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Buddhaghosa, identity, Linda Heuman, Pali suttas, Paul Harrison, Richard Gombrich, Richard Salomon, Siddhattha Gotama (Buddha)
There’s been a lot of talk among Buddhism-related bloggers lately about an article in Tricycle, by Linda Heuman. Heuman recounts the discovery, in 1994, of some very old scrolls – known as the Kharoṣṭhī fragments – in the the old Buddhist land of Gandhara, in what is now Afghanistan and Pakistan. Richard Salomon of the University of Washington has spent a great deal of time poring over these manuscripts. And what might we get out of them now? What difference might they make to Buddhists today?
Salomon argues that the manuscripts disprove an earlier model of Buddhist history – according to which there was an original council of Buddhists which established the first Buddhist canon, transmitted to disciples more or less verbatim. Instead, they show us that very different Buddhist texts were transmitted in very different places from very early on; the evidence doesn’t give us a first text that we can come back to.
The question is: what does that point imply? Heuman quotes Salomon to the effect that “none of the existing Buddhist collections of early Indian scriptures—not the Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese, nor even the Gandhari—’can be privileged as the most authentic or original words of the Buddha.’” (The first part of the quote, with the italics, is Heuman’s.) Heuman uses this claim to argue against Buddhist sectarian disputes: “Sectarian authority claims assume solid essentialist ground. That type of ground is just not there.” Let us assume for the purposes of this post that Salomon’s historical conclusions are correct. Does Heuman’s critique of sectarianism really follow?
Heuman claims: “Every school of Buddhism stakes its authority, and indeed its very identity, on its historical connection to this original first canon,” the canon established by the First Buddhist Council. But do they really? It is not the Council that was taken to have the perfect knowledge that liberates us, but rather the Buddha himself. Every tradition of Buddhism claims that its core teachings were taught by him.
And we have long known that the Mahāyāna claim to this effect is hogwash. I briefly discussed the evidence for this point before, and I am aware of no scholar with any training in historical methods who seriously contests it. Heuman quotes Paul Harrison to the effect that the Mahāyāna is much older than we had previously thought – but even he doesn’t buy the claim that the Mahāyāna was actually an esoteric teaching preached by the Buddha himself.
Rather, Salomon’s claims question further the ability of the Pali canon – the Theravāda sacred texts – to accurately represent the words of the Buddha. We have long known that the Pali texts were compiled several hundreds of years after his death by the Sri Lankan philosopher-monk Buddhaghosa (whose name, perhaps aptly, means “Voice of the Buddha”); the Kharoṣṭhī fragments cast further doubt on the accuracy of the texts he compiled. So the Pali texts are probably further from the claims of the historical Buddha than we might have thought.
But what does any of this do to undermine sectarian differences? Well, perhaps this evidence provides a way for Mahāyānists to proclaim to Theravādins: “Nyah-nyah!” They can turn the historical evidence that favoured the Theravādins on its head: maybe our texts weren’t really spoken by the Buddha, but neither are yours.
But what follows from such a point? Definitely not the “anti-essentialist” view that Heuman tries to argue, according to which “all Buddhists are 100 percent Buddhist.” That claim begs the big question: who counts as really Buddhist in the first place? As I’ve said before, if all people who call themselves Buddhists are Buddhists, then Dick Cheney can be a Buddhist simply by calling himself a Buddhist, even as he continues to promote mass murder and environmental pillage for the sake of oil profiteering. What that comes out to meaning, in the end, is that it matters not a whit whether you’re a Buddhist or not. Buddhism, on such a view, means nothing at all. And yet somehow the people who say these sorts of things still seem to call themselves “Buddhist practitioners,” as if the Buddha and his words actually mattered and were important somehow. The Heumans of the world want to have it both ways: following the Buddha matters, except that it doesn’t.
In discussing Heuman’s article, Justin Whitaker quotes Richard Gombrich to this effect: “The exegesis of the Pali canon has not yet advanced much beyond where the exegesis of the Bible stood in the middle of the 19th century…” This quote, I think, is correct. And what follows from it is that anyone who cares about the teachings of the historical Buddha should support textual studies like Salomon’s that will help us piece together the difficult task of reconstructing his ideas as best we can, just as biblical criticism has helped us to show how far the New Testament diverges from the words of the historical Jesus. What doesn’t follow is our saying: “Well, hey, we can’t actually know what the Buddha really said anyway, so we might as well just accept everything called Buddhism as genuine Buddhism.” As soon as we say this, we are saying that Buddhism doesn’t matter and there is no reason for anyone to bother calling themselves a Buddhist or engaging in any sorts of Buddhist practice.
The whole point of being a Buddhist or doing Buddhist practice is that that practice is better than other things one could be doing, or that those ideas are truer than others one could believe. (If one didn’t believe that, one would have no reason to be a Buddhist.) If one can accept that Buddhism is better than not-Buddhism, why is it so hard to accept that one kind of Buddhism could be better than another?
Now there are plenty of grounds other than connection to the historical Buddha on which one could argue for one tradition over another. It can sometimes be puzzling why the founder’s words are privileged so much – although I think there are some valid reasons to do so. By all means, say that Mahāyāna or Yavanayāna are an improvement over the teachings of the historical Buddha. Perhaps even try to argue that the Mahāyāna is closer to the Buddha’s words than we might have thought. Or make the theological claim that the different traditions are different skillful means, as long as you understand that that is a theological claim which goes against the self-understanding of most practitioners. Just don’t pretend that crucial questions which divide Buddhist practitioners from one another – should we seek our own liberation or everyone’s? Were there other buddhas after Gotama Buddha? – don’t matter.
Thill said:
This post raises and leads to a number of crucial questions for “Buddhists”.
The fundamental question, of course, is “What are the essential, constitutive, and core claims which identify a doctrine or belief-system as “Buddhist”?”
My proposal is this: A doctrine or belief-system is Buddhist if and only if its essential, constitutive, and core claims include the four “noble truths” and do not contain anything inconsistent with those four “noble truths” and their assumptions or presuppositions and implications or logical consequences.
If this is accepted, then it follows that any “teaching” which holds that there is no essential or inherent nature to anything, or that we cannot know anything with certainty, etc., cannot be a “Buddhist teaching” since it is inconsistent with the central assumption of the four “noble truths” that suffering has an inherent or essential nature, i.e., of being the inevitable consequence of desire, which can be understood.
michael reidy said:
Amod writes:
It might be that your initial encounter with the spiritual life was mediated by Buddhism and that you stick with that because you are following a certain programme, a graduated path that has its own internal logic and coherence. Good, better and best doesn’t come into it for the devotee, it’s the life of the Buddha that he’s following. The meditation on the archetypal elements of that life and the very early codification of its insights as Thill has pointed out is pukka Buddhist practice. Add on for the intellectuals annica/annata and you have the basis for speculative elaboration.
Thill said:
In terms of my criterion of “Buddhist teaching”, the denial of causality is inconsistent with the second noble truth which affirms that suffering is caused by desire and the fourth noble truth which claims that the eightfold path leads to the overcoming of suffering. Hence, a denial of causality cannot be a legitimate element of any Buddhist teaching.
The denial of a subject or self (a mutant of the denial of the Atman) is also inconsistent with the four “noble truths”. Suffering presupposes a subject or self who undergoes it; desire presupposes a subject or self who has it; the possibility of attainment of the goal of nirvana, or the overcoming of suffering, presupposes a subject or self who attains that goal; and the advocacy of the means of the eightfold path to attain the goal of nirvana presupposes a subject or self who follows that means. Hence, the denial of a subject or self cannot be a legitimate element of any Buddhist teaching.
Common sense is the only legitimate court of appeal for the first, second (particularly its assumption of causality), and the third “noble truths”. Hence, any denial of common sense as a legitimate court of appeal cannot be an element of a Buddhist teaching.
Thill said:
I will finish this train of reflection with one more: since “dualistic distinctions” of cause and effect, means and end, subject or self and its conditions, states, or experiences(conditions, states, or experiences such as suffering, desire, and the overcoming of suffering) are a part and parcel of the four “noble truths”, any form of non-dualism which denies, or implies the denial of these “dualistic distinctions”, cannot be an element of a Buddhist teaching.
Ramachandra1008 said:
“any “teaching” which holds that….we cannot know anything with certainty, etc., cannot be a “Buddhist teaching””
Indeed, it is silly to even ask the question “Can a Buddhist be a Skeptic?” given that a Buddhist must believe that there are truths, at least four of them, which can be known!
andrew merz said:
Hi Amod,
glad to be commenting again–I read you regularly, but usually feel too in-over-my-head from the get-go to try and wade into the comments and get in-over-my-head there.
I might be able to say that the Buddhist tradition I ended up in is “better for me,” but I don’t see that as grounds for saying that it is better for everyone, which seems to be what you’re getting at with the use of the term. And “better” kind of assumes that one ends up in a tradition through a process of comparison, or that one chooses and/or stays in a tradition for rational reasons; doesn’t this leave out some of the implications of being born into a tradition? Also, speaking for myself, I don’t particularly feel like I chose my tradition, but that somehow it chose me, and I don’t think this is an uncommon phenomenon. So, when I hear someone in another tradition report a similar experience, then, to me, theirs seems better for them. You could possibly argue about which traditions are relatively better for the world at large, which ones cause less suffering than others, help others more than others, but after a certain point it is folly to try to do so through the comparison of doctrines, since they are so rarely followed, or so often “creatively interpreted,” shall we say.
