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Charles Taylor, Daniel Mallory Ortberg, expressive individualism, Patrick Lee Miller, relativism
Like most of those around me, I feel the pull of expressive individualist ideas: I think it is a hugely important part of being human to be ourselves and express ourselves, in ways that express our own individuality and are not the same as others’. Yet there is also a grave danger in this ideal.
The danger is that we get so caught up in celebrating and expressing ourselves as we are that we refuse any attempt to get better: not merely “you deserve love just the way you are” (which is true of anyone), but “you are perfect just the way you are” (which is true of no one). And that approach is terribly destructive. We are naturally full of harmful impulses. Our selves just-as-we-are can be full of bad impulses that hurt us and make our lives worse, in ways that lead to self-destructive – and other-destructive – behaviours.
It can be dangerous to point to someone’s quick temper or vengefulness or emotional fragility or callous indifference and shrug and say “that’s just how he is” – if it is someone who considers us a friend or loved one and could be willing to listen to our advice. (With someone who is not going to listen to us, we may just need to accept this as one of the many external bads in the world that we cannot change – but when we can help someone live a more flourishing life than they are, it is usually a good thing to try to do so.) It is significantly worse when we justify those things as “that’s just how I am.” We need to give ourselves more credit – that is, we need to acknowledge at least some ability to change. And most of all, we should not celebrate those aspects of ourselves that go wrong.
I happen to suffer from generalized anxiety disorder and have many narcissistic personality traits. These are not things to be celebrated and affirmed; they’re flaws, they’re problems, they make my life a lot worse. To the extent that I can fix them, I should. They’re difficult to fix, and it’s dangerous to act as if they have been fixed when they haven’t; that way lies the bodhisattva complex, where we want to be angels but act like beasts. But their presence is like the presence of disease or famine or war: even when we can’t eliminate them, we need to acknowledge their badness as badness.
A decade ago Daniel Mallory Ortberg offered a hilarious caricature of the use of personality differences to justify one’s bad behaviour: “Sorry I murdered everyone, but I’m an introvert.” While nobody I’m aware of actually goes to the extreme that Ortberg is satirizing, its treatment of one’s personality traits as self-evident justification for any action bring out the direction in which expressive individualism goes badly wrong. (“I shouldn’t have killed them, but at the same time, it’s not wrong for me to need space to reflect and recharge before I’m ready to interact with people.”)
In our current era, the problem expresses itself strikingly as the celebration of mental illness, the taking of mental illness as an identity. Duquesne University professor Patrick Lee Miller had long asked students to write papers telling him who they essentially are. In a now-deleted tweet from 2022, he noted a disturbing trend:”There has been a dramatic shift in the last two years. Roughly three quarters of these college students define themselves as suffering from a mental illness, most often anxiety. This was rare when I started a decade ago.” Survey research backs him up: a Skeptic Magazine survey found that 67% of men and 72% of women born after 1997 believed “mental health challenges are an important part of my identity.”
To be clear, there’s nothing wrong with diagnosing mental illness at a higher rate. The more we notice our mental problems, the more possibility we open up of treating them and alleviating them. We were very poorly served by an approach that stigmatized mental illness and viewed it as something to be hidden. But what will not help us alleviate them is to define that illness as part of who we essentially are, as so many young people now do. If we do that, we have effectively given up on getting better. We might have been better off without the diagnosis in the first place.
There are plenty of reasonable criticisms that can be made of the medical model – that is, the model of our serious mental problems that defines them as illness. But the really good thing about conceiving mental illness as illness, is that illness is something you treat. You don’t celebrate it, you don’t let it define who you are. Ideally you cure it, and if you can’t do that, you treat the symptoms as best you can so that it doesn’t define your life. (This is a key reason it’s important not to define homosexuality or transgender identity as a mental illness: if they were that, they wouldn’t be identities worth celebrating.)
Insofar as we have an individual teleology, it must mean being our best selves. It is not good enough to say of a bad behaviour “but this is me!” Charles Taylor, introducing expressive individualism in The Malaise of Modernity (aka The Ethics of Authenticity), describes it as “an ideal that has degraded but is very worthwhile in itself…” (23) Expressive individualism degrades, in Taylor’s view, by sliding toward “soft relativism” and subjectivism about value, according to which
things have significance not of themselves but because people deem them to have it – as though people could determine what is significant, either by decision, or perhaps unwittingly and unwillingly by just feeling that way. This is crazy. I couldn’t just decide that the most significant action is wiggling my toes in warm mud. Without a special explanation, this is not an intelligible claim… (36)
Rather, Taylor notes, our self-expression itself depends on other people, and is developed in dialgoue with them. In that dialogue, and in our experience, we can learn what about ourselves needs to change – the ways in which we fail to be our best and truest selves.
