Responding to my post on doubt, Jim Wilton agreed that “truth established through thought and logic is always subject to doubt.” But he suggested that not all knowledge or truth is a product of logic – and, he claimed, perhaps this non-logical knowledge can be certain, indubitable.
I agree that not all knowledge is a product of logic. This is one of the reasons I have spent a great deal of time discussing what Thomas Kasulis calls intimacy worldviews, background approaches to philosophy that are not derived from direct argument. I agree with the thinkers in such traditions that truth is not merely something expressed in linguistic propositions.
Where I disagree strongly, however, is on the view that such non-logical knowledge can be a source of genuine certainty. Jim’s first example of such knowledge is the “eureka” moments of natural science: points where a discovery is made in a flash, a leap. I agree that such moments, though likely impossible without a long and disciplined prior process of rigorous logical reasoning, themselves include something more than logic; this example is an important argument for an intimacy worldview. The question is: are such moments free from doubt? I think the answer must be no. I don’t think one would have to probe the history of science very long to find a “eureka” moment whose resulting insight turned out to be largely false. I remember that writing my dissertation involved moments of insight which later reflection revealed to be untrue.
Jim refers to the knowledge faculty that produces such moments as “intuition.” He attempts to define “intuition” as a knowledge based on direct perception. But it seems to me that direct perception is among the most unreliable of all sources of knowledge – mirages, ropes misperceived as snakes, eye diseases or whatever example of illusion one might wish to cite.
I suspect that the underlying question in this discussion might be the kind of knowledge derived from mystical experience, the kind of wordless realization obtained in meditation. That possibility came up in the discussion that led to my old post on certainty, where a friend claimed that he reached absolute certainty in his Sufi chanting. But I said then and say now: such experiences lead to a feeling of certainty, but it could be a felt certainty of falsehood rather than truth. I suspect any of us could find a militant fanatic, of whatever stripe we disagree with, who derived his fanaticism from a cultivated vision.
Direct perception, intuition, mystical experience, aha experiences: I don’t intend to denigrate any of these as potential sources of knowledge. But are they sources of certain knowledge, indubitable knowledge? The answer must be no. Indeed, I would argue that they are less reliable sources than is boring old logic; for logic can proceed with the kind of inexorable rigour that rules out impossibilities. As I’ve said before, if there is certain knowledge to be found, it is likely to be there, in the kind of logical certainty sought by Plato.
Still, I want to note an important point of agreement between Jim and myself. In a comment on another post he claimed: “From my point of view (and I think Amod’s as well), doubt is more an openness to what exists than a negative statement or a disagreement.” I like this claim and I think it expresses something true and important. I see doubt as essential given our status as imperfect, non-omniscient beings – there is always more to be learned. Doubt is an intellectual manifestation of the key virtue of humility – a key virtue for monotheists and other encounter traditions, taken a step further by doubting even God. And so too with mystical experience and its directly perceived or intuited cousins: this, too, must be doubted. It is as capable of generating improper pride and arrogance as any of the works of logic and reason. We should not and will not find true certainty there.
Neocarvaka said:
“But it seems to me that direct perception is among the most unreliable of all sources of knowledge – mirages, ropes misperceived as snakes, eye diseases or whatever example of illusion one might wish to cite.”
A Carvaka ought to take strong exception to your rejection of perception, the fundamental means of knowledge in everyday life, science, and art. If you are not relying on perception because it is “among the most unreliable of all sources of knowledge”, what do you rely on in moving around everyday?
Reasoning or inference is also subject to error, fallacies, etc. Does this mean you don’t rely on reasoning either? What else do you rely on, especially in formulating your views on your blog?
I wonder if you have succumbed to some perfectionist standard: no means of knowledge is reliable if it is sometimes prone to error.
If the occurrence of error in the use of X were good grounds for not relying on it, neither science nor technology would exist.
Amod Lele said:
Thanks for the clarification, Neocarvaka. I don’t think I stated that very clearly. The “direct” is important here; I’m using “direct perception” in a fairly limited sense, to correspond with the way I understood Jim to be using the term. By “direct perception” I’m thinking here of unmediated perception or pure experience, to the extent that such a thing even exists – knowledge from the senses that is not filtered through language and logic. By contrast, when perception is used in tandem with reasoning, the two together form the most reliable source of knowledge we have.
Neocarvaka said:
I agree that in some cases a given perception needs another perception “in tandem” with inference to arrive at a correct judgment, e.g., we perceive a bent stick when it is immersed in water and we take it out and see that it is not bent and reason that it is only an illusion that it is bent when immersed in water, we perceive a snake in the dark and we turn the light on and see that it is a rope and reason that it was an illusion or error that it was a snake, etc.