I’m also a little confused by your use of “the teachings of the historical Buddha” later in the article. Even if they are earliest, I don’t consider Pali suttas to be the actual words of the Buddha, as I don’t see how they could ever be proven to be such. If there’s no historical bottom line to be found, then all claims become theological claims. And in any case, a historical Buddha was making theological claims himself, wasn’t he?
I guess I’m somewhat in Rita Gross’s camp, although I don’t see the different schools as skillful means, exactly. (incidentally, last week I caught a theravadan friend using that term as though it weren’t a mahayana concept, and chided her for stealing “our” best ideas. she didn’t realize it was a mahayana creation.) More like different people in different times and places taking things in different directions. Maybe you could say that when one values a phenomenological rather than a philosophical approach to these questions, it is easier to leave them unresolved?
As for defining “authentic Buddhism,” well, yikes. I fear it might be too late.
Amod Lele said:
Hi Andrew – thanks for your comment. I’m glad you weighed in on this one; your thoughts are valuable.
Your first point is important, and I think is similar to the one Michael Reidy made above: different traditions, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist, may simply be more appropriate for different people. On such a view they are best comparable to different kinds of psychotherapy, cognitive-behavioural therapy vs. art therapy vs. drug therapy. I think there’s something to this position, though I’d hesitate to go too far with it. But if that is the position one takes, then it would seem that one’s ability to establish historical precedent, or lack thereof, is not relevant in any case. It shouldn’t matter what the founder said even for, say, Baha’is or Mormons, where we can establish the founder’s words and intent with real accuracy. So, if we go from that premise, the question of whether one can establish a historic Buddhist canon – the central topic of Heuman’s article – turns out to be irrelevant.
When I speak of the “historical Buddha” in the last paragraph, I’m referring to the possible rhetorical strategies a Mahāyāna or Yavanayāna Buddhist could use to defend their traditions – since one of the key theological claims on behalf of Theravāda is that it is indeed closer to the words of the historical Buddha. And my point is that, while we can’t know exactly what the historical Buddha’s words were and we certainly can’t take the Pali canon to be such, that doesn’t mean we have no knowledge at all or cannot make educated guesses. Even in the early days of biblical criticism when one could only guess at the views of the historical Jesus, it was still pretty clear that he didn’t teach the Book of Mormon. Similarly, I think it’s still fair to say that the Pali canon is at least closer to the views and teachings of the historical Buddha than is the Lotus Sūtra.
jabali108 said:
“I might be able to say that the Buddhist tradition I ended up in is “better for me,”…”
Why do you consider it a “Buddhist tradition” to start with? What makes it “Buddhist”?
“Even if they are earliest, I don’t consider Pali suttas to be the actual words of the Buddha, as I don’t see how they could ever be proven to be such. If there’s no historical bottom line to be found, then all claims become theological claims. And in any case, a historical Buddha was making theological claims himself, wasn’t he?”
Your question at the end implies that you believe that “a historical Buddha” was making certain theological claims. But if you think there’s not even any reliable, if not foolproof, evidence for believing that the Buddha made a set of specific claims, e.g., the four noble truths, how can you at the same time believe that he made “theological claims”? To believe that he made “theological claims” is to assume that he did make certain types of claims. What is the basis of this assumption?
If I think that there is no evidence that Cheney cracked jokes at cabinet meetings, how can I also believe that he cracked dirty jokes at cabinet meetings?
andrew said:
“I might be able to say that the Buddhist tradition I ended up in is “better for me,”…”
Why do you consider it a “Buddhist tradition” to start with? What makes it “Buddhist”?
“Even if they are earliest, I don’t consider Pali suttas to be the actual words of the Buddha, as I don’t see how they could ever be proven to be such. If there’s no historical bottom line to be found, then all claims become theological claims. And in any case, a historical Buddha was making theological claims himself, wasn’t he?”
Your question at the end implies that you believe that “a historical Buddha” was making certain theological claims. But if you think there’s not even any reliable, if not foolproof, evidence for believing that the Buddha made a set of specific claims, e.g., the four noble truths, how can you at the same time believe that he made “theological claims”? To believe that he made “theological claims” is to assume that he did make certain types of claims. What is the basis of this assumption?
If I think that there is no evidence that Cheney cracked jokes at cabinet meetings, how can I also believe that he cracked dirty jokes at cabinet meetings?
Jabali, these are relevant points–I should have written simply “tradition,” as its Buddhistness or non-Buddhistness doesn’t matter to me at all. It is nominally Buddhist, in the broad and basically meaningless application of the term today. By “historical Buddha,” I meant the constructed notion referred to in Amod’s post, typically the figure in the “earliest” Pali texts. Instead of “a historical Buddha” perhaps I should have said “any historical Buddha”? Would that clear it up? The point was that I don’t see how or why this presumed Buddha’s claims can be differentiated from later or other “theological” claims. There is a purported record of jokes, and whether or not Cheney actually made them doesn’t determine their dirtiness. I guess I might be missing the point of differentiation between an assumed Buddha’s claims and a theological claim. But now I’m not sure what point I was trying to make, actually. My connection with and experience of my teacher and their effects on my life are what they are, whether or not his teachings can be traced back to an earliest or historical Buddha, or are judged as “authentically” Buddhist or not.
Jayarava said:
I found this an interesting perspective. I don’t read Tricycle or take much notice of that strain of popular Buddhism, but I have read much of (and corresponded a little with) Richard Salomon, and I’m fascinated by the Gandhāran area.
You say “We have long known that the Pali texts were compiled several hundreds of years after his death by the Sri Lankan philosopher-monk Buddhaghosa”
Have ‘we’? I think this is certainly an opinion that has been voiced in the 21st (possibly late 20th) century, primarily by a small group of iconoclastic scholars in America. Especially Greg Schopen and his colleagues, who refuse to accept the texts themselves as providing *any* historical information.
But we no more “know” this, than we know what language the Buddha spoke or what his name was. What we know is that there is no *archaeological* evidence before this period – and since the whole canon was unlikely to be carved into rock, and palm-leaves don’t last, we would not expect to. But the tradition itself speaks of compilation much earlier and like Professor Gombrich I take the tradition at it’s word unless I have reason to doubt it. What the Gāndhārī texts show is that there was a written Gāndhārī canon in the 1st or 2nd century CE – since some of the birch bark manuscripts from Bajaur can be carbon dated to that period (and this *is* supported by epigraphical evidence).
I don’t think the idea of a canon emerging immediately after the death of the Buddha seems likely – the bhikkhu(nī) saṅgha were too dispersed. I know that the Pāli texts very often contain different versions of one story – 3 and 4 retellings that vary only in minor details. This suggests that the texts represent the convergence of multiple oral lineages after some time allowing for divergence – and the divergences amongst the various canons. My reading of the many recent studies of Chinese translations of parallels to the Pāli is that they seldom show any great divergence unless given a Mahāyāna spin.
Given the political structures in India I think a canon is unlikely before the Mauryan period, and there probably was some standardisation under Asoka in Magadha which gave rise to the Pāli version of the canon. I confess that this simply a plausible narrative, and you can take it or leave it. However Bronkhorst has argued that another Gandhāran, Paṇīni was working from written versions of the Ṛgveda when he constructed has grammar, not long after the Buddha, and there are those who do not believe he could have done it without writing himself. Asoka’s stabilising and standardising role, and his widespread use of writing are suggestive.
That Buddhists have a fairly Protestant attitude towards written texts as authorities, or that the Mahāyāna Buddhists actually worshipped texts cannot be denied. But Buddhism as an historical and cultural phenomenon has always been more complex than it’s texts suggest. As Schopen has also noted the archaeological evidence almost always contradicts the textual record. Buddhists may revere their texts, but have never been entirely bound by them. So any argument about sectarianism that only uses texts as authority is pointless. Throughout the history of Buddhism charismatic individuals have always been able to over-ride textual Buddhism by claims to personal enlightenment. This has happened incredibly often, and is in fact happening in 21st century Western Buddhism (c.f. Daniel Ingram and other “Arahants”). To paraphrase Forest Gump, Buddhism is as Buddhists do. You complain that someone could *call* themselves a Buddhist but act in ways that are not generally sanctioned by other Buddhists (Cheney). But you are arguing about doxis not praxis – Buddhism is about praxis and what you believe is secondary to what you do. A Buddhist is someone who *practises* some form of Buddhism – and while this is still incredibly vague, it is less open to abuse than someone simply claiming to be Buddhist. So, as a Buddhist, I can feel a sense of solidarity (at least to some extent) with anyone who does a Buddhist practise with the aim of (eventually) being liberated from greed, hatred and delusion – be it meditation, chanting a mantra, visualising a deity, or simply being generous to monks. And for most of us our practice comes from a teacher, not from a book. It may well exist in written form, and the solitary teacherless bookworm Buddhist is an increasingly common Western phenomenon, but the archetype of the Buddhist is not someone who is well read, but someone who has a Buddhist teacher. We’re more angsty about lineage than we are about literature, though the Protestant West has amplified the authority of texts beyond even what Buddhists have traditionally acknowledged.
