Tags
atheism, Martin Luther King Jr., natural environment, New Testament, Richard Swinburne, Simone Weil, theodicy
There will, eventually, be an end to the human race. We don’t think enough about the significance of this fact.
I am not even talking about avoidable apocalypses, as real as the threat of those is. I am assuming for the sake of argument that we will manage to avoid being stupid enough to kill ourselves off in the next few centuries, through global nuclear war or climate change or AI robots or nanotechnology or a newly emerging plague. Many if not all of those are real threats and we should do whatever we can to prevent them from destroying us. But for my purposes here I’m assuming we’re smart enough to fend them off. The point is that humanity will end even so. It may take a very, very long time. But it will happen.
Even with all our technological ability to adapt, we are still dependent on a relatively fragile biosphere. A comet or nearby supernova could cause kill us off in a mass extinction event of the sort that got the dinosaurs. Even if we survive that, eventually the sun’s radiation will increase enough for plant life, and therefore all the species that depend on plants directly or indirectly, to go extinct. Beyond that, the oceans will evaporate and the climate will get as hot as Venus’s, no longer suitable for human life.
That’s millions or even a billion years in the future. By that point we may well have developed interstellar travel and the ability to colonize other planets. But then there will be events changing the very fabric of the universe – most likely the heat death of the universe, where the universe’s expansion continue to bring its temperatures toward absolute zero. Theories about these sorts of events are still relatively speculative – there are other ultimate fates speculated on for the universe, a “Big Rip” or “Big Crunch” – but we have no reason to believe that the current state of the physical universe is forever, and our existence depends on that current state. Our entire species is mere biology in a world of physics; at some point, inevitably, that species will cease to be biology and return to physics, and then our human existence will be no more. “Dust In The Wind” didn’t go far enough: at some point even the earth and sky, as we know them, will cease to be.
Now for immediate practical purposes, the sort of things we can plan for, none of this really matters a whole lot. We need to prevent the preventable apocalypses and maybe start thinking about eventual interstellar travel; in terms of what we can do, that’s good enough. But there is also a realm in which the inevitability of human extinction matters a great deal, and that is in our thinking about the meaning and purpose of human life. Because far too often, we think about that meaning and purpose in ways that effectively assume humanity will go on forever. And that is a deeply misguided approach.
Especially, human extinction strikes at the heart of any prophetic view of humanity’s ultimate purpose – whether theistic or secularized. It strikes deeply at Simone Weil’s claim that “Atheist materialism is necessarily revolutionary, because to orient oneself toward an absolute good down here, one must place it in the future.” When we recognize human extinction, we see that there will be no absolute good in the future, and cannot be. There will be relative goods: we can make our species’s future much better for millions of years, and it’s well worth trying. But that better future society cannot be the absolute good, the ultimate purpose of human life – not when it too will end. Just as we must develop our individual ethics with the recognition that individually we will each one day die, so too we must develop our politics and theory of history with the recognition that collectively, too, we as a species will die out. The fate of our species – and of every other species that depends on its fragile biology – is the fate of the individual writ large.
Thus it is folly to accept the revolutionary conception of the absolute good that, Weil claims, follows from atheist materialism. If Weil is right, atheist materialism is wrong. It’s quite reasonable to say that she isn’t right – that one can have an atheist materialism that doesn’t require an “absolute good down here”, or even that there is some absolute good down here that is not in the revolutionary future. But any reasonable cosmological understanding must tell us that the revolutionary future is not absolute. Even if we ever did produce a true utopia – which, given everything we know about how humans act in the world, seems extremely unlikely – it too will ultimately cease to be. That is the Lovecraftian reality underneath the universe, the actual lurking horror about which Kepler was right to panic, even if it’s able to continue to lurk for millions of years.
But is not just revolutionary atheist materialism for which humanity’s end poses a difficulty. Martin Luther King’s faith famously led him to proclaim that “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” But in its longer arc, the universe is amoral: once upon a time there were no moral beings, and someday, whatever justice has been achieved for the beings who remain, they too will be wiped away.