However, we normally don’t reason when we perceive familiar objects or familiar kinds of objects. We don’t see something, then reason, and then say “Therefore, that’s a tree.”! Our normal perception involves spontaneous recognition or knowledge of what we see.
michael reidy said:
The Advaitins speak of consciousness itself i.e. not any particular mode, as being a certain thing. Even the brain in the vat has that. Would the brain in the vat then go on to assert the principle of non-contradiction? Can we begin in any way to add to this base line as an axiom or an aporia? Possibly. It seems that I am not a brain in a vat. Let me proceed on that basis and find whether more confirmation is possible. Tentatively and with baby steps we could begin to compile a reasonable conspectus of reality.
Thill said:
“But are they sources of certain knowledge, indubitable knowledge?”
There seems to be a redundancy in “certain knowledge” unlike the case of “certain belief”.
In any case, to answer this question, one needs to state one’s standard of certainty.
As I think Neocarvaka pointed out or implied, it doesn’t follow from the fact that it is logically possible that X is false, that it makes sense to doubt that X is true if it is indeed true. It is logically possible that “I am a human being.” is false and that I am a visitor from another planet, but it would certainly be pathological to doubt whether I am literally a human being.
michael reidy said:
Thill:
It is perhaps due to the Thought Experiment fetish that remarkable scenarios are indulged. The everyday is not exotic enough for the philosopher. What was useful for the road testing of concepts becomes considered to be somehow possible because conceivable.
JimWilton said:
It’s off topic, but I just heard that Gene Smith died last night.
In the early 1960s, Smith headed the Library of Congress field office in Delhi. He was instrumental in prserving thousands of centuries old Tibetan Buddhist texts brought by manastic refugees leaving Tibet after the Chinese invasion. His contribution to the field of Buddhist studies and scholarship is incalculable.
JimWilton said:
Amod, here is a quote that I think is in line with your view on doubt.
Montaigne says:
“If my mind could gain a firm footing, I would not make essays. I would make decisions; but it is always in apprenticeship and on trial.”
Amod Lele said:
Interesting thought. Of course, too many people feel certain of the wrong things, and therefore make decisions quickly when perhaps they should be writing essays thinking it out instead.
Amod Lele said:
I heard. Sad news.
Zog Kadare said:
I guess you guys are talking about this “Experimental Philosophy” stuff, thought experiments etc.? The troubles with “Justified True Belief” model of thinking are interesting. And the fact that East Asian subjects disagree with Westerners.
Beside from the issues raised there is a useful distinction to be made between intuition that draws from an agreed upon sure data pool and the other kind.
There is the “eureka moment” that IS certain (for people who believe in a given kind of inductive or empirical , measurable fact base, if you see what I mean).When you have some information and you are thinking over “the facts and only the facts” and you notice a different way to arange them and suddenly the occluded contents hatch out for your understanding – basicly inductive reasoning “eureka moment”.
Then there is what is often meant by intuition – the Kantian problems etc. – and I think you have already described it above.
Amod Lele said:
Hi Zog – welcome to the blog, and thanks for the comments! I hope you’ll stick around. Speaking for myself, I wasn’t actually thinking about experimental philosophy in this post, though I’ve referred to it elsewhere (here, for example).
I agree that the distinction between different kinds of “intuition” is significant, though I don’t think it makes a difference to this particular post, because I don’t think the “eureka moment” drawing from a data pool leads to certainty either. It’s a matter of a new understanding that wasn’t there before – but further understanding could reveal that new understanding to be false itself.
charlie n said:
Certainty beyond logic
Amod writes…..
“I agree that not all knowledge is a product of logic. I agree with the thinkers in such traditions that truth is not merely something expressed in linguistic propositions.
Where I disagree strongly, however, is on the view that such non-logical knowledge can be a source of genuine certainty. “
If all knowledge is not a product of logic, than what other kind of knowledge is there?
The problem presented here is that IF there is a non-logical knowledge how can we deal with it logically?
The short answer is that you would not be able to deal with knowledge that is not logic based using logic.
If there is a possibility of Non-Logical Knowledge, than a rigorous investigation into Logical Knowledge would be the order of the day as a starting point. Not so much as to tear down and throw away Logic but at the minimum to try to understand the limits of logic based knowledge and to set the parameters for what could or could not be construed as non-logic based knowledge.
I will try to explain this by first assuming the existence of a non-logical knowledge, and then try to explain why this type of knowledge is beyond the scope of logic.
There are two ways humans can deal with nature. One by talking about it, that is by using our ability to reason and following the rules of logic and language.
The other method of dealing with nature is by direct sensory experience of it, without employing Logic and Language and Reason.
Direct Sensory Experience (DSE) would be our sensory knowledge of nature, prior to mediating the experience by employing our ability to reason.