The real claim that Buddhists make is not so much that our texts are original, which is incidental, but that our *methods are effective*. I think the concern with original texts, and the actual words of the Buddha, reflects a Western, even a Victorian, attitude related to Protestantism. It’s a side issue that Westerners find absorbing, because we have been arguing for centuries about this in relation to the Bible. But it’s a side show. And, I would argue, half an hour of mindfulness of breathing will amply demonstrate that to any curious person.
Thanks for a well written and thought provoking post, and apologies for ranting at length in my comment. It is something I’ve been thinking and writing about myself for some years now. I look forward to reading more having only recently discovered your blog.
Best Wishes
Jayarava
Amod Lele said:
Thanks very much for your considered reply, Jayarava. I’m delighted that you found the blog and hope to hear more from you.
Let me begin by admitting that the historical accuracy of the Pali canon is not an area of specialization for me. My dissertation work was on Śāntideva, thus a much later period. So it’s possible that what I thought was scholarly consensus was not so – perhaps others believe that the redaction of the Pali canon goes back well before Buddhaghosa. But I don’t think that point poses any problem for the larger point I was trying to make. Indeed, I think it strengthens it – in that case the Theravādins have more grounds of historical accuracy on which to build their claims.
Because this blog aims at very large-scale cross-cultural questions, I have followed a methodology of this sort very often. When confronted with a provocative and significant claim, I often say: let us grant for the sake of argument that the details of the evidence stand; the claimed significance of its conclusion still does not follow. In this respect the approach I’ve taken here to Heuman’s claims about the canon parallels my approach to Graham Priest’s arguments for dialetheism: even if the details of the argument work, the claimed result of the conclusion does not follow. If the details of the argument don’t work, then my refutation of that result is on even stronger ground.
Re doxis and praxis, I would dispute this. Don’t forget that right view is the very first portion of the Eightfold Path. To the extent that the traditional claim for Buddhism is that its Buddhist methods are effective, correct belief must be counted among these methods. So too, I suspect the concern with texts and their accuracy is more indigenous to traditional Buddhism than you’re admitting. Why else would premodern monks have spent so much more time in recitation than in meditation?
Thill said:
Priest’s position is that it is not necessarily true that only one of any given pair of contradictory statements is true. His conclusion is based on his work in the highly arcane and abstract area of logical paradoxes and their formalized resolution.
But his position certainly does not imply that there aren’t pairs of contradictory statements which cannot both be true.
In fact, barring a few statements in quantum physics, we would find it near impossible to give examples of contradictory statements which can both be true.
I am pretty sure that Priest himself would agree that only one of the following two contradictory statements can be true:
A. Priest holds that it is not necessarily true that only one of any given pair of contradictory statements is true.
B. Priest holds that it is necessarily true that only one of any given pair of contradictory statements is true.
So, I think that Priest’s work is virtually irrelevant for the application of consistency or coherence tests to claims in everyday life, a great deal of science, technology, the arts, religion, and philosophy.
JimWilton said:
Very interesting topic! I have been out of the country for ten days and I’m afraid I can’t catch up (72 commenets!).
I’ll just raise one point. It is not accurate to think of the practice of recitation as exclusively an intellectual exercise or a recognition of the primacy of concepts or beliefs in Buddhism.
The practice of recitation is mindfulness meditation but working with moving mind rather than the still mind that we traditionally think of as “meditation” (as in Zen mediattion for example). The process involves a mind training where we become distrated and return to the present moment and what is happening in the present moment.
In some traditions there is also an aspect of working with speech as well as mind. There are also Buddhist practices that work with body.
This is not to say that the concepts are unimportant.
elisa freschi said:
Amod,
I am sorry for asking just a liminal question: is it really beyond controversy that Buddhaghosa is the author/editor of the Theravāda Canon and that this did not exist before him in any form? Or do you just mean to say that it did not exist in its actual form before Buddhaghosa? That B. systematised and organised it?
Amod Lele said:
An important distinction to make, and one I didn’t say enough about. The scholars I’m aware of treat Buddhaghosa as the canon’s redactor, not its author – most of the texts likely existed before him, but he’s the one who put them in the form we now have, probably through editing as well as compilation and arrangement.
Thill said:
The charges of incoherence in “Buddhist teachings” or alleged “Buddhist teachings” I’ve raised in several earlier comments on this blog can be met by acknowledging that one of the elements or claims contributing to the incoherence is not really a Buddhist teaching since it is inconsistent with the four noble truths, and regardless of who has made it or how loudly it is proclaimed to be a Buddhist teaching.
My recent reflections on the core of Buddhism, viz., the four noble truths, are leading me in this direction. Of course, whether there is any incoherence in the four noble truths is an important issue, but a great deal of what I previously considered incoherent in Buddhism was generated by the inclusion of “Buddhist teachings” inconsistent with the four noble truths. This incoherence is eliminated by discarding those “teachings”, e.g., denial of the self, denial of causality, denial of inherent or essential nature, etc.
I will add that rationality – inclusive of the use of common sense and reason in ascertaining the universal features of the human condition, the analysis of causal relations, assessment of the proper means to achieving a goal or end, etc., – is also explicit in the formulation of the Four Noble Truths. Any form of irrationality or anti-rationality cannot be an element or feature of a Buddhist teaching since it is inconsistent with the Four Noble Truths.
Thus, a truly Buddhist teaching cannot contain the following seven claims:
1. Things have no inherent or essential nature.
2. Causality or causal relations have no reality.
3. We cannot know anything.
4. The subject or self does not exist.
5. Common sense is never reliable.
6. There are no real distinctions, i.e., “non-dualism”.
7. Rationality has no value and cannot facilitate enlightenment.
Ethan Mills said:
While it’s right that some things called “Buddhism” might be more genuinely Buddhist than others, I think it’s possible for rational people to disagree about such matters. A lot of what passes for “Zen” (especially in the West) doesn’t seem terribly Buddhist to me, but I’m open to being convinced. For instance, reading Dogen recently made me think that he might have a similar goal as, say, Dignaga (uprooting our ignorant ways of seeing things), albeit very different methods.
As for Thill’s idea that the four noble truths are the only criterion for true Buddhism, I would point out first that it’s far from clear what the four noble truths actually mean or whether they are supported by “common sense” (whatever “common sense” is, you’ll probably find more of it in Nyāya than in Buddhism). Second, I’d suggest that non-self is probably as essential a Buddhist doctrine as any. Objections similar to Thill’s were raised by Brahmanical philosophers in classical India and answered by Buddhists (basically they say such objections beg the question in favor of a self, and they can account for experience with dependent origination without positing a self). I think the Buddhists give a plausible response. But another problem is that what any of us mean by “self” today might be different than what either party in the debate meant in those days.
Thill said:
“Objections similar to Thill’s were raised by Brahmanical philosophers in classical India and answered by Buddhists (basically they say such objections beg the question in favor of a self, and they can account for experience with dependent origination without positing a self).”
If you can understand even the English translations with all hair-splitting and sometimes meaningless distinctions in those texts, you may want to give an example or two of those objections and replies in plain English.
“they can account for experience…without positing a self”. You mean a group of selves claim that they can do so?
Isn’t it astonishing that in philosophy we can say such things, e.g., “I will offer you an argument to show that neither I nor you have a self.”, with a straight face?
Of course, if by “denial of self” you mean denial of the Atman (the original sense of “Anatta”), I agree that this is consistent with the four noble truths. In fact, they imply that the individual self cannot be the self-sufficient and ever-blissful Atman since the former is subject to craving and suffering.
But if you are talking about what I consider a mutant of the original Anatman thesis, the denial of any selfhood as such, then we are not really dealing with a genuine Buddhist teaching at all.
The first noble truth affirms, at the very least, the reality of suffering. Now try to identify suffering or desire without first identifying individuals, or selves, or bearers of suffering or desire!
And I suppose we can also speak of the efficacy of path to liberation from suffering without any reference to a bearer or self which undergoes suffering and follows that path?
Let me know if you have figured out a way to do it – to identify running or swimming or singing in the real world without identifying a runner or swimmer or singer, and all that.
Ethan Mills said:
“If you can understand even the English translations with all hair-splitting and sometimes meaningless distinctions in those texts, you may want to give an example or two of those objections and replies in plain English.”
A pretty good source on this debate is the chapter on Nyāya in Siderits’s Buddhism as Philosophy. The plain English version is surprisingly close to what you’re saying: how can you have “action” without an “actor” or “desire” without a “desirer”? Also, doesn’t all of experience give a basis to infer a self? Typical Buddhist responses were to say that the experience of selfhood is an illusion created by the reflexivity of consciousness. There are little impermanent moments of consciousness, but no enduring self behind them and no self that possesses them. They probably had in mind an appeal to the “principle of lightness” (aka Ockham’s Razor): if you can account for experience without a self, that theory is more elegant and more likely to be true.
