Tags
conventional/ultimate, existentialism, expressive individualism, George Grant, Madhyamaka, Nishitani Keiji, Śāntideva
If we take a modern Buddhist approach where the ultimate reality is emptiness, what then does that look like in practice? Especially as we think about the key question:how can you be yourself if there is no self?
In thinking through my Buddhism, I had once turned to a reductionist “Sellarsian solution” because it allows in some sense for selves as conventional (rather than ultimate) truth. I’ve now moved instead to a Buddhist view that is based on emptiness rather than reductionism – and, crucially, the emptiness view allows selves in that conventional sense too. For that reason, I think an emptiness-based approach may still be able to leave room for an expressive individualism, where we seek to be ourselves more fully.
The key is that the empty ultimate is in some respects normatively inert: it’s beyond good and bad, because at some level it’s beyond anything at all, purely ineffable. That ultimate normative inertness is important because it allows room for our preexisting reasons for action. If good and bad were themselves something ultimate, then their ultimacy would dictate what our values should be (as it does for the Abrahamic monotheisms, which are often foes of expressive individualism).
But if good and bad are at the conventional level, then we have more room to think of them in terms of our existing considered ends, not only the removal of suffering. They can include our second-order ends, maybe even self-expression. The key is that that conventional normativity needs to be informed by the ultimate emptiness of both self and world. If it is not informed by that emptiness, then it is trapped in an illusion that leads to further suffering – like the illusion that what’s going to save us is a move to a post-capitalist utopia.
Let me spell out that last point a bit more. In all Buddhist traditions, the positing of ultimate truth matters greatly: ultimate truth informs the conventional, we see the conventional differently when we understand ultimate truth. In this case, we see that the universe itself is ultimately empty, void: made almost entirely of empty space, yes, but more fundamentally, empty of purpose, of ultimate teleology. Sentient beings and their products, I would argue, do have purposes – but emerging from their own consciousness and values. Not from the universe.
The core of the emptiness idea in Madhyamaka Buddhist thought is dependent origination, pratītya samutpāda: all things are empty in that they originate dependently on other things, and whatever is subject to origination is subject to cessation. Nothing is permanent: we individuals, the universe, and any future utopia must all come to an end, and we must understand our individual and collective lives in the light of that impermanence. That impermanence in turn lends our life on this planet a certain kind of unreality, a dreamlike quality: one that diminishes our attachment to this impermanent life when we take it seriously. Again in Śāntideva’s words: “When all things are empty in this way, what can be received, what taken away? Who can be honoured or humiliated by whom?”
Because human life will ultimately end, we need to move from the perspective of history to something more like what George Grant would call the perspective of eternity – even if, contra Grant, it turns out that the perspective of eternity is a non-perspective. Such a view ends up in some respects existentialist as well as Buddhist – in a way quite close, I think, to the existentialist Buddhism expressed by Nishitani Keiji in his brilliant Religion and Nothingness. Emptiness or zero-ness, on this view, looks a lot like the universe’s ultimate nihility.
The ultimate death, individual and collective, sets the horizon for everything, including science itself. Science only makes sense when done by a subject, someone to interpret it. And someday there will be no more subjects. On some level that future subjectless world, like the past subjectless world, is rocks floating in space – but on another level it is pure empty void with no rocks or anything else, because there will be no one to perceive it. We need to live our lives in a way that accounts for that ultimate emptiness – but that doesn’t mean we can’t express ourselves.
(Cross-posted on the Indian Philosophy Blog. Since the IPB started I’ve generally attached these notifications to the bottom of each cross-post, but that adds additional effort to the already significant weekly effort it takes to put up my posts on both blogs plus the Substack, so I’m going to stop doing it after today.)
Nathan said:
The blog of Seth Segall, who often comments here, is named “The Existential Buddhist”, but probably not for exactly the same reasons that Amod is sketching an existentialist Buddhism here. One aspect of their projects that I guess many of us share is the search for a coherent modern Buddhism or Buddhist modernism: making the truth in the Buddhist traditions cohere with our other modern knowledge.