Now nondual Buddhists like Wangchuk Dorje rightly point out that self-improvement is itself something one can push too far: since getting better is a long and slow process, one is going to be filled with flaws and imperfections at any given moment, and one paradoxical aspect of self-improvement is learning to be at peace with those imperfections that have not been eradicated in that moment. Still, that doesn’t get us out of the need for self-improvement in general. We need to accept the things we can’t change, but we do also need to change the things we can – whether those things are outside of us or inside.
I don’t think you go far enough in your examination of what could be wrong with what could be wrong with expressive individualism. You say the danger is “that we refuse any attempt to get better,” but I’d say the danger is that when we get too wrapped up in ourselves, we can do extreme harm to others. Perhaps I’ll write something more substantial in another place before too long on this subject…
N, I’d say a good understanding of individualism entails respect for individuals. If we’re “too wrapped up in ourselves” and “do extreme harm to others”, we’re not respecting other individuals, so we’re either not understanding or not applying an adequate ideal of individualism.
Though I’ve had your blog on my Feedly RSS Reader list of blogs for a while, for some strange reason I’ve never felt compelled to respond to your posts. This one did the trick! And before responding, I tried to catch up on your thinking by reading all your posts on expressive individualism, Richard Rorty, Tiantai Buddhist (I was delighted to see you’ve read Brook Ziporyn’s “Emptiness and Omnipresence”, a life-transforming book for me), the Lotus Sutra, upaya, and bodhisattvas.
A few observations. First, there is a dark side to everything. “There is [] a grave danger in [all] ideal[s].” That’s why Tiantai emphasizes that Buddha is the devil, and vice versa. Second, this relates to the Tiantai view that we are all not only already enlightened\awakened\liberated, by that we’re all already bodhisattva’s, not DESPITE not knowing we are, because BECAUSE we don’t know we are. So the dark side, the bodhisattva complex, is, again, an inevitable and essential part of bodhisattva-hood. I think Ziporyn’s parable of the Dolphin School (in E&O) is one of the most mind blowing takes on being a bodhisattva: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nNUpHf1jR_D_aa6Aswj8cMb2a9MPfxIv/view?usp=drive_link
Finally, I think you put it best in your post Self-improvement by not-self-improvement ( https://loveofallwisdom.com/blog/2023/11/self-improvement-by-not-self-improvement/ ): “The central paradox is this: It remains essential to a good human life that one strive to improve oneself. But one of the most important improvements, virtues, is itself to be more accepting of intractable imperfections – not only in the world outside oneself, but within oneself too.”
Besides Taintai, the deepest influence on my approach to expressive individualism is Richard Rorty. As I’m sure you’re well aware, one of his deepest themes was the tension between private expression and public solidarity\loyalty. I see this tension at the heart of your philosophical musings, and it is at the heart of mine. I’m tentatively calling my philosophy “Fruitionism” ( https://ironick.medium.com/fruitionism-efdad22e8d66 ):
“Fruitionism proposes a pluralistic, bittersweet rhetoric of ramifying creativity sparking the letting loose of hope: perpetually recontextualizing evanescent fruits (hopes, vocabularies, values) via errant, charitable, reciprocally-constituting improvisational experimentalism.”
(I enjoy trying to fit descriptions of philosophies into tweet-sized summaries.)
This description is a bit out of date because it omits a third strand of insight that I’m in the process of incorporating: the psychology and philosophy of INSPIRATION articulated by researcher Todd Thrash in works such as “The creation and curation of all things worthy: Inspiration as vital force in persons and cultures.” I wrote an essay ( https://ironick.medium.com/inspirational-freedom-44010d654e6a ) about Thrash’s theory as it apples to Martin Hägglund’s excellent “This Life: Secular Faith and Spiritual Freedom” (which I see you’ve discussed as well):
“Re-reading [“This Life”] through the lens of Thrash’s theory of inspiration has illuminated why, though I found Hägglund’s arguments against any form of aspiration to eternal salvation *rationally* persuasive, it is unlikely to *inspire* the religious faithful to reject such an aspiration. What Thrash has revealed is that the only way to defeat an inspiration is with another inspiration. In this brief essay I wanted to highlight a couple of new insights regarding This Life, sparked by Thrash’s work.”
Looking forward to continuing the conversation!