I think you’re right that the original Buddhist intention was primarily to deny the Upanishadic ātman, but as the tradition developed they seem to have thought it more and more necessary to deny any sort of selfhood. Vasubandhu’s critique of the Pudgalavāda school is a good example (the Pudgalavādins were Buddhists who believed that there is a “person” which is not a self). But Buddhist philosophers never denied a “conventional” self as a designation for a set of aggregates and developed a way to talk about “persons” without making the metaphysical assertion that there is any one thing that makes a person a person. The Questions of King Milinda is a good example there. But ultimately there is no person or self to be found.
None of this means Indian Buddhist philosophers were right, but I think it does mean that they had fairly sophisticated theories that were at the very least inspired by things the Buddha may have said about the denial of selfhood.
Thill said:
1. I am well aware of the long history of criticism of Buddhist doctrines in India. I have some of the primary texts in English translations and will give you proofs of what I mean by “hairsplitting and meaningless distinctions” and obscure replies at a later time.
“doesn’t all of experience give a basis to infer a self?”
2. We don’t infer that we have a self from our experiences or actions. Rather, the self is a constitutive feature of our experiences and actions such that any description of them is in terms of someone having that experience or performing that action.
Try describing experiences or actions without presupposing and using concepts and words which identify those experiences and actions in terms of a subject or agent. Pl. provide me with samples.
“Typical Buddhist responses were to say that the experience of selfhood is an illusion created by the reflexivity of consciousness.”
3. This doesn’t make sense. Selfhood is defined in terms of “reflexivity of consciousness”! To speak of a self is to speak of self-consciousness, the sense that one is the subject of experiences and the agent of actions. So, if “reflexivity of consciousness” is real, then a self is real!
“There are little impermanent moments of consciousness, but no enduring self behind them and no self that possesses them.”
4. We can’t even identify “moments of consciousness” without first picking out selves or persons who are bearers of that consciousness or who can become aware of those moments.
They probably had in mind an appeal to the “principle of lightness” (aka Ockham’s Razor): if you can account for experience without a self, that theory is more elegant and more likely to be true.”
5. You don’t see the inconsistency between your use of “they” – which proves the point that you can identify thoughts only by reference to thinkers – and your claim that we can account for experience or thinking or believing without reference to a self?
Anyway, it is meaningless to speak of “accounting for experience without a self” since we can only identify experiences by reference to subjects or selves who have those experiences.
Here’s something to laugh at:
Buddhist Dad ( a self): Jamie (he picked out a self), did you (he picked out a self) hear that shouting and laughing next door?
Jamie: Yes, Dad (she picked out a self!). Who (she is asking him to pick out a self or selves)do you (she picks out a self!) think it was?
Buddhist Dad (a self): Stop it, Jamie! (he picks out a self). How many times I (he refers to himself) have told you ( a self) that there is only shouting and laughing but nobody who is shouting and laughing?
Jamie ( a self): I (a self) don’t get it, Dad (a self).
Buddhist Dad (a self): Jamie, you’ve ( a self)got to study more Buddhism. Remind me (a self) to get a book on Buddhism for you (a self) the next time I (a self) go to the bookstore.
Jamie (a self): Ok, Dad (a self).
Ramachandra1008 said:
“Second, I’d suggest that non-self is probably as essential a Buddhist doctrine as any.”
Absurd as it is in any case, the doctrine of “non-self” would render morality or ethics meaningless or vacuous. Without the notion of a self which is harmed or helped by qualities and/or actions, ethical rules, precepts, and values would make no sense. The notion of responsibility would also become meaningless and with its demise punishment and reward will also go down the tube.
So, if you subscribe to the eightfold path, or any minimal concept of morality or ethics, there is no way you can also buy this non-self nonsense.
Thill said:
“it’s right that some things called “Buddhism” might be more genuinely Buddhist than others, I think it’s possible for rational people to disagree about such matters.”
Whether or not the people who disagree about such matters are expressing a rational disagreement depends on the grounds of their disagreement. The mere logical possibility of rational disagreement is not philosophically significant.
I don’t think there are “degrees of genuine Buddhism”. What is the criterion of “degrees of genuineness” here? Either a claim is genuinely Buddhist or it isn’t.
It is necessary to first think about the grounds on which one could justifiably maintain that “some things called “Buddhism”” are in fact Buddhist to start with. What “things” or claims? And why are they “Buddhist” in the first place?
“As for Thill’s idea that the four noble truths are the only criterion for true Buddhism, I would point out first that it’s far from clear what the four noble truths actually mean”
It is incontrovertible that the early Buddhist texts say that the Buddha’s first discourse after his enlightenment was primarily on the four noble truths. I don’t think there is a single early text which dissents from this. This is the basis of my proposal that we use the four noble truths as the touchstone for determining whether a claim is “Buddhist” or not.
I don’t see any serious problem in identifying the basic content or central claims of the four noble truths. The first noble truth at the very least affirms the reality and universality of suffering. The second noble truth states that suffering has a cause and that craving or desire is this cause. The third noble truth affirms that suffering can be overcome by eliminating its cause. And the fourth noble truth states that the eightfold path is the means to eliminating the cause of suffering, and, thereby, to achieve liberation from suffering.
If there are any significant alternative formulations in the early Buddhist texts, I would like to know what they are. Again, the mere logical possibility that they could have other meanings or formulations is not philosophically significant.
We should also note that the widely accepted traditional formulation of the basic content of the four noble truths has a logical structure:
identification of a universal and recurrent problem (suffering) -> identification of the major contributing cause -> affirmation of the feasibility of solving the problem by affirming the feasibility of eliminating the cause of the problem -> statement of the means of elimination of the cause of the problem
Any alternative formulation must not only have textual support but must also have this logical or rational structure or approach.
“or whether they are supported by “common sense” (whatever “common sense” is, you’ll probably find more of it in Nyāya than in Buddhism).”
It’s evident that the four noble truths implicitly rely on common sense.
How do you support the claim that suffering is a real and universal and recurrent feature of the human condition except by appealing to common sense, the common experience of human beings?
How do you support the idea that things or events have causes except by appealing to common sense?
How do you justify the idea that problems have causes and that to remove the problem you must remove the cause except by appealing to common sense?
Ethan Mills said:
In Pali, the first noble truth is simply “dukkha.” This could mean any of the following: “there is some suffering”, “everything is nothing but suffering plain and simple” or that “everything has a small part of suffering in it.” Also, later Buddhists came to classify three kinds of dukkha: normal pain, suffering produced by change, and suffering produced by conditioned states. There’s also the issue that “suffering” isn’t a particularly good translation for “dukkha” (I prefer the much uglier word: dissatisfactoriness). Hence, it’s not entirely clear.
Maybe “there is some suffering” is common sense, which might be defined as common experience, but if that’s all the Buddha (or the character called “the Buddha”) were saying, that wouldn’t be shocking to anybody. The more psychological aspects, however, are not at all common sense. If you took a poll and asked people whether the defining characteristic of human life is suffering, most people would say that’s crazy – what about pleasure, beauty, happiness, etc.? Isn’t it the case that “you need the bad to recognize the good”? (or whatever inane folk wisdom they might glibly unveil)
I could say much the same about the remaining three truths. None of them are entirely clear on their own nor do I think any of them are common sense if you mean that people would agree with them pre-reflectively.
Unless you mean something different by common sense? I’m honestly not sure what “common sense” is – what makes it either “common” or “sense”?
Thill said:
I would also like to propose my answer to the question “What is Buddhist philosophy? or “What is it to do Buddhist philosophy?”:
To do Buddhist philosophy is to:
a. clarify the four noble truths
b. analyze their assumptions and implications
c. examine the coherence or individual and mutual logical consistency of the four noble truths
d. examine the plausibility of the four noble truths
e. analyze the consistency between any relevant claim or theory (relevant to the content of the four noble truths)and the four noble truths
f. clarify any values implicit in the four noble truths
michael reidy said:
Thill:
Your insistence that the questions that you pose will be answered while remaining within the bounds of common sense, as you understand it, will inevitably be frustrated. Your common sense is useless for the purposes of providing a grounding of the fundamental characteristics of reality of which the 4 noble truths are an expression. It is essentially a one-dimensional, flatland philosophy lacking the depth of metaphysics and the height of aspiration to universal compassion. As a scholar you would not claim that the critique you offer of Buddhist ideas of causality and non-duality are original with you and have not been answered in the past. Shankaracarya in the BSB (Brahma Sutra Bhasya) with his polemical discussion of the various strands of Buddhism explores the difficulties with annica/annata. That whole book is in its way an exposition of non-duality as a transcendental postulate.
Trying to keep the balloon of Buddhism on the ground with the use of Common Sense won’t work. The very acceptance of the 4 Truths as the nucleus of practice and feeling their force and urgency requires Extraordinary Sense. From them will spring questions such as ‘whose suffering or who suffers’, what is the nature of the force of suffering as causal and so on and so forth. Enter Metaphysics.