Luke 1 says of Jesus, “the Lord God shall give unto him the throne of his father David: And he shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever; and of his kingdom there shall be no end.” We know now that this cannot be true, if any such kingdom were supposed to exist in the physical or material world. “His kingdom shall have no end” can only be true if it also had no beginning – if the kingdom is outside of time, outside nature itself. What it cannot correctly imply is a prophecy that there will be an endless godly kingdom here on earth. Such a view is implied in Richard Swinburne’s deeply problematic response to the problem of suffering: that the universe is “half-finished”, “such that it requires long generations of cooperative effort between creatures to make perfect.” Even if we thought that the great present suffering around us could be theologically justified by the need for our work in “making it perfect”, it turns out we can’t do that. We can’t make our utopia last – and if it doesn’t last, it’s not perfect. It’s certainly not going to justify all the children who had to die in fires and plagues along the way to get us there.
So too, if we seek to enrich humanity with our creations – artistic or scientific or philosophical or whatever – we must remember that while these can outlast us individually, they won’t outlast the species. With human extinction, there will be no one left to appreciate Shakespeare or Aśvaghoṣa, let alone the lesser works produced by the rest of us. The glory of Valmiki or Plato has lasted thousands of years longer than their own tiny lifespans did, but that glory itself is not immortal.
All of this probably sounds depressing, and it is depressing to anyone who has imagined their own purpose in life as building a permanent future utopia or writing immortal works. (I have not been immune to that way of thinking.) But the thought of one’s own individual death can be depressing in a similar way, and most of philosophy begins with a recognition of that constraint: we can and should live good lives that recognize we must eventually die. So what can we do to live good lives while recognizing that the world must eventually die? More on that question next time.
Nathan said:
This is an important topic, but I will offer my usual complaint against describing reality as “Lovecraftian”, as in “the Lovecraftian reality underneath the universe”. There is a way of thinking and feeling about reality that is Lovecraftian, but I think it’s a mistake to confuse that way of thinking and feeling with reality itself.
I’ve commented before that I separate my science-based models of the universe from my moods and emotions about how some part of the universe appears to me. The models depict a universe of evolving dynamical structures, very different from the way some part of the universe appears in ordinary human experiencing as solid permanent objects. (This difference is analogous to the difference between Wilfrid Sellars’s scientific image and manifest image.) I want to be able to explain subjective experiencing (and other processes) by means of such models, but the models themselves do not contain any subjective experiencing such as pain or pleasure or hope or fear. Any such emotions that arise when contemplating the models can be recognized as emotions and managed; they are not intrinsic to the models. When I start with better models of reality (versus the emotional mythmaking of theodicy and Lovecraftian fiction) and differentiate those models from my emotional responses to them while managing my emotions, I can expect to make better decisions.
The last two paragraphs of the post above refer to great works (implied by “lesser works”), “glory”, and “immortal works”, suggesting that vainglory about one’s achievements is delusional. I don’t disagree, but if we leave aside the vainglorious aspect and consider human achievement more selflessly, from an evolutionary perspective, achievements that advance the growth of knowledge are valuable insofar as they provide a foundation for future generations to solve new problems or find better solutions to old problems. Credit for achievements can be seen as just a way to motivate people to contribute to such a process even if they don’t understand the more selfless perspective.
The development of organized complexity can also be conceived as intrinsically valuable, even if it will be destroyed by events outside of our control (e.g., Clément Vidal & Jean-Paul Delahaye, “Universal ethics: organized complexity as an intrinsic value”, in: Georgiev, G. Y., Smart, J. M., Flores Martinez, C. L., & Price, M. E., eds., Evolution, Development and Complexity: Multiscale Evolutionary Models of Complex Adaptive Systems (pp. 135–154), Cham: Springer, 2019).
Seth Zuihō Segall said:
Amod,
I think here of the Japanese sentiment of “Mono no Aware”—the poignant beauty of ephemeral things—like plum blossoms that fall. Shunryu Suzuki Roshi said something like “life is setting out on the ocean on a small boat and knowing that in the end it will sink.” Each moment has its own beauty and meaning, and the fact that everything may end is the background against which this meaning and beauty appear. Will the universe really end in heat death? Will humans find other planets to live on before the earth is engulfed by the sun? Who knows? We just take care of the little piece of the story that we occupy, hopefully make things better for the generation that follows, and if we are the Iroquois, we think seven generations ahead. If it all will end one day, let’s be glorious right now.
Nathan said:
That Shunryu Suzuki quote came to mind for me too. But there’s also this story, from Zen Is Right Here: I asked Suzuki Roshi about life and death. The answer he gave made my fear of death, for that moment, pop like a bubble. He looked at me and said, “You will always exist in the universe in some form.”
In Zen (as I understand it) impermanence is paired with nonseparation from the whole universe. Identifying only with the human species, or with one organism, would be a mistake—a very common mistake!