Nick, I’m doubtful that “There is a grave danger in all ideals” is true. It really depends on the content of the ideal. The grave danger, it seems to me, is in bad ideals. (Expressive individualism may be such a bad ideal, but I’ll address that in a separate comment.)
In the practice of Buddhism, for example, it’s often emphasized that it is important to have a good teacher/mentor, and that is emphasized because, in part, a good teacher/mentor can help us understand the content of Buddhist ideals correctly (i.e. understand what exactly makes them good or skillful ideals) and apply them appropriately in a given context, taking into consideration the complexity of problems and multiplicity of values involved.
You expressed interest in pragmatism. Good ideals are very pragmatic, as Nicholas Rescher often emphasized, e.g., in his book Ethical Idealism (University of California Press, 1987) & his chapter “The Pragmatism of Ideals” in Pragmatism: The Restoration of Its Scientific Roots (Transaction Publishers, 2012).
I’ve read Brook Ziporyn, and while I have great respect for his linguistic skill (he could run circles around me in that respect), I find his work generally (and this is true of E&O) to be too abstract and insufficiently pragmatic. You were summarizing his exposition of Tiantai well enough when you said that “the dark side, the bodhisattva complex” is inevitable, but I don’t think it’s true—at least, not for everyone. In practice, I think that dark side is often most likely to be a result of not having had good enough mentoring/educating/parenting.
Thanks for your reply, Nathan. What you say makes a lot of sense. Your perspective may be more a more fruitful upaya than mine for you and for many others. But for me, and I hope many others, my perspective may be more of a fruitful upaya than yours.
I AM interested in pragmatism. I’m particularly interested in the neopragmatism of Richard Rorty, who said something that I didn’t hear anyone enthusiastically endorse until I came across Ziporyn and Tiantai: “What was glimpsed at the end of the eighteenth century was that anything could be made to look good or bad, important or unimportant, useful or useless, by being redescribed.”
So when you say that the grave danger is bad ideals, the pragmatist in me wants to reply, “But any ideal can be redescribed to seem bad.” The same goes for your comment about the dark side being the result of a lack of good mentoring: any mentoring can be made to appear good or bad. In fact, even grave danger can be redescribed to appear to be utmost safety.
Ziporyn would use the word “recontextualize” over “redescribe”, but the sentiment is the same. For me, that’s what the SKILL in “skillful means” (upaya) as all about: redescribing things to look good or bad in order to help enlighten someone. That’s why I find Ziporyn to be every bit as pragmatic as Rorty.
There are different types of pragmatism, and various ways to classify the types. A very simple classification, one among various classifications that Rescher has used, is a soft pragmatism of the left (e.g. Rorty) versus a hard pragmatism of the right (e.g. Peirce). The former is more relativistic, the latter more universalistic. (This is not to be conflated with the commonly used political spectrum.) Everything you’ve said puts you in the pragmatism of the left, whereas I’m much more a pragmatist of the right. You’re association of Ziporyn with Rorty makes sense, but that also perfectly explains my objection to Ziporyn as too relativistic. I don’t believe anything you said in your penultimate paragraph!
Correction: “Your association of Ziporyn with Rorty…”
Nathan, Thanks for your fruitful reply. Yes, there are different kinds of pragmatism. Each variation may be a more fruitful upaya for different audiences. Such diverse (re)descriptions of Pragmatism are just another example of the power of redescription / recontextualization.
Your response was fruitful for me because it prompted me to play around with ChatGPT regarding the similarities and differences between Rorty’s and Peirce’s Pragmatism. Given my belief in the power of redescription / recontextualization, I was sure I could blur the supposed boundary between Peirce and Rorty. My wedge was Peirce’s late writings regarding “uberous musement”. I’ve long felt that this was deeply resonant with Rorty’s ironism. So I used this connection to engage in a discussion with ChatGPT: https://chatgpt.com/share/68921845-4ea4-8006-9c3c-30a144d1c3dd .
The end result is this delightful (to me) dialog between Peirce and Rorty, where they come to agree that with a little enlightening redescription, they are both gesturing towards the same insights(!): https://www.awesomescreenshot.com/image/55814856?key=adeae0e7469869fcba3a58d97f4b57e3
It may be helpful to describe the pragmatism of the right, so I will quote from the entry on Nicholas Rescher written by Michele Marsonet in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (and here I would interpret “social-linguistic” very broadly, as equivalent to “semiotic” very broadly conceived, as in biosemiotics):
What I find to be sorely lacking in Ziporyn’s works that I’ve read (including E&O but not his most recent book on mystical atheism, which I quickly stopped reading after being exasperated by the same limitations familiar from his previous works, though perhaps I should go back and finish the book someday) is any serious discussion of points (a) and (f) above. That’s what I had in mind when I initially called Ziporyn’s work “too abstract and insufficiently pragmatic”, although now I see that I need to qualify “pragmatic”.