Thill said:
This is all fascinating rhetoric but it does nothing at all to address and undermine my simple point that the four noble truths with their affirmation of the reality of suffering, that it has a cause, and that the removal of the cause leads to the removal of suffering, etc., presuppose or require only common sense as the court of appeal.
If you have read my recent posts, you would know that I am accepting the obvious, commonsensical affirmation of causality in the second noble truth, and rejecting non-dualism as a genuine Buddhist article on grounds of its inconsistency with the four noble truths.
What “mudha-physics” is there in the claim that suffering is an universal and recurrent feature of the human condition, or that it has a cause, or that the removal of the cause leads to liberation from suffering?
Philosophy becomes a circus when rhetoric is substituted for argument, when the simple is occluded by portentous obscurity and pretentious complexity, and when the plain distinction between sense and nonsense is itself eroded in an insufferable din of words.
Jabali108 said:
MR, you seem to be blissfully ignorant of the Buddha’s silence on metaphysical questions, his advice to avoid wasting precious time in metaphysical divagations and digressions because they are irrelevant to the four noble truths.
“Your common sense is useless for the purposes of providing a grounding of the fundamental characteristics of reality of which the 4 noble truths are an expression.”
Which “fundamental characteristics of reality” are you talking about? How do you know them? And how are the four noble truths their “expression”?
“The very acceptance of the 4 Truths as the nucleus of practice and feeling their force and urgency requires Extraordinary Sense.”
What in the name of Brahman do you mean?
“From them will spring questions such as ‘whose suffering or who suffers’”
This is the sort of thing the Buddha would consider to be metaphysical twaddle (dualism, Atmanism, etc) irrelevant to the problem of understanding suffering, its cause, and the means to liberation from it.
One doesn’t need to know anything other than the self-evident fact that one is subject to suffering. What could possibly be a better alternative answer to the question “Who suffers?” than that “I suffer!”?
Jayarava said:
The Four Noble Truths are only an application of the general principle of paṭiccasamuppāda to dukkha. So they are in no way fundamental to Buddhist thought, any more than other applications of the general principle are.
Thill said:
Rather, I think, the four noble truths paved the way for the development of the paticcasamuppada doctrine by first applying causality to dukkha. I think the textual record bears this out. So, the four noble truths remain fundamental.
If the paticcasamuppada doctrine was fundamental, then we would expect the first noble truth to have stated it. Instead, what we find first is the statement of the problem (of suffering) to be overcome.
If indeed the paticcasamuppada doctrine was fundamental, we would expect the second noble truth to carry the causal analysis further back to desire or craving and examine the cause of desire or craving, and so on. But it does nothing of this kind. It simply stops with the putative or proposed immediate cause of suffering.
This shows that the four noble truths are not an application of a primary paticcasamuppada doctrine, but rather a foundation for the later development of that form of causal analysis.
Thill said:
The fact that the second noble truth does not assert the interdependence of desire and suffering, but only the dependence of suffering on desire is further evidence that the four noble truths are independent of the doctrine of paticcasamuppada, a doctrine which is more than the simple application of causality to dukkha we find in the second noble truth.
Thill said:
The patticasamuppada doctrine is logically dependent on the four noble truths. Here is why. Before one embarks on a causal or dependence relations analysis, one must first identify the object, phenomenon, or event to analyze and the significance or value of the analysis. The four noble truths provide these prerequisites. Hence, they have primacy over the patticasamuppada doctrine.
Neocarvaka said:
MR: “Enter Metaphysics.”
Enter: Acrobats and contortionists, veritable “Ashtavakras”, of language and thought.
michael reidy said:
Thill, Jabali,
I am not a Buddhist so should I be talking about this issue? The reason I am not a Buddhist may be relevant however as it casts light on what I have called the extraordinary sense as opposed to the common sense that Thill is attempting to foist on the Four Noble Truths.
Even though I have been reading for a long time in general Buddhist texts and have come across the 4 Noble Truths often I have never been stopped in my tracks and said to myself, ‘How true, how very true, my God it’s really, really true, I could live by this etc, etc. The full force of that which Buddha attained and of which the aspirants realisation is but a faint echo was never mine. I get it that it’s a possible way to live your life, my common sense tells me that but the extraordinary sense that would allow me to commit myself whole heartedly to it is not there. And that is why I am not a Buddhist.
I had a look at the google preview of Mark Siderits’ book on Buddhism as Philosophy. He represents the Buddha as delivering an explication of the Second Truth as a 12 linked chain of causes and effects. From Ignorance comes Impermanence, Suffering and Non-Self. The theme of the OP has been that it is not established that the Buddha did any such thing or that there is no direct evidential link to such explication and Siderits would of course know this. Evidently at the very least some early back room Bodhisattvas thought it a noetic necessity which of course it is.
There will always be a ‘Paul’ and there will always be a ‘Marcion’.
Thill said:
A little mindfulness before making allegations could prevent them from becoming baseless.
You keep on caviling against common sense without argument.
Once again, how do you justify the claim that suffering is real and universal without appealing to common sense?
Once again, how do you justify the claim that suffering has a cause without appealing to common sense?
Try explaining the second noble truth without appealing to common sense.
Where in the four noble truths do you find any hint of dismissal of common sense or anything which undermines common sense?
It seems that your much-vaunted “Extraordinary Sense” is just another fact familiar to common sense: a strong attraction to a set of beliefs or ideas which compels you to adhere to them.
michael reidy said:
Thill:
When one thinks of all the austerities that the Buddha went through, the techniques that he mastered, the attacks of Mara and then consider that it might all have been avoided by the application of common sense. Mind-boggling.
Thill said:
Those austerities didn’t solve the problem of suffering for him. Perhaps, it is also “mind-boggling” to you that the Buddha should advocate the common sense approach, the “majjhimā paṭipadā” or “the Middle Way”, of avoiding extremes after all that.
“…the traditional story that the Buddha realized the meaning of the Middle Way when he sat by a river and heard a lute player in a passing boat and understood that the lute string must be tuned neither too tight nor too loose to produce a harmonious sound.”
Oh, how “far out” from our common sense all this is!
michael reidy said:
Thill:
You think that it’s merely a matter of understanding the 4 Noble Truths, of aligning them with common sense, checking them: Good, good, fine, splendid, next question. Common sense does not come near these mysteries. Going by common sense we would have to say, Buddhists say one thing, Advaitins say something else, Dvatins say yet another. Muslims and Christians are saying that all the rest are misled. To the avatar of common sense they can’t all be right, there is only one correct answer.
Buddhist type liberation may well bring in its train all those realisations about causality and non-self that may be obnoxious to common sense. Leave it to them.
Thill said:
There you go again with less-than-mindful attributions!
I never said that it is “merely a matter of understanding the 4 Noble Truths, of aligning them with common sense”.
Obviously, the fourth noble truth is all about practicing on the way to liberation from suffering.
I am yet to hear an answer from you to the questions I posed on how you would explain and justify the four noble truths without recourse to common sense.
There is also no reasoned objection to my claim that non-dualism and denial of causality are inconsistent with the four noble truths.
Could it be that your “extraordinary sense” of the truth of your own claims merely on grounds of asserting and repeating them is increasingly displacing your common sense? LOL
Jabali said:
Michael:
The myth of Mara is just that, a myth. If the Buddha himself had believed that a supernatural agency or being can attempt to produce, often successfully, desire-laden states of mind in us, he would have affirmed it in the second noble truth. But there is no reference to any supernatural agency or being in the four noble truths. Hence, the Buddha did not believe in supernatural agencies or beings.
Jabali said:
“Going by common sense we would have to say, Buddhists say one thing, Advaitins say something else, Dvatins say yet another. Muslims and Christians are saying that all the rest are misled. To the avatar of common sense they can’t all be right, there is only one correct answer.”
Yes, common sense tells us that they are making conflicting claims and that they can’t all be right in just the way common sense tells us that a person who cries “Wolf!” and a person who cries “No wolf!” can’t both be true at the same time.
But common sense (on the world and our own minds), science (which is largely an extension and augmentation of common sense), and reasoning based on them are sufficient guides for sorting out sense and nonsense, fact and fiction, truth and error, plausibility and implausibility, and the reasonable and unreasonable in those claims.
If you disagree, I would like to hear your argument with an example or two of those sorts of conflicting claims you mention.
“Buddhist type liberation may well bring in its train all those realisations about causality and non-self that may be obnoxious to common sense. Leave it to them.”
It would be helpful if you would first clarify what you mean by “Buddhist type liberation” and the basis for your conception of it. Second, what are the “realisations about causality and non-self” you are talking about? Third, how are these “realisations” the products of “Buddhist type liberation”?
Jabali said:
“Going by common sense we would have to say, Buddhists say one thing, Advaitins say something else, Dvatins say yet another. Muslims and Christians are saying that all the rest are misled. To the avatar of common sense they can’t all be right, there is only one correct answer.”
Yes, common sense tells us that they are making conflicting claims and that they can’t all be right in just the way common sense tells us that a person who cries “Wolf!” and a person who cries “No wolf!” can’t both be true at the same time.
