of common sense is effectively self-refuting – although common sense itself is not. The very idea of “common sense” is then itself a matter of secondary theory; it cannot be a part of common sense, for it is reflective in a way that moves away from anything basic and detectable to a common human understanding. There may be a certain romanticism in such a notion – oh, were it only that we were like those humble unreflective peasants who are untroubled by all our philosophical worries! – but then I suppose the notion of “common sense” is itself romantic in this way, privileging the lives of the unreflective masses over those foolish philosophers bewitched by their metaphysical twitterings.
I think the problem of philosophical hypocrisy, or, more broadly, intellectual hypocrisy, has not received the attention it deserves in ethics!
I define philosophical hypocrisy in terms of professing philosophical points of view, beliefs, and values contrary to those presupposed or evident in one’s everyday life and discourse.
For an example of such philosophical hypocrisy, Sankara will suffice for now!
If the story on Shankara’s performance of his mother’s last rites is true (his community in Kerala was not willing to help and he dismembered his mother’s body and performed the last rites in a backyard, then those actions show that this man firmly believed in the reality of his mother’s body and jiva or soul! But he professed belief in the unreality of all individuals and individual objects!
There is also the story of his encounter with an outcaste (I am inclined to think that the event occurred shorn, of course, of its trappings of Hindu mythology.)in Kasi. Sankara, on his way to a bath in the ganges, asked an outcaste or Chandala to move aside out of deference to the disparity in their respective caste status and was rebuked for his hypocrisy in countenancing caste distinctions while professing his non-dual doctrines.
As Thomas Reid wrote in the passage I quoted in an earlier response, those who profess metaphysical theories at variance or in contradiction to commonsense show in their daily actions and everyday discourse that they possess it or subscribe to it on pain of being sent to the “infirmary”. He seems to have overlooked the moral problem of philosophical hypocrisy such cases starkly present.
I would like to add a clarification to my post on philosophical hypocrisy. I am not using an argument from philosophical hypocrisy to undermine professed philosophical claims at variance with the beliefs evident in one’s daily life and discourse. I am pointing out the serious problem of philosophical hypocrisy as such. Of course, any form of hypocrisy implies a lack of sincerity. And a lack of sincerity in the context of arguing for philosophical points of view may well be a form of “bullshit”, one which is somewhat different from Harry Frankfurt’s conception of “bullshit”. LOL
Alternatively, the combination of prodigious intellectual effort, e.g., Shankara, Nagarjuna, etc., expended in the defense of philosophical doctrines one cannot possibly be committed to on the evidence of one’s daily life and discourse, and philosophical hypocrisy may well constitute an interesting and novel form of pathology! LOL
Thill:
Some sentiments of Sankara or attributed to him undoubtedly reflect casteism and sexism. Those views were commonly held at the time and seemed to reflect eternal verities eg. from Vivekacudamani
Even today you may find pockets of such rebarbative opinion impervious to the high claims of common sense.
Horton’s use of “primary theory” to refer to commonsense truths is illicit! It conflates fact or truth and theory.
We can make sense of the claim that a theory is false. If commonsense were a theory, albeit “primary theory”, it would make sense to think that it is false. But, as Wittgenstein pointed out in On Certainty, it makes no sense to doubt commonsense because it is presupposed by the very act of doubting, and I would add, in the very articulation of the doubt. W also maintained that it is meaningless to doubt certain things, e.g., to doubt that you are having pain when you are in pain.
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