Historically this would be known as “common sense”, how we sense the world in common, because we have pretty much the same set of sense organs.
However, this phrase “common sense” now is taken to mean something very different; currently it is understood to represent anything that is logical, or reasonable.
Some may doubt that you can have a direct sensory experience without mediating that experience by using reason, or would doubt the usefulness of knowledge based upon DSE because of illusions and snakes and bent sticks.
I cannot logically prove the existence of your direct sensory experience in the sense that I can logically prove to you that two plus two equals four.
From a logical point of view, you can take the position that DSE does not exist and I would take the side of attempting to prove to you that they do.
In my attempt to prove to you that DSE do exist, and the knowledge gained by them is useful, I am restricted to using the methods and means of Language and Logic and Reason (LLR).
If however we were in the same room I would be able to take my finger and “flick” your head and by doing so you would have a Direct Sensory Experience, although you could still argue that you did not.
The fundamental problem with dealing with any DSE is that they are subjective; they are unique to each individual. My experience is different than yours, totally.
You cannot experience the exact same experience as I do and vice versa.
Even if we were in the same room at the same table, our field of vision would be very different, minimally my face would be in your field of vision and your face would be in mine.
Not only is your DSE very different than mine, but both of our DSE’s change at every instant.
Indulge me, try this.
Sit up straight and look directly in front of you, don’t focus on any specific thing, try to take in your entire field of vision. Now slowly move your head as far as you can to your left, then bring it back to right in front of you.
Let’s, for arguments sake, say it took you 4 seconds to do this.
What has changed and what has remained the same in the time it took to move your head?
The entirety of nature (the world, the universe, the cosmos) has changed in time.
Every “thing” is 4 seconds older and every “event” is 4 seconds along in its unfolding.
Now select one thing, a wall, a tree outside, the table, your computer, they have all changed. They will never be the same as you experienced them 4 seconds ago.
Not only has the entirety of nature changed in time, everything has changed in space also.
Standing on the surface of planet earth we are all moving east at so many mph, we are traveling around the sun at so many mph, and the sun is moving through our galaxy, which in turn is also traveling through the vastness of space.
No “thing” is ever in the same place from one instant to another.
So your direct sensory experience of nature only happens in a time we call now and a place we call here. You cannot have direct sensory experience of anything in the past or any thing in the future, but you can talk and think about things in the past and things in the future.
But it sure seems like there are things that do last through time, and stay in the same place.
I am still sitting at a “table” that was here yesterday and will very probably be here tomorrow. So what is it about the “table” that has made it past “Now” and is still “Here”?
The only aspect of the “table” that does not seem to move or age is its name.
Just like you and me, we both have names but once we take a good look at our selves we see that we are not exactly the same people as we were yesterday, the only “thing” about us that remains the same is our “name”.
When we give the name “table” to “the collection of features that make a table” we are creating a concept. We (collectively all English speaking people) have come to the agreement that the word or symbol “table” will represent the “collection of features that make a table”.
Now the important thing to remember is that the word table is a symbol, a representation of the thing, not the thing in itself. The thing in itself is a collection of properties that we group together to form this thing. The concept “table” only exists in the minds of men and woman, and only represents a table to those who accept the meaning of the concept.
Why do we do this? It has proven useful to name different collections of aspects of the natural world in this way. The usefulness is shown by our creating languages for communication.
When I ask my wife to put my coffee on the table I don’t say, “please put my coffee on the square flat thing in the kitchen supported by four legs, that we eat dinner on”, I say “please put my coffee on the table”.
My wife does not have to stop and decipher what I mean by the verbal symbol table.
She is very adept at using her reason to almost instantaneously recognize the meaning of the word and put my coffee where I want it.
Although her ability to reason seems “seamless” it is not necessarily automatic in the sense that she has no other choice. The employment of reason is optional. We are very good at it and it seems to work very well that we rarely question it, but it is not compulsory, we have a choice in the matter.
Snakes and ropes.
If I see a rope on the ground and mistakenly think it is a snake, what’s going on?
The direct sensory experience (sense of sight) tells me there is something on the ground.
I take this sensory input and translate it into something I can deal with reasonably.
I know there are snakes around here and it has the outline of a snake, I name it “snake” and jump on the table.
You come in behind me and go pick up the rope and throw it at me and say “get off the table you idiot”.
We cannot blame my actions on my sense of sight; it was doing its job to the best of its ability. The problem comes from me mis-naming, or mis-interpreting my sensory input.
My sense of sight doesn’t know what a “rope” is or what a “snake” is. My sense of sight deals with a field of vision. It takes in all light reflected off any objects in front of it with no care or interest or ability to name or classify any of the objects. I can only “mediate my sensory input” by employing my ability to reason, that is to mentally manipulate concepts (names).