But common sense (on the world and our own minds), science (which is largely an extension and augmentation of common sense), and reasoning based on them are sufficient guides for sorting out sense and nonsense, fact and fiction, truth and error, plausibility and implausibility, and the reasonable and unreasonable in those claims.
If you disagree, I would like to hear your argument with an example or two of those sorts of conflicting claims you mention.
“Buddhist type liberation may well bring in its train all those realisations about causality and non-self that may be obnoxious to common sense. Leave it to them.”
It would be helpful if you would first clarify what you mean by “Buddhist type liberation” and the basis for your conception of it. Second, what are the “realisations about causality and non-self” you are talking about? Third, how are these “realisations” the products of “Buddhist type liberation”?
Thill said:
“Buddhist type liberation may well bring in its train all those realisations about causality and non-self that may be obnoxious to common sense.”
Michael, don’t you see the contradiction here? If by “realisations about causality” you are talking about the denial of causality, isn’t it rather odd to also speak, in the same breath, of this “realisation”, the denial of causality, as a likely effect or product of “Buddhist type liberation”?
In other words, you are invoking causality in the very attempt to justify a denial of causality by stating that this denial is a likely product or effect of “Buddhist type liberation”.
Thill said:
I have summarized my recent reflections on Buddhism on my blog:
http://thebaloneydetective.com/
I also added the following argument:
The notion advanced by some schools of “Buddhism” that we have an innate, enlightened, “Buddha Nature” or pure self undefiled by ignorance, desire, and suffering is also inconsistent with four noble truths, particularly the first and second noble truths which acknowledge that we are subject to suffering as a consequence of our subjection to desire, and the fourth noble truth which implies that we are not already enlightened or liberated from suffering and must follow a way, the eightfold path, to become enlightened or liberated from suffering.
Dion said:
Amod
Really enjoy your blog. One of the few places – perhaps the only place – on the web where one can go for good writing and thinking on both eastern and western philosophy.
Dion
Amod Lele said:
Thank you, Dion. I’m glad you enjoy it and I would be happy to see more of you around!
Thill said:
From Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta:
“So, Malunkyaputta, remember what is undeclared by me as undeclared, and remember what is declared by me as declared. And what is undeclared by me? ‘The Universe is eternal’ is undeclared by me. ‘The universe is not eternal’ is undeclared by me. ‘The Universe is finite’, ‘The universe is infinite’, ‘The soul & the body are one and the same’, ‘The soul is one thing & the body another’, ‘A Tathagata exists after death’, ‘A Tathagata does not exist after death’, ‘A Tathagata both exists and does not exist after death’, ‘A Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death’. All these positions are undeclared by me.
And why are these undeclared by me? because they have nothing to do with the goal, they are not part of the holy life. They do not lead to an end to confusion, release from the heat of passion, cessation of craving, equanimity, vision and insight, awakening, nibbana. That is why they are undeclared by me.
“And what is declared by me? ‘This is dukkha‘ is declared by me. ‘This is the origin of dukkha‘ is declared by me. ‘This is the cessation of dukkha‘ is declared by me. ‘This is the path that leads to the cessation of dukkha‘ is declared by me. And why are these declared by me?
Because they are tied to the goal; they are fundamental to the holy life. They lead to an end to confusion, release from the heat of passion, cessation of craving, equanimity, vision and insight, awakening, nibbana. That is why they are declared by me.
“So, Malunkyaputta, remember what is undeclared by me as undeclared, and what is declared by me as declared.”
That is what the Honored One said. Gratified, the Venerable Malunkyaputta delighted in the Honored One’s words.
Thill said:
From the Anuraadho Sutta:
“Good, good, Anuraadha. As before, so now I proclaim just suffering and the ceasing of suffering.”
Thill said:
I forgot to give the sources for the translation of the two excerpts:
First excerpt: http://dharmastudy.org/suttas-2/cula-malunkyaputta-sutta/
Second excerpt: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.086.wlsh.html
Thill said:
The widespread prevalence of the four noble truths in the Buddhist textual corpus is only one of the reasons for holding that it is probably the central and core teaching of the Buddha. There are other reasons and collectively they make the case for its centrality strong:
1. It is widely acknowledged in the texts that the Buddha’s first discourse after his enlightenment, and hence presumably a crystallization of that enlightenment, dealt only with the four noble truths.
2. The Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta and Anuraadho sutta suggest that the Buddha himself held that the four noble truths were his central and indispensable, if not the sole, teaching.
3.The former sutta gives us Buddha’s own reason for affirming the centrality of the four noble truths: it is maximally functional for the understanding of and liberation from suffering in its fundamental forms.
4. This also implies a master criterion of selection applicable to the plethora of doctrines attributed to the Buddha in the corpus of “Buddhist” literature: if a doctrine or view is not maximally functional for the understanding of and liberation from suffering in its fundamental forms, then the Buddha could not have espoused it.
5. Therefore, in what has passed for “Buddhist” textual corpus, any view which does not contradict the four noble truths and meets the Buddha’s master criterion is certainly a Buddhist teaching.
6. Apart from the fact that the denial of causality and the self is absurd, it should be clear that they do not meet the master criterion of the Buddha. They undermine the possibility of understanding of suffering and liberation from it. Hence, the Buddha could not have espoused them. Hence, they are not really Buddhist doctrines.
Thill said:
The fourth noble truth makes no mention of working to make another person liberated. The Buddha’s last words also exhorted his disciples to work diligently toward their own individual liberation. This makes sense.
The other cannot remove my propensity for desire or craving which leads me to various forms of suffering. I cannot remove the other person’s propensity for desire or craving which leads him or her to various forms of suffering.
Thus, the notion that I can help another person to achieve liberation or that another person can help me to achieve liberation is alien to the spirit of the four noble truths and the Buddha’s last teaching.
It is also be inconsistent with them for the following reason.
To think that another person can help me to achieve liberation is a case of false or wrong belief or view (and the fourth noble truth emphasizes the importance of right or true belief or view as part of the means to liberation) because another person cannot dissolve or remove, although he or she can temporarily satisfy, or help me to satisfy, a particular desire or craving I may have, my propensity for desire or craving as such.
All this would also apply to view that the Buddha can bring about my liberation from suffering. In terms of his own teaching of the four noble truths, he cannot. Hence, the view is inconsistent with the Buddha’s teaching of the four noble truths.
Ramachandra1008 said:
I understand that another person, including a Buddha or a “Bodhisattva” (If you are right, the rate of unemployment among them should be 100%! LOL), cannot liberate anyone, but what is the argument for thinking that one can achieve liberation by one’s own efforts? I know that it is presupposed by the fourth noble truth, but what is the argument for that presupposition?
Consider the objection that liberation, a state of freedom from suffering, cannot feasibly be the result of the efforts of a self which is conditioned by ignorance and desire, the very factors responsible for suffering.
If this objection is good, then liberation from suffering, assuming that it is real, is either a random event not causally connected to any scale of effort or preparation the individual may make, OR it is the result of the will of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omni-benevolent being, or God, who brings it about, perhaps in accordance with the sincerity and intensity of a person’s aspiration for it.
Neocarvaka said:
I came across some interesting information on the violence unleashed by rebellious Mahayana sects in China.
Here is one example:
“Pre-Maitreyan Buddhist messianic rebellions
Southern and Northern Dynasties
515
The Mahayana Rebellion. In the late summer of that year, the renegade monk Faqing 法慶 married a nun and formed a sect in the Northern Wei province of Jizhou 冀州 (in the southern part of today’s Hebei province) with the assistance of a local aristocrat named Li Guibo 李歸伯. The sect was named the Mahayana (“The Great Vehicle”, in reference to Mahayana Buddhism), and Li Guibo was given the titles of Tenth-stage Bodhisattva, Commander of the Demon-vanquishing Army, and King who Pacifies the Land of Han by Faqing.
Using drugs to send its members into a killing frenzy, and promoting them to Tenth-Stage Bodhisattva as soon as they killed ten enemies, the Mahayana sect seized a prefecture and murdered all the government officials in it. Their slogan was “A new Buddha has entered the world; eradicate the demons of the former age”, and they would kill all monks and nuns in the monasteries that they captured, also burning all the sutras and icons.
After defeating a government army and growing to a size of over 50,000, the rebel army was finally crushed by another government army of 100,000. Faqing, his wife, and tens of thousands of his followers were beheaded, and Li Guibo was also captured later and publicly executed in the capital city Luoyang.”
You can find more examples at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maitreya#Maitreyan_rebellions
Jabali108 said:
Rama, your argument assumes what it must prove. Why can’t the self which has “conditioned” itself by desire, by desiring this or that, be unable to free itself from that conditioning? Don’t we have plenty of examples of individuals achieving freedom from that to which they were in abject subjection, e.g., alcohol, by a systematic application of knowledge and willpower?
Since you haven’t shown that the self cannot “uncondition” itself from desire, or the factors which bring about its suffering, your disjunctive claim that “liberation from suffering, assuming that it is real, is either a random event not causally connected to any scale of effort or preparation the individual may make, OR it is the result of the will of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omni-benevolent being, or God…” is vitiated by the omission of the alternative that liberation is the result of the self’s efforts.
