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Advaita Vedānta, mystical experience, nondualism, perennialism, phenomenology, Rāmānuja, Robert Forman, Śaṅkara, Seth Zuihō Segall, Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī, Teresa of Ávila, Upaniṣads, W.T. Stace
Defenders of cross-cultural mystical experience are right to note that in many widely varying cultures, respected sages have referred to the experience of an ultimate nonduality: a perception that everything, including oneself, is ultimately one. But one might also then rightly ask: which ultimate nonduality?
Nondualism may be the world’s most widespread philosophy, but it can mean different things – not merely different things in different places, but different things in the same place. Members of the Indian Vedānta tradition frequently proclaimed that everything is “one, without a second”, in the words of the Upaniṣads they followed. But they disagreed as to what that meant. Śaṅkara founded the Advaita Vedānta tradition – a-dvaita literally meaning non-dual – which argued that only the one, ultimate truth (sat, braḥman) was real, and all multiplicity and plurality was an illusion. His opponent Rāmānuja agreed that everything is “one, without a second” – but in his Viśiṣṭādvaita (qualified nondual) school, that meant something quite different. All the many things and people we see around us – what Chinese metaphysicians called the “ten thousand things” – are parts of that ultimate one, and they are real, not illusory.
I was reminded of this point in the great comments on my previous post about cross-cultural mysticism. I had cited W.T. Stace as an influential advocate of the view that mysticism is cross-cultural, and noted how Robert Forman’s book defended Stace by pointing to contentless experiences of void, from the Yoga Sūtras to Hasidism, that “blot out” sense perception. Seth Segall made the important point that in Stace’s own work not all mystical experiences are contentless in this way. Leaving aside the “hot” or “visionary” experiences (like St. Teresa and the angel) which Stace does not count as mystical experiences – even among what Stace counts as genuine mystical experiences, he makes a key distinction between introvertive and extrovertive mystical experiences. This isn’t just a distinction between the interpretations applied to the experiences, but between the experiences themselves. The contentless “Pure Consciousness Events” described in Forman’s book, where distinctions fade into void, are introvertive; experiences of merging with a unified natural world, like Teresa saying “it was granted to me in one instant how all things are seen and contained in God”, are extrovertive.
And here’s where I find this all really interesting: that introvertive/extrovertive distinction, between different types of experiences, corresponds to the metaphysical difference between Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja! Neither Śaṅkara nor Rāmānuja cites experience, mystical or otherwise, as the source of their philosophy. Both claim to be deriving it from the Upaniṣads (and other texts like the Bhagavad Gītā), and they each defend their view (of the scriptures and of reality) with logical arguments. Yet even so, the distinction Stace observed in descriptions of mystical experiences turns out to correspond pretty closely to the distinction between their philosophies.
In Śaṅkara’s philosophy, as in an introvertive experience, the many things of the world, including oneself, all fall away; what remains is the one reality alone. In Rāmānuja’s philosophy, as in an extrovertive experience, the things of the world, including oneself, remain, but they are all unified together: they continue to have a real existence, but as connected members of a larger unity.
All this is a major caveat for perennialist-leaning ideas: even if you were to argue that mystical experience pointed to a cross-culturally recognized nondualism, you would still have to specify which nondualism. The smartass response is to say “all the nondualisms are one”, but that’s not really satisfactory, not even to the nondualists themselves. Rāmānuja attacked Śaṅkara’s view, and while Śaṅkara lived centuries before Rāmānuja, he attacked other thinkers who had views like Rāmānuja’s.
Some mystically inclined thinkers take a moderate or intermediate position that compromises between an absolute nondual view and the view of common sense or received tradition. Such was the approach of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī, the Indian Sufi who reconciled Sufi experiences of mystical oneness with Qur’anic orthodoxy by proclaiming “not ‘All is Him’ but ‘All is from Him'”. It’s tempting to view Rāmānuja’s approach to Śaṅkara as similar, tempering an absolute mysticism with a common-sense view of the world as real: Śaṅkara’s mystical excesses take him way out there and Rāmānuja pulls him back. But such an approach doesn’t really work. It’s flummoxed not only by the fact that Śaṅkara claimed no mystical grounding for his philosophy, but also by the existence of extrovertive mysticism: the many who have felt an experience of oneness with the grass and trees would not have been drawn by that experience to Śaṅkara’s view, but directly to Rāmānuja’s. (I have previously suggested that Rāmānuja is indeed moderating Śaṅkara’s overall approach – but with respect to Śaṅkara’s possible autism rather than to mysticism.)