Paul D. Van Pelt said:
I suggest you research Graham Martin and his early book, Does Anything Matter? In the Big Picture, I suggest nothing does. Infinity is irreplaceable. But , it is neither objective nor destination. You can’t get there from here. There is no *there*, there.
Nathan said:
Paul, I googled the book you recommended, which appears to be Graham Dunstan Martin’s Does It Matter?: The Unsustainable World of the Materialists (Edinburgh: Floris Books, 2005). Given your stated position that nothing matters in the big picture, Martin’s book seems like an odd one to recommend, because Martin argues for an apparently opposing position: an idealist metaphysics in which meaning and purpose are grounded in the spiritual nature of reality that “possesses power, bliss, wisdom, benevolence, and timelessness” (p. 244). As Martin concludes on page 250:
I leafed through the Internet Archive copy of Martin’s book, and it looks like an interesting book with a good bibliography for its time, though I noticed a number of arguments that I found unconvincing. On page 238, for example, he gives an argument for “the superior reality of mystical experience over the hypotheses of science” that relies on an untenable dualism between experiencing and hypothesizing, when experiencing is better conceived as involving hypothesizing, a conception well summarized, for example, in the title of Finn Tschudi’s chapter “Constructs are hypotheses”, in: Adams-Webber, J. R. & Mancuso, J. C. (eds.), Applications of Personal Construct Theory (pp. 115–125), Toronto; New York: Academic Press, 1983. As Tschudi put it (p. 120):
This issue (of whether or how much mystical experiencing is construct/hypothesis-laden) has been discussed in conversations about mystical experience on this blog (though without reference to Tschudi—that reference just came to mind for me now because of how Martin framed the issue).
If you wish, you could say more about how you think the book is relevant in the present context, beyond being an idealistic counterpoint to the rather materialistic premises of the post above.
Paul D. Van Pelt said:
Nathan:
I read Martin’s book many years ago when I knew nothing at all about philosophy. To be honest with you and anyone else, I know little more now, buy am learning, a little at a time. Thanks for the suggestions and pointers. Will consider all.
skaladom said:
Hi Amod, thanks for bringing up this weighty topic. I completely agree on this one, many philosophies, secular or otherwise, feel the need to project a sense of ultimate goodness into the indefinite future. So I think it’s fair to say that they are defeated by the simple recognition of the scientific fact that humanity, in any sense we may want to define it, will end. There’s not only the universe’s heat death, which sci-fi authors have speculated on at length, and at least we would see it coming gradually – read up on vaccum decay for a truly spectacular one. If those theories are right, the very fabric of space-time could just spontaneously morph into something else, at any random time!
I think it’s worth giving credit to the Buddhists here, it’s the one religion/philosophy that has truly integrated the lesson of impermanence from the very beginning. Instead of making prophecies about some ultimate future good, they made them about roughly how long the Buddhist creed would last. And there’s even a deeper understanding there, because Buddhist philosophy points out that identity itself is only ever a relative phenomenon; I’m obviously “me” today and tomorrow, and we as a humanity are obviously still “we” some decades earlier or later, but what if we give it a few million years? If our current lives would be rather unreadable to our own ancestors of a million years ago, what hope can we have to be able to envision what our successor’s experiences and values might be a million years from now, even assuming that a line of succession manages to last so far? People say that the past is a foreign country, but it’s really a question of scale – zoom in or out far enough, and the foreign country turns into a truly alien world.
That said, I always like to push back when people say that our eventual disappearance makes life bleak or poses a problem for the question of meaning and value. Meaning and value are experienced in the present, and when they manifest, they are undeniable, right there and then. Projections of value into the future are, to my mind, only a secondary phenomenon, a combination of the undeniable present experiences we all know, with our mind’s ability to project, imagine and idealize.
So if all sorts of prophetic ideas that would put the ultimate source of value in the indefinite future are felled by your argument, my reply is that maybe there were not that great to begin with.
Amod Lele said:
Thank you. I think one of the things that causes difficulties is that we are a planning species – we look to the future and not just to immediate satisfaction – and we think of our lives in terms of narrative. Both of these are good things all told, but they make it very easy and natural for us to keep planning for the future even when there isn’t one. At an individual level this comes out to accumulating more things when “you can’t take it with you”; socially, we imagine progress toward a permanent good state that can’t happen. Or, in a non-prophetic context, we imagine ourselves as continuers and transmitters of a lineage from “time immemorial” that we will sustain into the future – not recognizing that someday that too shall pass.