Neocarvaka said:
The concept of “liberation from suffering” employed in the fourth noble truth sorely needs clarification. What does it mean? No more aches and pains in the limbs, no toothaches, no sorrow at the loss of loved ones???
It is futile to discuss whether “liberation from suffering” can be achieved, if at all, by one’s own efforts, or “Divine Grace”, etc., without first clarifying the meaning of the concept.
On another note, and from another standpoint, isn’t it strange that the moment you dive beneath the placid surface of these “religions”, you find a chaos of fragmentation in the form of conflicting doctrines, conflicting interpretations, proliferation of sects and each claiming to be the bearers of the original teaching, subdivisions of sects, and on and on? And what a horrid din of words they all raise? Clarity, rationality, and even sanity have no chance if they are caught in the crossfire! And the intolerance, persecution, and blood-lust they have inspired! The less said of that the better!
Perhaps, all this provides a good reason to steer clear of these “religions” altogether?
Neocarvaka said:
I mean the third and the fourth noble truths.
Glenn Wallis said:
This is the second such discussion I have viewed in the last week. since the correspondence is exact, I hope you won’t mind if I say here what I did there.
But first: I agree completely with Amod’s point in the post; namely, that Heuman draws and unwarranted conclusion from the evidence that she presents. Her conclusion, of course, is quite convenient for a magazine like Tricycle, which advocates for – indeed, has helped to create – the doctrine of “One Dharma.”
Now, to my reaction to the comments. Wow! …This discussion perfectly exemplifies the need to perform some of the cognitive and affective strategies that articulate at my Speculative non-Buddhism blog. To name just a few, these strategies include:
* Establish fitting proximity to the tradition. Too close, and you can become entangled in Buddhism’s hoary thicket of views, opinions, doctrines, texts, etc., etc., etc.
* Inhibiting the network of postulation. Why? As this discussion shows, because the wires, so laden with energy, are tortuously entangled.
* Non-decision. Disinterest. If you’ve already made a decision about X or Y [for instance, what constitutes “Buddhism,” the value of Salomon’s argument, the merits of Schopen’s work, indeed, even the salutary nature of “Buddhism”] then you have by definition forfeited your place in the forum of open inquiry. If you can manage to become disinterested in upholding Buddhism’s superiority in the world of ideas, then you can win your seat back.
* Muting tradition’s vibrato. But most of all, this discussion convinces me even further of the necessity of muting Buddhism’s vibrato – it’s (that is to say, it’s followers’) often shrill, cacophonous, and disconcerting insistence on specialness. Once muted, Buddhism, and indeed the Buddha, appear quite ordinary. The shriller Buddhist discussions become, the more I suspect that Buddhists in the West are indeed on to this fact.
…
One final word about this business of saying “what the Buddha said.” It is very common in Buddhist polemics and argumentation. It’s just a form of argument from authority. I find it tedious generally, but even more so when it comes to Buddhism. The fact is we have no idea “what the Buddha said.” All of the canonical literature has been so heavily edited, and in such an overtly politicized and biased manner, that saying what the Buddha said is not much different than saying what Don Quixote said. … Buddhist literature is a chaotic cacophony – quite often shrill and irritating and disconcerting – of disparate voices. The only thing that can be proven in claiming that the Buddha said X in sutta Y is that X is said in some text Y in the name of a protagonist named “the Buddha.” People who ignore this fact, and go around citing Buddhist literature as proof of what Buddhism is about or “what the Buddha said” are, to my mind, mere sutta-thumpers: all they are ever pointing out is ink on a page.
___
As erudite and informed as they are, discussions like the one here only convince me further that Buddhism is a colossal, decaying baroque cathedral, slowly collapsing under its own weight.
May Buddhism’s vibrato be muted and its warrant canceled. Perhaps, we may then hear afresh whatever deep resonances it has to offer our contemporary lives.
Peace and thanks to all of you. Now, let’s go meditate!
Neocarvaka said:
“Now, let’s go meditate!”
“Meditate” on what? And Why?
Glenn Wallis said:
Oh, right, a carvaka. Okay, I’ll rephrase: Let’s go have a Guinness!
The reference to meditation was ironic. After criticizing sutta-thumpers I thump the Bhara Sutta. My point was to add some salt and indeed some salus to my own restriction.
Now, Let’s go get laid!
Neocarvaka said:
“Now, Let’s go get laid!”
No thanks! I must decline on grounds of the third Vinaya precept! LOL LOL LOL
Are you suggesting “Let’s go get laid!” as a “Buddhist” alternative to the fourth noble truth?
Glenn Wallis said:
That’s a great question, Thill. I realize that it “checks” me into applying one of your criterion, but barely. So, I will have to go with A: what makes one a Buddhist is that one self-identifies as “Buddhist.” That is a minimal “belief,” one that does not “[i]dentify the core teachings or beliefs which constitute and identify…Buddhism.” But it is of the same thread that weaves big-ticket item belief.
So, good move, my friend!
If this answer satisfies you, can I get a pass to (don’t tell my wife) Muslim heaven instead of the Buddhist Pure Land?
Thill said:
Glenn, did you miss Amod’s excellent point in his earlier posting on the Kharoshi fragments?
“As I’ve said before, if all people who call themselves Buddhists are Buddhists, then Dick Cheney can be a Buddhist simply by calling himself a Buddhist, even as he continues to promote mass murder and environmental pillage for the sake of oil profiteering. What that comes out to meaning, in the end, is that it matters not a whit whether you’re a Buddhist or not. Buddhism, on such a view, means nothing at all. And yet somehow the people who say these sorts of things still seem to call themselves “Buddhist practitioners,” as if the Buddha and his words actually mattered and were important somehow. The Heumans of the world want to have it both ways: following the Buddha matters, except that it doesn’t.”
Or, perhaps, you’ve read it and disagree? OOPS, “disagreement” is the inevitable bane of human conversation, ain’t it?
In any case, I am interested in your rebuttal of Amod’s point, if you have one.
Glenn Wallis said:
Thanks, I’ll have a closer look at the context of Amod’s statement. My first impression is that we have stumbled into the Socrates-Wittgenstein language divide here, right? –the nature of a definition, location of terminological significance, meaning, etc.
I very much dislike the “anything goes” approach; so, am in agreement with Amod on that. I am just surveying the field of actual usage and reporting back that an absurd incommensurability is the case where the term “Buddhist” is concerned. To me, the term itself is one of the rotting pillars of the great Buddhist fortress.
Thill said:
“If this answer satisfies you, can I get a pass to (don’t tell my wife) Muslim heaven instead of the Buddhist Pure Land?”
Sorry, Glenn, those passes are sold out! Ask “evolutionary psychologists” for an explanation. LOL
Why not encourage “Buddhists”, yes “Buddhists”, to propose additional features, resembling the Islamic heaven,to the Pure Land? On your terms, they can still remain “Buddhists” as long as they claim to be “Buddhists”.
Thill said:
Whether one is talking about Buddhism or Christianity or Islam, or Judaism, one first needs criteria of individuation or identification: what constitutes Christianity or a Christian approach and so forth. Otherwise, the use of such terms becomes meaningless.
There are only two positions one could take on this issue:
A. Identify the core teachings or beliefs which constitute and identify Christianity, Buddhism, etc.
B. Take Wittgenstein’s approach and deny that there is any single feature or set of features which constitutes “Christianity”, “Buddhism”, etc., and maintain that there is only a “family resemblance” among the doctrines, beliefs, and practices of different groups or sects all claiming to be “Buddhist” or “Christian”, etc.
Needless to say, in just the way we are required to point out family resemblances in terms of the features of the members of a family, we are also required to show which features or set of features constitute the family resemblance among the different schools and sects of Buddhism, Christianity, etc.
Both approaches (A) and (B) need to be explored before we can form a view or perspective on the issue.
Glenn Wallis said:
Thill,
The problem with both approaches, A. and B., is that they are futile. Why? Because each just leads to further disagreement. Whatever you determine to be sufficiently justifiable criteria will appear idiosyncratic to the next person. The conversation will circle in on itself like a gnarly thorn bush.
Hence, my project at the Speculative non-Buddhism blog. How can we clear a space for engagement with Buddhist ideas and practices and literature, etc., that is not prone to — indeed is unmolested by — Buddhism’s centripetal force? Many of the concepts that I offer at the blog are meant to serve as aids in thinking through the kinds of issues that you and others have raised here. The work accomplished by employing these concepts is, of course, cognitive, but also affective, in nature. They are all performed in relation to some held notion “Buddhism.” Just to name a bunch, and without further commentary:
fitting proximity
disruption
devitalization of charism
curvature
disinterest
inhibiting the network of postulation
postulate deflation
re-commissioning of postulates
saliency of requisite disenchantment
non-decision
incidental exile
transgression of thaumaturgical refuge
cancellation of warrant
ancoric loss
aporetic dissonance
structural suspension
uninterpretability
muting vibrato
Thill said:
Glenn:
I will take a look at your blog. It sounds interesting.
Here are some problems with your response.