None of this is intended as a refutation of mystical views of reality, or even necessarily of perennialism. It seems to me that both introvertive and extrovertive experiences are found across a wide range of cultures, often accompanied by a sense of certainty, and are worth taking seriously for that reason. But we then need to take both seriously: if the world is one, then are our many differing perceptions illusory or real? Here, I think, it helps that both illusionist and realist forms of nondual philosophy – experientially based or otherwise – also occur in multiple places. The debates between them might help us sort out what reality – if any – the experiences are pointing to.
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Paul D. Van Pelt said:
Your post today follows another bloggers thoughts from a day or so ago. The notion of geographical origins came forward in that discussion. I said that interests, preferences and motives (may) influence a culture’s viewpoints on a variety of things. Whether those viewpoints are affected by philosophy or religion or some combination thereof depends on how much emphasis is placed upon philosophy and religion. I did not think that external factors such as geography, climate and so on are ‘prime movers’. One’s neighbors, hostile or amicable, likely have more effect. That being said, isolation and security may be more favorable to philosophy and intellectual development. Ancient people, having less to fear from their near neighbors, would have had better things to do, seems to me. Confucianism illustrates this well.
Nathan said:
Continuing our discussion of this topic from the previous post “Mystical experience across cultures” (which is linked in the article above): a simple way of summarizing what is going on here is that the sages are “experiencing different ultimate unities” because they are experiencing their metaphysics. So it is no surprise “that introvertive/extrovertive distinction, between different types of experiences, corresponds to the metaphysical difference between Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja!”
Borrowing a cue from the title (but not necessarily the content) of L.A. Paul’s article “Metaphysics as modeling”, we could change the title of this post from “Experiencing different ultimate unities” to “Experiencing different models of ultimate unities”. Those two words, “models of”, point to (or stand in for) a lot of epistemological and psychological knowledge. If I lack that knowledge, then I am unaware of the modeling that is happening in my experiencing, and I think I am directly experiencing ultimate unities, which could be called “naive mysticism”, analogous to “naive realism”. (Even if there is a disruption of the modeling in my experiencing, I still have to resume modeling to make any sense of the disruption.) In contrast, the more sophisticated view that comes with greater epistemological and psychological knowledge can be called “perspectivism”.
Amod Lele said:
Who are you claiming are “experiencing their metaphysics”? I hope it’s not Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, since they never said anything about their experiences! Rāmānuja specifically says perception of any kind – even the yogic perception of an advanced sage – can’t provide access to the ultimate braḥman. Yet the two metaphysics that they advocate correspond to experiences that other people describe or suggest – experiences that are from different traditions than theirs, or (in the case of the Yoga Sūtras) predate them.
Nathan said:
Thanks for the question; it prompts me to restore a term that I had considered using but decided to omit for simplicity: “they are experiencing their implicit metaphysics”, as opposed to explicit metaphysics. The relation between the two is complex, since the process of creating an explicit metaphysics can change one’s implicit metaphysics. And perhaps I should note that by “metaphysics as modeling” I mean modeling as any kind of representing, not just logico-mathematical modeling. I’ve never read Rāmānuja, but Shyam Ranganathan says in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “The individual self (jīva) on Rāmānuja’s account is also capable of having a direct vision of transcendent entities, like Brahman. Yet, the character of the epistemic state in which one is acquainted with Brahman is a type of perception for Rāmānuja.”
Nathan said:
Amod, I noticed that in response to a comment on the cross-post at the Indian Philosophy Blog, you said:
This apparent conflict is easily resolved (easily for us today, at least) by thinking of (mystical, spiritual, transcendent, etc.) experiencing as “experiencing models of ultimate reality” rather than as “experiencing ultimate reality”. Such experiencing does not directly “divulge” ultimate reality through appearances; it “models” ultimate reality from appearances. The resulting models can be called fictions or illusions, because they are not the reality to which they refer, but insofar as they successfully refer they can be called realistic. The integration of (awareness of) both the fictional/constructive aspect of experiencing and (when successful) the realistic aspect can be called perspectivism.