I think Rorty would enthusiastically endorse the quoted description of “objective pragmatism” (though he might not love the label).
Perhaps the differences among pragmatists shouldn’t be overemphasized; notably, all pragmatism is post-Darwinian and therefore starts from (a). Whereas Ziporyn’s works that I’ve read give no indication that evolutionary science exists. To be clear, I like and have learned a lot from Ziporyn’s way of describing certain thought experiments, but once we leave the sphere of pure contemplation and verbal play for the realm of “the sphere of rational deliberations implementing actions”, we can’t spend our time endlessly recontextualizing everything but face objective constraints that have a large role in determining what is a good or bad ideal.
I agree with both your insights: pragmatism is deeply shaped by Darwinism (see “The Metaphysical Club”) and Ziporyn’s writings are almost completely devoid of any mention of it.
Nonetheless, I’m quite sure that Ziporyn embraces Darwin’s core insight of blind variation with selective retention. Here’s a brief discussion from his book ‘Evil and/or/as The Good’:
“Such a stance also presupposes a fixed definition of good and evil; if one side of the personality extirpates the other, what happens if the environment changes and the formerly bad part is precisely what is needed? It seems more plausible that all parts of the personality have occasions within which they are harmful. and some within which they are helpful, however these may be defined. Moreover, the rapid changes in the living environment of the human animal in recent times, in line with the presently prevailing evolutionary picture of man as an organism called on to adapt to his environment, make this practice of throwing out part of our personality, assuming hubristically that we know now what will be good for all times to come, is not only naive but, it could be argued, actually dangerous.” p.371
(I love the suggestion that moral perfectionism, if embraced species-wide, could turn out to be an evolutionary dead end!)
One of the things I hope to do in the philosophy of Fruitionism I’m developing is to highlight the Darwinian roots and implications in both NeoPragmatism and NeoTiantai.
Interesting, thanks. I haven’t read that book you quoted. That argument by Ziporyn is similar to what some philosophers discuss under the name of moral ecology and moral niche construction. It’s also very similar to Gerald Gaus’s argument for moral diversity in, e.g., his article “The complexity of a diverse moral order”, Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, 16(SI), 2018, 645–680: “This essay explicates and defends what I call the New Diversity Theory, which analyzes moral diversity not as moral reasoning gone awry, or even as a feature of free societies to be managed, but as a fundamental moral phenomenon. Under New Diversity Theory, moral diversity is not simply a challenge to reasonably stable moral order, but a critical resource for free societies to discover better ways of living.”
Not coincidentally, I cited one of Gaus’s previous books in another comment on this post. It’s not coincidental because individualism rather straightforwardly leads to arguments for moral diversity. But both Gaus and the moral ecologists (and even Ziporyn in that quote, defying my portrayal of him as relativistic) avoid relativism by referring to an objective source of value.
Amod, this post reminded me of C. B. Macpherson’s distinction between possessive individualism and developmental individualism. Perhaps all that is needed to purify your ideal of its dark side is one more word (and a concomitant emphasis on what that word entails for the ideal): developmental expressive individualism.
Interesting you mention MacPherson: I’d started reading The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism recently but hadn’t finished it. I didn’t know about his concept of developmental individualism: is that in the same book?
As I recall, I was introduced to the term in Maciej Kassner’s chapter “John Dewey and Friedrich von Hayek on individualism and freedom” in: Hickman, L. A. (ed.), The Continuing Relevance of John Dewey (pp. 273–294), Rodopi, 2011.
Kassner cited Macpherson’s article “Pluralism, individualism, and participation”, Economic and Industrial Democracy, 1(1), 1980, 21–30, reprinted in The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice and Other Essays (Oxford UP, 1987), 92–101.
You go into more detail here about the psychological aspects of self-development, which is entirely appropriate and necessary; Macpherson’s article focuses on political theory. But I think it’s clear in Macpherson’s article that developmental individualism includes those psychological aspects, even though he doesn’t discuss them.
Influenced by Macpherson, Gerald Gaus covered much of the same intellectual history in the chapter on developmentalism in The Modern Liberal Theory of Man (Croom Helm & St. Martin’s Press, 1983).
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