Now we have two different types of vision, spotlight and floodlight. Your field of vision is like a floodlight it covers a wide area, but when you want to look at some thing specific you use your spotlight vision.
Now pick up your head again and look around the room paying attention to your floodlight vision, your field of vision.
How many things do you see? Hundreds?
Your floodlight vision takes them all in at once, instantaneously. Your floodlight vision works in the here and now, it takes in everything as it is including every change that happens at every instant.
But if you want to talk about these things, deal with these things logically (describe the room you are in) you have to do it linearly, object by object. You would have to consciously focus your attention (spotlight) on each object individually to describe it, i.e. name it.
Try it. Start naming these “things” but remember that in 4 seconds they will all have changed and the only thing you are dealing with is the symbols for these things.
To deal with nature logically or conceptually, by employing your ability to reason, you have to do it step by step, whereas your senses deal with nature totally, taking in everything all at once, even when every thing is changing at every instant.
So the “certainty beyond logic” is the certainty that the entirety of nature is in flux and your senses can deal with it.
You may not be able to explain it logically, but hey, what do you want? Everything?
Thanks for letting me ramble.
Charlie n.
neocarvaka said:
“Start naming these “things” but remember that in 4 seconds they will all have changed and the only thing you are dealing with is the symbols for these things.”
What’s up with this weird ritual of naming things every 4 secs? Pl. identify what has changed in the object in 4 secs? And how do “you” know that? According to your thesis, the observer also has changed in those 4 secs! So, what gives continuity to the process of knowing anything since obviously there is such continuity both in the object and the observer?
charlie n said:
Neocarvaka…
Neo.. What’s up with this weird ritual of naming things every 4 secs?
Not a ritual, just a small exercise to try to show that the only “thing” that remains the same, over time is the “name” we give to the thing.
Neo….Pl. identify what has changed in the object in 4 secs? And how do “you” know that?
Put a banana on your table and do nothing with it for two weeks. After two weeks go look at the banana. It is not same banana you put there two weeks ago. The banana has gone through some changes; it is now probably a rotten banana. It is only the “same” banana in the sense that it still has the name banana.
The banana did not turn into the rotten banana in an instant. It is a process of continuous, minute, changes that over a few weeks present itself as a rotten banana.
There is nothing that we can experience directly that does not change.
Neo… According to your thesis, the observer also has changed in those 4 secs! So, what gives continuity to the process of knowing anything since obviously there is such continuity both in the object and the observer?
Not sure what you mean here, “what gives continuity to the process of knowing anything”.
Are you asking how we know the banana from a week ago and we still know the banana a week later, even if the banana and I have changed?
If this is the question, then the “what” that “gives continuity to the process of knowing” is our use of language.
If this is not what you meant, could you please rephrase your question?
Thanks
Charlie n.
Neocarvaka said:
To say that a specific banana X has turned rotten over time, you must correctly identify that banana as the one which has turned rotten. How do you do that?
Since you have changed, your brain and its memories must also have changed. Or is your memory unchanged here? So, how do you know that you are using language correctly in calling it a “banana” or a “rotten banana”?
If the person who committed a crime at time T1 has no continuity with who he is at time T2 when his crime was discovered, why do you hold him responsible for what he did at time T1? I am glad our judges and lawyers don’t subscribe to this weird theory of change!
jabali108 said:
Hey Charlie, here’s a conundrum for you!
Let’s say James was married twenty years ago and is getting divorced now. Surely, according to your theory of change, there must been a great deal of change in James and his spouse. I think you would claim that they are not even the same persons in any significant sense, right? Now if they are not the same persons who married twenty years ago, what sense does it make, according to your theory, to say that THEY are getting divorced?
charlie n said:
Hi,
go get James wedding picture and hold it up next to James. What is the same about James in the wedding picture and James standing next to it twenty years later.
I have been married 32 years, my three children and 5 grand children are not in my wedding picture.
Something has changed.
jabali108 said:
But you haven’t answered my question. Obviously, there has been significant change. So, how do you identify the person as the same person? How are you able to say “I have been married 32 years.” if in all those years you have been undergoing change?
Could it be that there are features which change very slowly and hence are more stable than other features? Think of how you recognize your own face or the faces of your friends over the years. There are relatively constant features which help you to recognize them. This also applies to objects around us.
charlie n said:
hi jabali,
i responded to Neo with this…
Not sure what you mean here, “what gives continuity to the process of knowing anything”.
Are you asking how we know the banana from a week ago and we still know the banana a week later, even if the banana and I have changed?
If this is the question, then the “what” that “gives continuity to the process of knowing” is our use of language.
is this what you are asking?
charlie n.