Amod mentioned Keiji Nishitani, a philosopher of the Kyoto School, in this post and in previous posts. In a comment on the previous post I mentioned Eshin Nishimura, another Kyoto School scholar, and in a 2021 comment I mentioned how Masao Abe, another scholar associated with the Kyoto School, created a succinct diagram that showed the difference between the concepts of “emptiness” and “God” in relation to “good” and “evil”, illustrating why (in Abe’s words) “in Buddhism ultimate reality is not God as the supreme good, but Emptiness, which is neither good nor evil”. In the post above, this is what Amod called the “normative inertness” of the ultimate. As I noted before, Abe’s diagram can be viewed at https://archive.org/details/ourreligions00shar/page/119/mode/1up
The Kyoto School already did the work of articulating a coherent modern Buddhism, so it can be inspiring to read those scholars and encounter how much they had already accomplished. When I talked about Zen in my comments on the previous post, I was above all thinking of post–Kyoto School Zen that had already metabolized modern philosophy. I guess that most lay Zen practitioners haven’t read Kyoto School scholars, but Kyoto School scholarship has affected Zen practice through priest training perhaps similarly to how modern theology has affected the practice of the liberal Abrahamic traditions.
Above, Amod said: “In all Buddhist traditions, the positing of ultimate truth matters greatly: ultimate truth informs the conventional, we see the conventional differently when we understand ultimate truth.” I think this pretty good, but I would say instead: “when we try to understand ultimate reality”, or simply (eliminating the terms conventional and ultimate): “we see differently when we try to understand reality better.”
That last version, “when we try to understand reality better”, reminds me of a quotation that I found, from Roy Wood Sellars, about Eddington’s two tables that were mentioned in Amod’s previous post. Roy apparently was less enamored of Eddington’s two tables than was his son Wilfrid Sellars. Sixteen years before his son lectured on “Philosophy and the scientific image of man”, Roy wrote, in “Is naturalism enough?”, The Journal of Philosophy, 41(20), September 1944, p. 536:
We could also say, following Roy Wood Sellars: there are not two truths, conventional and ultimate. Those are useful fictions. We just come to know more about reality through skillful inquiry. This formulation saves us from the delusion of thinking that we have finally figured out the ultimate truth once and for all; past revolutions in knowledge, individual and collective, give me good reason to doubt that anyone’s understanding of reality is the ultimate truth.
Amod Lele said:
Yeah, Abe’s diagram is a good illustration of the idea I was putting forward in the 2021 post you commented on: the true ultimate is beyond normative distinctions. I love Nishida’s formulation that “God as the true absolute must be Satan too.”
In the Madhyamaka thinkers I know best, especially Śāntideva, ultimate truth is not speakable, and beyond distinctions – which is to say that in some sense it is neither ultimate nor truth (nor conventional nor falsehood). Whatever we say about it is an approximation. But speaking about it is a way to help us understand all the other, conventional, things that we can and do speak about.
Seth Zuiho Segall said:
Laozi also comments on the nonnormativity of the absolute in the Daodejing when he notes “天地不仁”—”Heaven and earth are not humane(rén)”
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Paul D. Van Pelt said:
Seems to me Sellars and son were tracking something here. However, I do not believe it was, or is, ultimate truth, whatever that may mean. Emptiness, or if you rather, nothingness, is only *a truth*, in itself—were there no sentient life, or any life, to know a difference. Neither emptiness or, ‘nothingness’ rely on the awareness of sentient beings. Nothing else matters. The Seven Valleys of the Baha’i faith are instructive, only until the Valley of Absolute Nothingness. At that point, the implication is observers are quite dead. Nothingness, emptiness, void—none of these terms hold meaning for anyone, save, perhaps deceased people. Anything else is belief, doctrine and/or dogma
Should I learn something different, before dying, I’ll let you know—if I can.
Amod Lele said:
At some level emptiness is indeed belief or dogma – the dṛṣṭi that Nāgārjuna advises us to avoid – but the key to the idea is that so is everything else, including that the cat is on the mat or the grass is green.