“The problem with both approaches, A. and B., is that they are futile. Why? Because each just leads to further disagreement.”
This assumes that disagreement turns a discussion futile for the participants. Is that really so?
Not necessarily and certainly not if you have good standards to resolve, or rationally and productively develop and sort through disagreements.
The benefits of discussion in the face of disagreements, or perhaps precisely because of disagreements, need not be appreciated by everyone. You may disagree with me and fail to see my point and yet I could learn much from it about what makes thinking bad or flawed from all that. And vice-versa.
“Whatever you determine to be sufficiently justifiable criteria will appear idiosyncratic to the next person. The conversation will circle in on itself like a gnarly thorn bush.”
What prevents this scenario from happening in the context of your proposed concepts? I am sure your proposed concepts don’t come with an inbuilt Yantra warding off disagreements altogether! So, how do you deal with disagreements on the concepts and their alleged functions?
Thill said:
In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill alludes to the “the deep slumber of a decided opinion” in the absence of disagreements and criticisms, not quite the sort of condition which favors “awakening”!
Glenn Wallis said:
Hi Thill, Thanks for your response. I think the crux of the matter (and of our disagreement?) is this–well, no, let me first ask a question: Do I understand correctly that your principles A. and B. aim to tickle discussants out of their sweet slumber of decided opinion? If so, that is indeed a laudable endeavor. And I, too, am a robust critical interlocutor in conversation. I was under the impression that the kind of movement that inter-Buddhist dialogists seek requires strong forms of agreement and resolution. So, now to the crux. I am not, here or in dialogue or in my writing, at all interested in resolving disagreements; I do not seek solutions, certainly not resolution. If something like agreement or resolution ensues, that’s not my fault. To the point of Amod’s post here, I find it hard to imagine that Buddhists will ever agree on anything of real importance concerning their radically variegated tradion. (And I say make this statement as someone who spends virtually every day of his life in contact, and often sustained dialogue, with committed Buddhists, both western and Asian.) Buddhists begin with different premises, so how and on what could they “agree”? The schools to which they are committed each emerged under radically different social and historical circumstances. They have institutions and organizations to fund and protect. They need new members to support them. In short, the myriad Buddhisms do not share the same DNA; they are not of the same “family.” So, I say, let’s move past that conversation and salvage what we can.
Peace.
Thill said:
The obvious question here which secures admission to the Pure Land if answered well is this: Why do you keep calling them “Buddhists”? What makes them all “Buddhists” if they all start with “different premises”?
Glenn Wallis said:
That’s a great question, Thill. I realize that it “checks” me into applying one of your criterion, but barely. So, I will have to go with A: what makes one a Buddhist is that one self-identifies as “Buddhist.” That is a minimal “belief,” one that does not “[i]dentify the core teachings or beliefs which constitute and identify…Buddhism.” But it is of the same thread that weaves big-ticket item belief.
So, good move, my friend!
If this answer satisfies you, can I get a pass to (don’t tell my wife) Muslim heaven instead of the Buddhist Pure Land?
Thill said:
“what makes one a Buddhist is that one self-identifies as “Buddhist.”
This raises the question: Is this self-identification as a “Buddhist” arbitrary? That can’t be. So, why do you “self-identify” as a “Buddhist”? rather than as a “Muslim” or “Orthodox Jew”?
Glenn Wallis said:
Thill,
I, too, would want to abide by the principle such that self-identification as “Buddhist” (or anything else) can not be arbitrary. Language has to say something; it can not be the mere twittering of fledglings. When, however, we consider the latitude given that epithet in actual usage, then that principle breaks down. Other then the fact that, for instance, Nichiren Buddhists and Won Buddhists self-identify as “Buddhists,” there is nothing whatsoever binding them together–no core beliefs and no family resemblances. They may have nominal commonalities–e.g., faith in the Buddha’s “enlightenment”–but when questioned on their respective understanding of this event, the commonality rapidly corrodes. There are dozens, maybe even hundreds, of such instance in the history of the term “Buddhist.”
Anyway, enough of that, don’t you think?
Thill said:
Glenn, you may be interested in my recent posts on “Buddhism Without Baloney?” at my blog
http://thebaloneydetective.com/
Charlie said:
Thill,
It seems like you are defending the 4NT as the core of a particular tradition, as you have spent a lot of time explaining your ideas on the relationship among them.
I don’t know if I agree with you or not because I am not clear on what you mean when you say “suffering”.
What do you mean when you use the word suffering?
Thanks in advance.
Charlie
Thill said:
One approach would be to look at the prevalent formulations of the first noble Truth (not all of them coherent) in the early Buddhist texts and try to construct or reconstruct the meaning of “suffering” or “Dukkha” on this basis. We have to look at the examples of suffering identified in the first noble truth.
I think that “Dukkha” basically refers to a state of dissatisfaction or discontent, implying a serious constraint on one’s functioning and lack of peace and joy. There are different types of Dukkha based on the prominent features.
Charlie said:
Hi, Thill
Thank you for your response.
I asked “What do you mean when you use the word suffering?
The operative word in this question would be “you”.
Thill replies….
1. “One approach would be to look at the prevalent formulations of the first noble Truth (not all of them coherent) in the early Buddhist texts ….”
You say you want to look at fundamental formulations of 4NT,
You offered this formulation a few weeks ago….
“This is dukkha is declared by me.”
“This is the origin of dukkha is declared by me. “
“This is the cessation of dukkha is declared by me”.
“This is the path that leads to the cessation of dukkha is declared by me. “
Should we agree on this formulation as the one you are talking about, or would you like to offer an alternative?
2. “…and try to construct or reconstruct the meaning of “suffering” or “Dukkha” on this basis. ”
To be in the position of re-constructing or constructing the meaning of a word that you have just used for the past few weeks seems to me to be a little disconcerting.
Especially if the word is the basis of, or foundation of the declarations you are attempting to make claims about.
If you are making claims about the 4NT, and the central point of the 4NT is suffering, and now you are saying we should NOW start an investigation into what suffering means, seems a little awkward.
If you did not know the meaning of suffering when you were making these claims, how can I accept any of your claims?
3. “We have to look at the examples of suffering identified in the first noble truth.”
If we accept the formulation of the 4NT above, it seems like there is no mention of “examples” of suffering.
Yup, I just reviewed and re-read the 1NT, and have found no examples of suffering or dukkha identified in it.
4. “I think that “Dukkha” basically refers to a state of dissatisfaction or discontent, implying a serious constraint on one’s functioning and lack of peace and joy.”
Are you in a state of dissatisfaction or discontent?
5. “There are different types of Dukkha based on the prominent features.”
Is dissatisfaction a type of Dukkha or a prominent feature of Dukkha?
Again, thank you for your time.
Charlie
Thill said:
Charlie: “It seems like you are defending the 4NT as the core of a particular tradition, as you have spent a lot of time explaining your ideas on the relationship among them.
I don’t know if I agree with you or not because I am not clear on what you mean when you say “suffering”.
What do you mean when you use the word suffering?
Charlie, what’s all this circus about? Did you want to know what I understand by “suffering” or “Dukkha” as it occurs in the 4NT’s or about my own concept of suffering? Your reference to the 4NT’s suggested that the former is the case and hence I gave you the response I did.
I gave the central coherent assertion of the first noble truth. However, it is a complex claim. Pl. read the full formulation of first noble truth. You may want to read my posting on “Buddhism and Baloney-I” on my blog at
http://thebaloneydetective.com/2011/02/20/buddhism-and-baloney-i/
If you want to know my concept of suffering, why drag in the 4NT’s into the picture and muddle things up?
Thill said:
“Yup, I just reviewed and re-read the 1NT, and have found no examples of suffering or dukkha identified in it.”
How astute of you! But you have overlooked the formulation of the first noble truth in the
Dharmacakra Pravartana Sutra:
“This is the noble truth of suffering: birth is suffering, aging is suffering, illness is suffering, death is suffering; sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair are suffering; union with what is displeasing is suffering; separation from what is pleasing is suffering; not to get what one wants is suffering; in brief, the five aggregates subject to clinging are suffering.”
Look again. No examples of suffering? Are you sure? This is just common sense, you know! :)
Thill said:
4. “I think that “Dukkha” basically refers to a state of dissatisfaction or discontent, implying a serious constraint on one’s functioning and lack of peace and joy.”
“Are you in a state of dissatisfaction or discontent?”
Question dismissed! LOL It is irrelevant!
Charlie, you would become a little wiser by asking yourself that question since any answer I gave would make not a whit of difference to your condition.
5. “There are different types of Dukkha based on the prominent features.”
Is dissatisfaction a type of Dukkha or a prominent feature of Dukkha?
This is a good question. Dissatisfaction or discontent is the essence of Dukkha, but there are other properties which distinguish the types or forms of dukkha arising from physical and/or emotional causes.
Thill said:
“Dissatisfaction or discontent is the essence of Dukkha, but there are other properties which distinguish the types or forms of dukkha arising from physical and/or emotional causes.”
I should say “proximate or immediate physical and/or emotional causes”. The second NT should be read as making the claim that desire is the ultimate cause of “Dukkha”.
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